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While symbolic and statistical approaches to natural language process-
ing have become undeniably impressive in recent years, such systems still
display a tendency to make errors that are inscrutable to human onlookers.
This disconnect with human processing may stem from the vast differences in
the substrates that underly natural language processing in artificial systems
versus biological systems.
To create a more relatable system, this dissertation turns to the more
biologically inspired substrate of neural networks, describing the design and
implementation of a model that learns to comprehend and produce language
at the sentence level. The model’s task is to ground simulated speech streams,
representing a simple subset of English, in terms of a virtual environment.
The model learns to understand and answer full-sentence questions about
the environment by mimicking the speech stream of another speaker, much
as a human language learner would. It is the only known neural model
to date that can learn to map natural language questions to full-sentence
natural language answers, where both question and answer are represented
sublexically as phoneme sequences.
The model addresses important points for which most other models,
neural and otherwise, fail to account. First, the model learns to ground its
linguistic knowledge using human-like sensory representations, gaining lan-
guage understanding at a deeper level than that of syntactic structure. Sec-
ond, analysis provides evidence that the model learns combinatorial internal
representations, thus gaining the compositionality of symbolic approaches to
cognition, which is vital for computationally efficient encoding and decod-
ing of meaning. The model does this while retaining the fully distributed
representations characteristic of neural networks, providing the resistance to
damage and graceful degradation that are generally lacking in symbolic and
statistical approaches. Finally, the model learns via direct imitation of an-
other speaker, allowing it to emulate human processing with greater fidelity,
thus increasing the relatability of its behavior.
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Symbolic and statistical approaches currently dominate the field of nat-
ural language processing. Systems based on these approaches have made
exciting progress recently, utilizing ever-larger corpora and ever-more com-
putational resources to attempt to automatically make sense of the wealth
of speech and text data that exists in the world, digitally and otherwise.
One recent and well-known example is Watson, IBM’s question-answering
system designed to play the popular quiz show Jeopardy! (Ferrucci et al.,
2010). Watson famously bested some of the most skilled human competitors
in a series of televised games in February 2011. While question-answering
systems like Watson are undoubtedly impressive, they still frequently make
mistakes, and these errors are often baffling and inscrutable to onlookers.
For example, during one of Watson’s television appearances, the contestants
received the following clue: “The New Yorker ’s 1959 review of this said in
its brevity and clarity, it is ‘unlike most such manuals, a book as well as
a tool.’” Whereas a correct answer might have been “What is Elements of
Style?” Watson buzzed in first, responding “Who is Dorothy Parker?” A
human competitor would never give an answer like this, and indeed, the looks
of bewilderment on the faces of the competitors and the host were proof that
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they could not follow whatever chain of logic had led Watson to generate its
reply. This anecdote, taken together with many other instances of incompre-
hensible answers, suggests that the strategies that systems like Watson use
are far different from those that humans employ.
Watson and its brethren generally base their skills on expansive cor-
pora that are preprocessed and compressed into an easily searchable knowl-
edge base. Human memory seems, on the surface, to be built on a sim-
ilar idea, with learners building their own content-addressable knowledge
bases populated by their life experiences. So why, then, do artificial sys-
tems make mistakes no human ever would—ones that humans cannot even
fathom? This dissociation may stem from the fact that artificial and natural
systems are built upon vastly different substrates. Most symbolic and statis-
tical approaches to language processing build upon the conceptual substrate
of modern computing machinery, in which the elementary operations include
storing information and retrieving perfect copies of said information. The
human mind, on the other hand, is built on the brain, which admits much
fuzzier conceptions of storage and retrieval. The brain’s stored memories
are routinely split, merged, altered, lost altogether, or even spuriously cre-
ated. While these may seem to be dire weaknesses of the brain’s approach to
memory, the inherently distributed, associative nature of this substrate may
confer benefits that cannot be achieved through other means. If the goal of
natural language processing is to create systems that function like humans,
and to which humans can readily relate, this warrants the investigation of
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systems that more closely identify with what is known about the human
mind and brain.
The scientific community studies the human brain and mind at many
different levels of abstraction—from individual ion channels of neurons to
high-level cognitive processes, to the actions we take in the world. All of
these types of studies have their place, and cognitive scientists must strive
to eventually unite them vertically, with the lower-level explanations giving
rise to the next higher level, from voltage gradients and chemical messengers
all the way up to consciousness, intelligence, and behavior. This dissertation
focuses mainly on intermediate to high levels within this hierarchy. Specifi-
cally, the research presented here is concerned with the dynamics necessary
to turn a large collection of autonomous processors—neurons—into a cogni-
tive machine, capable of understanding and acting in the wider world. That
is the overarching theme, at least. At a more practical level, this dissertation
develops a model, based on a brain-like substrate, that attempts to imple-
ment those parts of a mind that learn to understand language, relate it to
the world, and produce it. The hypothesis is that this level of fidelity to
the human substrate of language processing will enable more relatable and
human-like models of language processing.
Understanding language, and how humans come to acquire and use it,
has been a unifying theme in the cognitive sciences, and is actively studied
at many levels in many different disciplines. Turing (1950) chose language
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as the basis for his famous test for recognizing an artificial intelligence, due
in part to the fact that we humans use the same conversational criteria as a
part of our everyday judgments about the natural intelligence of our peers.
Though not everyone agrees that language ability is either a necessary or
sufficient condition for intelligence (e.g., Searle, 1980), language is widely
viewed as one of the faculties that sets human intelligence beyond others we
have so far encountered.
Theories of human language processing have been the subject of con-
siderable scientific work, as has the task of engineering an artificial system
capable of such processing. Though such work spans the scale of possible
abstraction levels, a great deal of it occurs as high-level psycholinguistic
theories describing how a cognitive-level language system could cause ob-
served behavioral phenomena. This research is often supplemented by work
that begins at the lower neural level and focuses on directly implementing
a specific cognitive-level theory. Much less work spans the two levels, map-
ping the neural level directly to behavior. This dissertation focuses on this
last category to discover what kinds of cognitive-level systems emerge when
a dynamical neural system learns to perform language tasks. Reasons for
studying language learning, and cognition in general, in this level-spanning
way include:
1. Observability of the building blocks. Neurons and neural networks
in human brains are becoming ever more observable as the pace of
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innovation in neuroimaging accelerates and its spatial and temporal
resolutions increase. The goal is to understand how interconnected
networks of simple processing elements can create and maintain the
rich cognitive world that humans possess in a way that will, in the near
future, be directly verifiable.
2. Learnability of cognitive systems. Humans are not born with a fully
developed cognitive system, yet cognitive theories tend to focus on the
function of normal, or occasionally, impaired adult minds. Much psy-
chological and psycholinguistic research is concerned with how children
develop, but the explanations these studies provide are usually couched
in cognitive terms as well. While these are useful ways to approach the
problem, they do not often address the question of what these cogni-
tive systems are made of and how they come into being. Studying the
level below cognition provides the opportunity to observe how cogni-
tive systems emerge from learning, what forms they take under varying
conditions, and what constraints the neural substrate places upon their
formation.
3. Functionality and robustness to damage. Neural network modeling
provides a natural way to implement a theoretical system and compare
its functionality to that of a human. Though many theoretical systems
can be simulated directly at the cognitive level, such systems are often
brittle in ways that humans are not. Put another way, it is often
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difficult to determine how one could damage a cognitive-level system
to produce observed human deficits. In a neural system, on the other
hand, the question is reduced to where to place the lesion, after which
behavior can be directly observed and compared to empirical human
data.
4. Referentiality of cognitive states to the world. Neural systems can
readily receive input from the world in the same ways that humans
do: through a grid of retinal cell activities for vision, a distribution
of frequency-based cochlear cell activations for audition, and so on.
Such a system can also be designed to act on the world via motor
controls that are similar to a human’s, such as a simulated vocal tract
that can be manipulated to produce speech. The experiences of such a
system would parallel human experiences to a substantial degree. This
similarity has the potential to greatly aid human understanding of the
system’s cognitive functions.
A model that exemplifies the preceding four qualities was termed the
Wernicke-Lichtheim-Geschwind (WLG) model of word and picture learning
(Weems and Reggia, 2006), as its neural structure was inspired by the work
begun by these three scientists. The WLG model implemented a neural
network approximating the structure of the classical model of language’s
neurobiological basis, centered upon the eponymous brain regions studied by
Broca (1861) and Wernicke (1874) and including the parietal association ar-
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eas identified by Geschwind (1965). The model received auditory and visual
inputs similar to those of human sensation—in the form of auditory phonetic
features and grid-based black-and-white images—and produced verbal out-
put by generating a series of motor commands for a simulated vocal tract.
Weems and Reggia trained the network to repeat words—that is, produce a
sequence of motor actions corresponding to a heard sequence of sounds—and
to recognize and name pictures, which it successfully learned to do for ap-
proximately 50 word/picture pairs. Following training, Weems and Reggia
lesioned the model in various ways corresponding to the classic aphasia syn-
dromes (Lichtheim, 1885) and measured the model’s behavior on recognition,
repetition, and naming tasks. Remarkably, the lesioned models displayed the
same types of deficits as humans with similar lesions.
The WLG model satisfied all four of the preceding criteria: It was built
of neural-level building blocks in a configuration suggested by a long history of
aphasia literature; it learned to produce interesting behavior despite having
no such functionality built in; it responded to damage in ways similar to
humans; and it utilized human-like input and output representations. While
it is a convincing first step towards a functional model of the brain’s language
architecture, it needs to be improved and extended before it can be fully
assessed. The model’s foremost limitation is that it only deals with single
words and objects. Even as a model of aphasia, it is incomplete because its
inability to understand or produce sentence-level speech puts many relevant
diagnostic metrics, such as grammaticality and fluency, out of reach.
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The research described in this dissertation began as an attempt to build
an updated version of the WLG model that would possess sentence-level lan-
guage abilities. Such a model would have to address many issues that were
not present in the design of the first model. For example, a sentence-level
language ability requires a strong generalization capability, since language
users frequently encounter novel sentences, yet have little trouble interpret-
ing them. The word-level WLG model, on the other hand, had no need of
generalization, being content to memorize its input/output patterns. An-
other issue is more practical: Sentence-level language requires the ability to
retain long sequences of inputs and produce long sequences of outputs—a
task at which neural networks have not traditionally excelled. Thus, the first
challenge to meet in building such a model was to evaluate the capabilities of
various types of neural networks in the domain of processing and producing
temporal sequences.
Initial investigations involved self-organizing maps (SOMs; Kohonen,
1990), which are desirable due to their ability to organize incoming input
without supervision. Of particular interest were varieties of SOMs capa-
ble of sustaining multiple simultaneous local winners (Schulz and Reggia,
2004); these types of networks have been shown to readily produce units
with feature-detection properties mimicking those found in the visual system
(Schulz and Reggia, 2005; von der Malsburg, 1973). This type of SOM had
been used in the original WLG model to aggregate temporal sequences of
auditory and visual input.
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Application of multi-winner SOMs to temporal sequences of sentence-
level speech data showed the creation of phoneme- and word-detector units
as one might expect to find in the human auditory system (Monner and
Reggia, 2009). However, SOMs are designed to map their inputs to the most
similar group exemplar previously seen. This property is perfect for mapping
fuzzy speech input to phonemes and words, or for cleaning up a noisy visual
image of a known object. However, this tendency becomes counterproductive
as part of a system that needs to systematically generalize to combinatorial
input.
An initial investigation subjected SOM-based networks, in either single
or multi-layered configurations, to sentences drawn from a limited grammar,
presented temporally as sequences of phonemes. The SOM would learn to
produce a single spatial representation of a heard sentence, which was then
interpreted by a separate readout network—a simple feed-forward network
trained with back-propagation. The SOMs readily learned to recognize famil-
iar sentences but were utterly unable to generalize to new ones. In essence,
a trained SOM would incorrectly attempt to interpret a novel sentence as
a different but similar sentence with which it was already familiar. The
method of SOM training was directly responsible for this preference for the
familiar, as revealed by an experiment in which the readout network tried
to interpret sentences passed through an untrained SOM, only to find that
its ability to generalize to novel sentences had improved dramatically. This
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made it clear that the SOM approaches in question are not appropriate for
tasks that require extensive generalization to new inputs.
The search for a more useful set of neural network methods warranted
brief experiments with echo state networks (Jaeger, 2001, 2002; Prokhorov,
2005), which, with their untrained self-recurrent reservoirs of neurons and
simple readout networks, superficially resembled the untrained SOMs that
had recently yielded the best results to date. Unfortunately, the experiments
with echo state networks did not produce significantly better results. This
fact, combined with concerns about the biological feasibility of large collec-
tions of nonadaptive neurons, indicated that echo state networks were not
the method of choice for the task.
At this point, the search expanded to neural network methods that
have been traditionally classified as supervised learning, meaning that
the network relies on an external teacher to provide a gold-standard signal
that should be imitated. The most prevalent of these fall under the um-
brella of gradient descent methods, where the training procedure attempts
to minimize an error function—defined as the difference between the network
output and the teaching signal—using an inverse hill-climbing approach in-
volving the gradient, or derivative, of the error function.
Most critics of gradient descent methods begin from a cognitive plau-
sibility standpoint, citing the rarity or absence during human learning of a
teacher who can give reliable, direct feedback. Such critics insist on unsu-
pervised learning methods, of which the SOMs from earlier are an example,
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or reinforcement learning, where detailed error feedback is replaced with
a coarse-grained reward signal, leaving the learner with a difficult credit-
assignment problem. However, there are situations where gradient descent
training can make use of teaching signals that are inherent in the input, thus
getting around the lack of an explicit teacher. Elman (1993), for example,
used direct error feedback to train simple recurrent networks (SRNs) to pro-
cess an input sequence and, at each point, predict which input would come
next. Such an approach can hardly be called supervised in the traditional
sense, since the teaching signal can be internally generated from observable
input. One can think of this approach as self-supervised learning, and
the language learning problem is indeed one where self-supervised learning is
feasible. A learner need only observe the linguistic interactions of others and
attempt to emulate them to generate teaching signals for gradient descent
training. This idea is discussed in the context of the models in Chapters 3
and 5.
Supervised gradient descent methods are also often criticized in terms
of biological plausibility. In particular, the popular method of error back-
propagation (Rumelhart et al., 1986) was recognized by its own authors as
particularly implausible for biological neurons because no signal is known by
which neurons can transmit error information backward through the network.
However, a recent discovery by Xie and Seung (2003) demonstrates the near
equivalence of weight changes due to back-propagation and those produced by
contrastive Hebbian learning (CHL; Movellan, 1990). By this logic, back-
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propagation can be seen as a computationally expedient form of Hebbian
learning, which is widely believed to occur in biological neurons and is used in
such biologically motivated systems as Leabra (O’Reilly, 2001; O’Reilly and
Frank, 2006). So while the precise method of weight-change calculation may
have no known biological basis, gradient descent training methods powered
by back-propagating error retain their biological plausibility, at least in terms
of the results they generate.
With gradient descent methods on the table, the investigation shifted
course to include training an SRN-based model on the language tasks. The
results, however, were largely disappointing. The network required multiple
hidden layers to efficiently encode multiple levels of linguistic representa-
tion, from phonemes and morphemes up to words, phrases, and finally entire
sentences. Since the error signal in traditional back-propagation training
degrades as it passes backward through the network, training these deep
networks proved to be difficult. Additionally, with input sequences routinely
reaching lengths of 40 or more for individual trials, the network had trou-
ble maintaining enough of the sequence in working memory to generate a
response at the end of the trial.
Fortunately, others had already discovered solutions to these problems.
Hochreiter and Schmidhuber (1997) developed a variant of the SRN, called
the long short-term memory (LSTM), to address both issues outlined above.
This type of network has a special architecture designed to allow information
12
to persist unperturbed in the network across long time lags. The network is
still trained with gradient descent, but individual units function in such a way
as to prevent the degradation of the error signal when propagated backward
through space or time. Initial tests showed that this type of network, when
faced with a task involving long temporal sequences, learns and generalizes
drastically better than all previous methods encountered.
The original LSTM training algorithm and its subsequent variations
(Gers and Cummins, 2000; Gers and Schmidhuber, 2001), however, were not
designed to train networks with more than a single hidden layer. To train
these types of networks, researchers had fallen back to less biologically plausi-
ble methods, such as back-propagation through time (BPTT; Werbos, 1990)
and real-time recurrent learning (RTRL; Williams and Zipser, 1989). All
of these methods perform computations that are nonlocal in space, time, or
both, rendering them unlike both the original LSTM training algorithm and
the current neuroscientific understanding of biological neural computation.
Most neural networks used in artificial intelligence research already eschew
close neurobiological ties, substituting highly idealized units and connections
for real neurons and synapses. However, the locality constraints in real neural
networks rank high in the list of properties that make them interesting sub-
jects of study. Training methods that discard them are likely to be impossible
to implement in brain-like networks, at least given current neurobiological
understanding. Furthermore, it is easy to imagine such training methods, by
virtue of their nonlocality, giving rise to different types of learned represen-
13
tations that are less distributed and less competitive than those produced by
their localized counterparts.
In light of these objections, the existing methods of training deep LSTM
networks do not capture essential aspects of the human neural substrate
and are thus unsatisfactory for the task at hand. Replacing these is a new
version of the LSTM training algorithm, appropriately generalized to handle
networks with multiple hidden layers in series. This novel algorithm, called
generalized long short-term memory (LSTM-g), provides a straightforward
training method that remains brain-like in terms of spatial and temporal
locality and is the subject of Chapter 2.
After initial tests confirmed LSTM-g’s efficacy at training networks
to learn speech-like data, the investigation turned to the extent to which
LSTM-g learning resembled certain aspects of human learning. The impor-
tance of human-like learning should be readily apparent when considering
that the ultimate goal is to use LSTM-g to create language processing mod-
els to which humans can more easily relate. A particularly interesting metric
that can be used to measure the algorithm’s fidelity to human learning is its
ability to reproduce high-level human-like learning artifacts. One such arti-
fact is an age-correlated decline in the ability of human learners to acquire a
second language: Those who start later in life have poorer ultimate attain-
ment of many aspects of the language than do native speakers. Chapter 3, af-
ter covering the relevant linguistic and computational background, describes
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two neural network models, trained by LSTM-g, that examine the influ-
ence of first-language entrenchment and memory development on language
learning. The article-prediction model does this by learning a gender
assignment task in two languages, while the phoneme-prediction model
learns a much more involved gender agreement task. Though these models
are limited in many ways when compared to a human language learner, they
both independently reproduce patterns of language aptitude that strongly
suggest that they successfully capture aspects of the human language learn-
ing process that would be difficult to observe in higher-level models.
The remaining chapters of this dissertation deal with the development
of a detailed neural model that learns to understand and produce sentence-
level language, represented and processed as individual speech sounds. Chap-
ter 4 describes how an early version of the model, the grounded-meaning
model, learned to interpret sentences in terms of a visual micro-world, form-
ing grounded internal representations of sentence meanings. Grounding of
linguistic representations in other forms of experience is key to forming a true
understanding of language at levels beyond that of syntax; however, symbolic
and statistical natural language processing systems do not generally address
this problem.
Distinguishing it from many past neural network models, the grounded-
meaning model performs systematically, making the correct generalizations
after observing only a tiny fraction of the input space. The discussion in
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this chapter presents evidence that the learned representations appear to be
largely compositional in nature, demonstrating that a neural network can
learn distributed representations that it can manipulate and combine much
like the symbols used in high-level cognitive models. This finding is impor-
tant because compositional representations provide the means of efficiently
encoding and computing over very high-dimensional spaces—a quality that
connectionist models are often accused of lacking.
Chapter 5, after discussing relevant previous work, presents two more
advanced versions of the model from Chapter 4. The first of these, termed
the meaning-answer model, not only understands the sentences it hears,
but recognizes questions and shows its ability to answer them by producing
a grounded representation of the meaning of a complete-sentence answer.
The final version of the model, termed the spoken-answer model, speaks
its answers, directly producing sequences of speech sounds without recourse
to the experimenter-imposed internal meaning representations utilized by
the previous versions of the model. This last and most complex model is
also the most plausible in terms of its learning method, as both its input
and its training signal would be readily observable in any human linguistic
interaction.
The spoken-answer model fulfills the criteria set out earlier for a useful
neural-level model of language learning at the sentence level. Currently, it is
the only known neural network model capable of simultaneously learning to
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understand and produce sentence-level language that is represented sublex-
ically as temporal sequences of phonemes. When compared to symbolic or
statistical models of natural language processing, the model’s computational
substrate and its training regimen more closely resemble those of humans,
lending credence to the idea that scaling such a system up would produce a
more human-like natural language processing system. Unfortunately, large-
scale natural language applications are not yet feasible, pending either greater
computational resources or special-purpose neural network hardware. As the
concluding remarks in Chapter 6 discuss, however, the models presented here
have immediate potential applicability in a number of areas, including brain-
level investigations as a successor to the WLG aphasia model, as well as
higher-level models of psycholinguistic phenomena.
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Chapter 2
Generalizing a Training Algorithm
2.1 Introduction
The second-order recurrent neural network models in this dissertation
have two major requirements that existing neural training methods cannot
satisfy simultaneously. The first requirement is the ability to train architec-
tures with deep serial structure involving multiple internal layers of units,
which is important for tasks that decompose hierarchically or involve multi-
ple levels of representation. The second requirement is informational locality,
both in space and in time, which is a physical requirement of biological brains
that induces important distributive and competitive properties within the
network. Both of these are essential properties that differentiate the neural
substrate from the traditional substrate of computing machinery. The goal
of creating a natural language processing model that is truly grounded in a
human-like neural substrate, then, necessitates the creation of a new train-
ing algorithm that can fulfill both requirements. This chapter describes such
an algorithm, which generalizes the spatially and temporally local training
method originally used with networks of the long short-term memory
(LSTM; Hochreiter and Schmidhuber, 1997) architecture.
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The LSTM is a recurrent neural network architecture that combines
fast training with efficient learning on tasks that require sequential short-
term memory storage for many time-steps during a trial. Since its inception,
LSTM has been augmented and improved with forget gates (Gers and Cum-
mins, 2000) and peephole connections (Gers and Schmidhuber, 2000); despite
this, the usefulness of the LSTM training algorithm is limited in that it can
only train a small set of second-order recurrent network architectures. The
term second-order neural network in this context means one that not
only allows normal weighted connections that propagate activation from one
sending unit to one receiving unit, but also allows second-order connections:
weighted connections from two sending units to one receiving unit, where the
signal received is dependent upon the product of the activities of the sending
units with each other and the connection weight (Miller and Giles, 1993).
When LSTM is described in terms of connection gating, as discussed later,
it becomes clear that the gate units serve as the additional sending units for
the second-order connections.
The original LSTM architecture has an input layer, a hidden layer con-
sisting of cell assemblies called memory blocks, and an output layer. Each
memory block is composed of memory cell units that retain state across time-
steps, as well as three types of specialized gate units that learn to protect,
utilize, or destroy this state as appropriate. The LSTM training algorithm
back-propagates errors from the output units through the memory blocks,
adjusting incoming connections of all units in the blocks, but then truncates
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the back-propagated errors. As a consequence, LSTM’s training algorithm
cannot be used to effectively train second-order networks with units placed
between the memory blocks and the input layer. More generally, LSTM’s
training algorithm cannot be used to train arbitrary second-order recurrent
neural architectures, as the error propagation and weight updates it pre-
scribes are dependent upon the specific network architecture described in
the original paper (Hochreiter and Schmidhuber, 1997).
While there exist other methods capable of training arbitrary second-
order networks, none share a principal advantage of LSTM’s training algo-
rithm: locality in time and space. Spatial locality here means that the
changes to connection weights that happen at some location in the network
should be directly computable from information available within the spatial
neighborhood of the connection in question. Similarly, temporal locality
means that weight changes cannot rely upon precise records of information
from arbitrarily far in the past. A training algorithm that possesses these
properties can, if it is general enough, be applied without modification to any
network architecture, and in fact even to architectures that change during
training. The human brain is an obvious example of an architecture that
changes during learning, and concerns about spatial and temporal locality
might be summarized as a desire to maintain the locality constraints that
brains appear to have.
Error back-propagation for feed-forward networks (Rumelhart et al.,
1986) and simple recurrent networks (SRNs; Elman, 1990) are examples of
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training algorithms that exhibit locality in time and space while generalizing
to a wide variety of architectures. To date, it appears as if no such algo-
rithm for arbitrary second-order networks has been described. Algorithms
like back-propagation through time (BPTT; Werbos, 1990) that have been
used to train second-order architectures (e.g., Graves and Schmidhuber, 2008)
violate temporal locality by basing weight updates on perfect records of net-
work activations extending back in time to the beginning of arbitrarily long
input sequences; the same goes for the evolutionary training method known
as Evolino (Schmidhuber et al., 2007). Real-time recurrent learning (RTRL;
Williams and Zipser, 1989) is not local spatially since the gradient term for
a given weight depends directly on every other weight in the network. De-
coupled extended Kalman filters (DEKF; Gers et al., 2003; Puskorius and
Feldkamp, 1994) utilize a host of external matrix operations to control train-
ing and thus are not spatially local. While this list is not exhaustive, every
such training algorithm examined, other than LSTM, was either spatially or
temporally nonlocal.
The desire for an architecture-independent training algorithm with
these properties led to the development of the training algorithm described in
this chapter, the generalized long short-term memory (LSTM-g; Mon-
ner and Reggia, in press a). This approach retains the spatial and temporal
locality of the original LSTM training algorithm and can be applied, with-
out modification, to a much wider range of second-order recurrent neural
networks. Each unit in a network trained by LSTM-g has the same set of
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operating instructions, relying only on its local network environment to de-
termine whether it will fulfill the role of memory cell, gate unit, both, or
neither. In addition, every unit is trained by LSTM-g in the same way—a
sharp contrast from the original LSTM training algorithm, where each of
several different types of units has a unique training regimen. LSTM-g rein-
terprets the gating of unit activations seen in LSTM; instead of gate units
modulating other unit activations directly, they are viewed as modulating
the weights on connections between units. This change in perspective, while
mathematically equivalent to the original design, offers increased flexibility
to network designers who wish to explore arbitrary architectures where gates
can temporarily isolate one part of the network from another. While pre-
vious work (Bayer et al., 2009) has examined alternative architectures for
LSTM-style second-order networks—as derived by network evolution to suit
a particular task—that work relies on the nonlocal BPTT algorithm to train
the evolved networks. While this chapter focuses on alternative second-order
architectures as well, the primary aim is to provide a local algorithm to train
them.
In addition to its expanded architectural applicability, LSTM-g pro-
vides all of the benefits of the LSTM training algorithm when applied to
the right type of architecture. LSTM-g was designed to perform exactly
the same weight updates as the original algorithm when applied to identi-
cal network architectures. However, on LSTM architectures with peephole
connections, LSTM-g often performs better than the original algorithm by
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utilizing a source of back-propagated error that appears to have heretofore
gone unnoticed.
Section 2.2 presents LSTM and its training algorithm as previously
described, followed by the generalized version in Section 2.3. Section 2.4
provides the mathematical derivation of the LSTM-g learning rules, and Sec-
tion 2.5 then proves that LSTM-g is a generalization of LSTM training.
Section 2.6 presents an analysis of the additional error signals that LSTM-g
uses to its advantage, followed by experimental evidence in Section 2.7 that
LSTM-g often performs better than the LSTM algorithm when using the
original architecture. Further experiments show that LSTM-g performs well
on two architectures specifically adapted to two computational problems.
2.2 LSTM
LSTM was developed as a neural network architecture for processing
long temporal sequences of data and is trained using a hybrid descendant of
truncated BPTT and RTRL. Other recurrent neural networks trained with
various gradient methods proved to be ineffective when the input sequences
were too long (Hochreiter and Schmidhuber, 1997). Analysis showed that
for neural networks trained with back-propagation or other gradient-based
methods, the error signal is likely to vanish or diverge as error travels back-
ward through network space or through time. This is because, with every
pass backward through a unit, the error signal is scaled by the derivative of
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the unit’s activation function times the weight that the forward signal trav-
eled along. The further the error travels back in space or time, the more
times this scaling factor is multiplied into the error term. If the factor is con-
sistently less than 1, the error will vanish, leading to small, ineffective weight
updates; if it is greater than 1, the error term will diverge, potentially leading
to weight oscillations or other types of instability. One way to preserve the
value of the error is by requiring the scaling factor to be equal to 1, which
can only be consistently enforced with a linear activation function (whose
derivative is 1) and a fixed weight of wjj = 1. LSTM adopts this require-
ment for its memory cell units, which have linear activation functions and
self-connections with a fixed weight of 1 (Figure 2.1(a)). This allows them to
maintain unscaled activations and error derivatives across arbitrary time lags
if they are not otherwise disturbed. Since back-propagation networks require
nonlinear hidden unit activation functions to be effective, each memory cell’s
state is passed through a squashing function—such as the standard logistic
function—before being passed on to the rest of the network.
The processing of long temporal sequences is complicated by the issue
of interference. If a memory cell is currently storing information that is not
useful now but will be invaluable later, this currently irrelevant information
may interfere with other processing in the interim. This in turn may cause
the information to be discarded, improving performance in the near term
but harming it in the long term. Similarly, a memory cell may be perturbed
by an irrelevant input, and the information that would have been useful
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later in the sequence can be lost or obscured. To help mitigate these issues,
each memory cell has its net input modulated by the activity of another
unit, termed an input gate, and has its output modulated by a unit called
an output gate (Figure 2.1(a)). Each input gate and output gate unit
modulates one or a small number of memory cells; the collection of memory
cells together with the gates that modulate them is termed a memory block.
The input gates provide a context-sensitive way to update the contents of a
memory cell and protect those contents from interference, while the output
gates protect downstream units from perturbation by stored information that
has not become relevant yet. A later innovation was a third gate, termed
the forget gate, which modulates the amount of activation a memory cell
keeps from the previous time-step, providing a method to quickly discard the
contents of a memory cell after this information has served its purpose (Gers
and Cummins, 2000).
In the original formulation of LSTM, the gate units responsible for
isolating the contents of a given memory cell face a problem. These gates
may receive input connections from the memory cell itself, but the memory
cell’s value is gated by its output gate. The result is that, when the output
gate is closed (i.e., has activity near zero), the memory cell’s visible activ-
ity is near zero, hiding its contents even from those cells—the associated
gates—that are supposed to be controlling its information flow. Recogni-
tion of this fact resulted in the inclusion of peephole connections—direct







































(b) Equivalent for LSTM-g
Figure 2.1: Architectural comparison of LSTM’s memory block to the equiv-
alent in an LSTM-g network. Weighted connections are shown as black lines,
and gating relationships are shown as thicker gray lines. The elongated en-
closure represents the extent of the memory cell. In (a), connections into the
LSTM memory cell are first summed (the input-squashing function is taken
to be the identity); the result is gated by the input gate. The gated net
input progresses to the self-recurrent linear unit, whose activity is gated by
the forget gate. The state of the recurrent unit is passed through the output-
squashing function, which is then modulated by the output gate. This mod-
ulated value is passed to all receiving units via weighted connections. The
peephole connections project from an internal stage in the memory cell to the
controlling gate units; this is an exception to the rule that only the final value
of the memory cell is visible to other units. In (b), the weights on the input
connections to the LSTM-g memory cell are modulated directly by the input
gate before being summed by the linear unit. Unmodulated output leaves
the memory cell via weighted connections. Connections to downstream units
can have their weights modulated directly by the output gate, but this is not
required, as can be seen with the equivalent of LSTM’s peephole connections
proceeding normally from the output of the memory cell. This scheme is ca-
pable of producing the same results as the LSTM memory block, but allows
greater architectural flexibility.
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the memory cell and projecting to each of the memory cell’s gates (Gers and
Schmidhuber, 2000). Unlike all other connections originating at the memory
cell, the peephole connections see the memory cell’s state before modulation
by the output gate, and thus are able to convey the true contents of the
memory cell to the associated gates at all times. By all accounts, peephole
connections improve LSTM performance significantly (Gers and Schmidhu-
ber, 2001), leading to their adoption as a standard technique employed in
applications (Graves et al., 2004; Gers et al., 2003).
The LSTM network ostensibly has only three layers: an input layer, a
layer of memory block cell assemblies, and an output layer. For expository
purposes, however, it will be useful to think of the memory block assemblies
as composed of multiple separate layers (see Figure 2.2): the input gate layer
(ι), the forget gate layer (ϕ), the memory cell layer (c), and the output gate
layer (ω). For notational simplicity, assume each of these layers has the same
number of elements, implying that a single memory cell cj is associated with
the set of gates ιj, ϕj, and ωj; it is trivial, though notationally messy, to gen-
eralize to the case where a set of gates can control more than one memory cell.
The input layer projects a full set of connections to each of these layers; the
memory cell layer projects a full set of connections to the output layer (θ). In
addition, each memory cell cj projects a single ungated peephole connection
to each of its associated gates (see Figure 2.1(a)). The architecture can be
augmented with direct input-to-output connections and/or delayed recurrent
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Figure 2.2: The standard LSTM architecture in terms of layers. The memory
block assemblies are broken up into separate layers of memory cells, input
gates, forget gates, and output gates, in addition to the input and output lay-
ers. Solid arrows indicate full all-to-all connectivity between units in a layer,
and dashed arrows indicate connectivity only between the units in the two
layers that have the same index (i.e., the first unit of the sending layer only
projects to the first unit of the receiving layer, the second unit only projects
to the second, and so forth). The gray bars denote gating relationships and
are displayed as they are conceived in LSTM-g, with the modulation occur-
ring at the connection level. Units in each gate layer modulate only those
connections into or out of their corresponding memory cell. The circular
dashed connection on the memory cell layer indicates the self-connectivity of
the units therein. This diagram shows the optional peephole connections—
the dashed arrows originating at the memory cells and ending at the gate
layers—as well as the optional direct input-to-output layer connections on
the left.
in the following sections, the operation of the LSTM training algorithm is
very much dependent upon the specifics of the LSTM architecture.
The following equations detail the operation of the LSTM network and
its original training algorithm through a single time-step. A time-step is
defined to consist of the presentation of a single input, followed by the ac-
tivation of all subsequent layers of the network in order. This notion of a
time-step, most often seen when discussing feed-forward networks, enables a
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more intuitive description of the activation and learning phases that occur
due to each input. Following Graves et al. (2004), all variables in the following
refer to the most recently calculated value of that variable (whether during
this time-step or the last), with the exception that variables with a hat (̂)
always refer to the value calculated one time-step earlier; this only happens
in cases where the new value of a variable is being defined in terms of its
immediately preceding value. Following Gers and Schmidhuber (2000), the
following definitions deviate from the original description of LSTM by reduc-
ing the number of squashing functions for the memory cells; here, however,
the definition omits the input-squashing function g (equivalent to defining
g(x) = x) and retains the output-squashing function, naming it fcj for mem-
ory cell j. In general, the formalism that follows will use the subscript index
j to refer to individual units within the layer in question, with i running over
all units that project connections to unit j, and k running over all units that
receive connections from j.
2.2.1 Activation dynamics
When an input is presented, the network proceeds through an entire
time-step, activating each layer in order: ι, ϕ, c, ω, and finally the output
layer θ. In general, when some layer λ is activated, each unit λj in that
layer calculates its net input xλj as the weighted sum over all its input
connections from units i (Equation 2.1). The units i vary for each layer and
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potentially include recurrent connections; the most recent activation value
of the sending unit is always used, even if it is from the previous time-
step as for recurrent connections. For units that are not in the memory
cell layer, the activation yλj of the unit is the result of applying the unit’s
squashing function fλj (generally taken to be the logistic function) to its
net input (Equation 2.2). Each memory cell unit, on the other hand, retains
its previous state ŝcj in proportion to the activation of the associated forget
gate; the current state scj is updated by the net input modulated by the
activation of the associated input gate (Equation 2.3). A memory cell’s state
is passed through its squashing function and modulated by the activation of




wλji yi for λ ∈ {ι, ϕ, c, ω, θ} (2.1)
yλj = fλj(xλj) for λ ∈ {ι, ϕ, ω, θ} (2.2)
scj = yϕj ŝcj + yιjxcj (2.3)
ycj = yωj fcj(scj) (2.4)
When considering peephole connections in the context of the equations
in this section, one should replace the sending unit activation yi with the
memory cell state sci since peephole connections come directly from the in-
ternal state of the memory cells rather than their activations.
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2.2.2 Learning rules
To learn effectively, each unit needs to keep track of the activity flow
over time through each of its connections. To this end, each unit main-
tains an eligibility trace for each of its input connections and updates this
trace immediately after calculating its activation. The eligibility trace for
a given connection is an aggregate record of the amount of activation that
has crossed the connection and that still has influence over the state of the
network. It is similar in spirit to those used in temporal-difference learning
(Sutton and Barto, 1998), except that here the decay of these traces is vari-
able and learnable. When a target vector is presented, the eligibility traces
are used to help assign error responsibilities to individual connections. For
the output gates and output units, the eligibility traces are instantaneous—
they are simply the most recent activation value that crossed the connection
(Equation 2.5). For the memory cells (Equation 2.6), forget gates (Equa-
tion 2.7), and input gates (Equation 2.8), the eligibility traces are partial
derivatives of the state of the memory cell with respect to the connection in
question; simplifying these partial derivatives results in Equations 2.6–2.8.
Previous eligibility traces are retained in proportion to the amount of state
that the memory cell retains (i.e., the forget gate activation yϕj), and each
is incremented according to the effect it has on the memory cell state.
ελji = yi for λ ∈ {ω, θ} (2.5)
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εcji = yϕj ε̂cji + yιj yi (2.6)








Between time-steps of the activation dynamics (i.e., after the network
has generated an output for a given input), the network may be given a target
vector t to compare against, where all values in t are in the range [0, 1]. The
difference between the network output and the target is calculated using the
cross-entropy function in Equation 2.9 (Hinton, 1989). Since E ≤ 0 when
the t and y values fall in the range [0, 1] as required, one trains the network
by driving this function towards zero from below, or alternatively driving
its negation towards zero from above. Deriving Equation 2.9 with respect
to the output unit activations reveals the error responsibility δθj for the
output units (Equation 2.10). One obtains the deltas for the output gates
(Equation 2.11) and the remaining units (Equation 2.12) by propagating the





tj log(yθj) + (1− tj) log(1− yθj)
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(2.9)














δθk wθkcj for λ ∈ {ι, ϕ, c} (2.12)
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Finally, the connection weights into all units in each layer λ are updated
according to the product of the learning rate α, the unit’s error responsibility
δλj , and the connection’s eligibility trace ελji (Equation 2.13).
∆wλji = α δλj ελji for λ ∈ {ι, ϕ, c, ω, θ} (2.13)
2.3 Generalized LSTM
The long short-term memory algorithm, as presented in Section 2.2,
is an efficient and powerful recurrent neural network training method, but
is limited in applicability to the architecture shown in Figure 2.2 and sub-
architectures thereof.1 In particular, any architectures with multiple hidden
layers (where another hidden layer projects to the memory block layer) can-
not be efficiently trained because error responsibilities are truncated at the
memory blocks instead of being passed to upstream layers. This section de-
tails the new generalized version of LSTM training, which confers all the
benefits of the original algorithm, yet can be applied without modification
to arbitrary second-order neural network architectures.
The generalized long short-term memory (LSTM-g) approach reinter-
prets the gating mechanism employed by LSTM. In LSTM, gate units directly
act on the states of individual units—a memory cell’s net input in the case
1LSTM can also train architectures with additional layers that operate in parallel with
the memory block layer, but the important point here is that LSTM cannot effectively
train architectures containing layers that operate in series with the memory block layer.
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of the input gate, the memory cell state for the forget gate, and the memory
cell output for the output gate (Equations 2.3–2.4). By contrast, units in
LSTM-g can gate at the level of individual connections. The effect is that,
when passing activity to unit j from unit i across a connection gated by k,
the result is not simply wji yi, but instead wji yi yk. In this sense, LSTM-g is
similar in form to traditional second-order networks (e.g., Giles and Maxwell,
1987; Psaltis et al., 1988; Shin and Ghosh, 1991; Miller and Giles, 1993), but
with an asymmetry: The notation used here considers the connection in this
example to be primarily defined by j and i (the weight is denoted wji and not
wjki), where k provides a temporary gain on the connection by modulating
its weight multiplicatively. This notation is convenient when considering con-
nections that require an output and an input but may or may not be gated;
in other words, the notation can refer to a connection without specifying
whether it is a first- or second-order connection.
In LSTM-g, every unit has the potential to be like LSTM’s memory
cells, gate units, both, or neither. That is to say, all units contain the same
set of operating instructions for both activation and learning. Self-connected
units can retain state like a memory cell, and any unit can directly gate any
connection. The role each unit takes is completely determined by its place-
ment in the overall network architecture, leaving the choice of responsibilities
for each unit entirely up to the architecture designer.
Equations 2.14–2.24 describe the operation of a network trained by
LSTM-g through a single time-step. Just as in the description of the original
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LSTM training algorithm, a time-step consists of the presentation of a single
input pattern, followed by the ordered activation of all noninput layers of
the network. The order in which layers are activated is predetermined and
remains fixed throughout training. If a layer to be activated receives recurrent
connections from a layer that has not yet been activated during this time-step,
the sending layer’s activations from the previous time-step are used. The full
derivation of the LSTM-g training algorithm can be found in Section 2.4.
2.3.1 Activation dynamics
LSTM-g performs LSTM-like gating by having units modulate the ef-
fectiveness of individual connections. As such, the formalism begins by spec-
ifying the gain gji on the connection from unit i to unit j (Equation 2.14).
gji =

1 if connection from i to j is not gated
yk if unit k gates the connection from i to j
(2.14)
Much as with memory cells in LSTM, any unit in an LSTM-g network
is capable of retaining state from one time-step to the next, based only on
whether or not it is self-connected. The state sj of a unit j (Equation 2.15)
is the sum of the weighted, gated activations of all the units that project
connections to it. If the unit is self-connected, it retains its state in proportion
to the gain on the self-connection. As in LSTM, self-connections in LSTM-g,
where they exist, have a fixed weight of 1; otherwise wjj = 0. Given the
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state sj, the activation yj is calculated via the application of the unit’s
squashing function fj (Equation 2.16).
sj = gjj wjj ŝj +
∑
i 6=j
gji wji yi (2.15)
yj = fj(sj) (2.16)
When considering these equations as applied to the LSTM architec-
ture, for a unit j /∈ c, it is clear that Equation 2.15 is a generalization of
Equation 2.1. This is because the first term of Equation 2.15 evaluates to
zero on this architecture (since there is no self-connection wjj), and all the
gji = 1 since no connections into the unit are gated. The equivalence of
Equation 2.16 and Equation 2.2 for these units follows immediately. For a
memory cell j ∈ c, on the other hand, Equation 2.15 reduces to Equation 2.3
after three simplifications: the self-connection gain gjj is just yϕj ; the self-
connection weight wjj is 1; and the gji are all equal to yιj and can thus be
pulled outside the sum. However, for the memory cell units, Equation 2.16
is not equivalent to Equation 2.4, since the latter already multiplies in the
activation yωj of the output gate, whereas this modulation is performed at
the connection level in LSTM-g.
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2.3.2 Learning rules
As in LSTM, each unit keeps an eligibility trace εji for each of its
incoming connections (Equation 2.17). This quantity keeps track of how
activity that has crossed this connection has influenced the current state of
the unit and is equal to the partial derivative of the state with respect to the
connection weight in question. For units that do not have a self-connection,
the eligibility trace εji reduces to the most recent input activation modulated
by the gating signal.
εji = gjj wjj ε̂ji + gji yi (2.17)
In the context of the LSTM architecture, Equation 2.17 reduces to
Equation 2.5 for the output gates and output units; in both cases, the lack
of self-connections forces the first term to zero, and the remaining gji yi term
is equivalent to LSTM’s yi.
If unit j gates connections into other units k, it must maintain a set of
extended eligibility traces εkji for each such k (Equation 2.18). A trace
of this type captures the effect that the connection from i potentially has on
the state of k through its influence on j. Equation 2.18 is simpler than it
appears, as the remaining partial derivative term is 1 if and only if j gates
k’s self-connection, and is 0 otherwise. Further, the index a, by definition,
runs over only those units whose connections to k are gated by j; this set of
units may be empty.
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It is worth noting that LSTM uses traces of exactly this type for the
forget gates and input gates (Equations 2.7–2.8); it just so happens that each
such unit gates connections into exactly one other unit, thus requiring each
unit to keep only a single, unified eligibility trace for each input connection.
This will also be the case for the alternative architectures explored in later
sections, but is not required. A complete explanation of the correspondence
between LSTM’s eligibility traces and the extended eligibility traces utilized
by LSTM-g can be found in Section 2.5.
When a network is given a target vector, each unit must calculate its
error responsibility δj and adjust the weights of its incoming connections
accordingly. Output units, of course, receive their δ values directly from the
environment based on the global error function (Equation 2.9), just as in
LSTM (Equation 2.10). The error responsibility δj for any other unit j in
the network can be calculated by back-propagating errors. Since each unit
keeps separate eligibility traces corresponding to projected activity (εji) and
gating activity (εkji), the error responsibility is divided accordingly. First, let
Pj be the set of units k which are downstream from j—that is, activated
after j during a time-step—and to which j projects weighted connections
(Equation 2.19). Similarly, let Gj be the set of units k which are downstream
38
from j that receive connections gated by j (Equation 2.20). Both of these sets
are restricted to downstream units because an upstream unit k has its error
responsibility updated after j during backward error propagation, meaning
that the error responsibility information provided by k is not available when
j would need to use it.
Pj = {k | j projects a connection to k and k is downstream of j} (2.19)
Gj = {k | j gates a connection into k and k is downstream of j} (2.20)
The error responsibility of unit j with respect to the projected connec-
tions in Pj (Equation 2.21) is calculated as the sum of the error responsibil-
ities of the receiving units weighted by the gated connection strengths that






δk gkj wkj (2.21)
Since the memory cells in LSTM only project connections and perform
no gating themselves, δPj of Equation 2.21 translates directly into Equa-
tion 2.12 for these units, which can be seen by noting that the gain terms gkj
are all equal to the output gate activation yωj and can be pulled out of the
sum.
The error responsibility of j with respect to gating activity is the sum
of the error responsibilities of each unit k receiving gated connections times
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a quantity representing the gated, weighted input that the connections pro-
vided to k (Equation 2.22). This quantity, as with the same quantity in
Equation 2.18, is simpler than it appears. The partial derivative evaluates to
1 only when j is gating k’s self-connection and to 0 otherwise, so this term
either simplifies or drops completely. The index a runs over only those units
















To find j’s total error responsibility (Equation 2.23), the error respon-
sibilities due to projections and gating are added.
δj = δPj + δGj (2.23)
To obtain weight changes similar to LSTM training, δj is not used
directly in weight adjustments; its purpose is to provide a unified δ value
that can be used by upstream units to calculate their error responsibilities
due to unit j. Instead, the weights are adjusted by combining the error
responsibilities and eligibility traces for projected activity and adding the
products of extended eligibility traces and error responsibilities of each unit
receiving gated connections. The result is multiplied by the learning rate α
(Equation 2.24).
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Section 2.4 provides a detailed derivation of these learning rules, includ-
ing a complete treatment of all deviations from the true gradient. Section 2.5
shows that the weight changes made by both the LSTM (Equation 2.13) and
LSTM-g (Equation 2.24) algorithms are identical when used on an LSTM
architecture without peephole connections. This establishes that LSTM-g is
indeed a generalization of LSTM’s training algorithm.
2.4 Learning rule derivation
This section derives the LSTM-g learning algorithm by calculating the
gradient of the cross-entropy function (Equation 2.9) for a general unit in
an LSTM-g network. Such a unit may both project normal weighted con-
nections to other units and multiplicatively modulate the weights of other
connections. The error responsibility for a general unit j can be obtained by
approximating the gradient of the error function with respect to the unit’s
state sj (Equation 2.25). This approximation posits that the error responsi-
bility of unit j depends only upon units k that are immediately downstream
from j (Equation 2.26). The remaining error gradients for k are δk by defi-
nition. Equation 2.27 breaks up the second partial derivative into a product
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that includes j’s activation directly so as to account for the effects of j’s
squashing function separately. The dependence of j’s activation on its state
is simply the derivative of the squashing function, which is constant across
the sum and thus can be moved outside (Equation 2.28). Equation 2.29 sep-
arates the set of units k into two (possibly overlapping) sets—those units to
which j projects weighted connections (Equation 2.19) and those units that
receive connections gated by j (Equation 2.20). The derivation will thus han-
dle error responsibilities for projection and gating separately, even in cases
where j both projects and gates connections into the same unit k, thereby










































= δPj + δGj (2.30)
In calculating δPj , Equation 2.32 expands sk from Equation 2.31 us-
ing the definition from Equation 2.15. This part of the derivation is only
concerned with cases where j projects connections; as such, gkk and gkj′
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do not depend on j and are treated as constants. Since the previous state
of k does not depend on the current activation of j, the first term in the
parentheses vanishes completely. Individual terms in the sum vanish as well,
except for the one case when j′ = j, leaving gkj wkj as the entire derivative


























δk gkj wkj (2.33)
To find δGj , Equation 2.35 similarly begins by expanding sk from Equa-
tion 2.34. In this case, the derivation concerns only connections that j gates.
Now the gkk term is in play, since it is equal to yj if j gates k’s self-connection
(see Equation 2.14); this leads to the first term inside the parentheses in
Equation 2.36, where the derivative can take the values 1 or 0. For indi-
vidual terms in the sum, yj′ 6= yj since this derivation does not deal with
connections j projects to k. However, gkj′ may be equal to yj in some cases;
where it is not, j does not gate the connection and the term goes to zero.
Thus, the sum is reindexed to include only those units a whose connections





































This allows the calculation of the error responsibility δj of any unit j
by back-propagation. Starting at the level of units k that are immediately
downstream from j (Equation 2.37), Equation 2.38 separates the k units by
function, and Equation 2.39 breaks up the remaining partial derivative in
the first sum. Rearranging terms in the first sum (Equation 2.40) reveals a
grouping equal to δPj (see Equation 2.31). The derivative in the first term is
equal to the eligibility trace εji; the second term is the extended eligibility





























































To calculate the eligibility trace εji, Equation 2.43 substitutes sj from
Equation 2.15 into Equation 2.42. Assuming unit j does not gate its own self-
connection, gjj is a constant. The previous state ŝj depends on wji producing
a partial derivative that simplifies to the previous value of the eligibility trace,
ε̂ji. The only term in the sum with a nonzero derivative is the case where















= gjj wjj ε̂ji + gji yi (2.44)
Working on the extended eligibility trace εkji, Equation 2.46 again ex-
pands sk from Equation 2.45. When performing the partial derivative on the
first term, gkk may be equal to yj, which depends on wji; also, ŝk depends
on wji via its effect on sj, requiring the product rule to derive the first term.
For terms in the sum, unit j can gate the connection from j′ to k, but k 6= j
so wkj′ can be treated as constant, as can yj′ since this part of the derivation
is not concerned with connections that j projects forward. In Equation 2.47,
what remains is the result of the product rule and the remaining terms of
the sum, where the a index runs over only those connections into k that j
does in fact gate. Equation 2.48 shows that the first partial derivative is
simply the previous value of the extended eligibility trace. Equation 2.49
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(cf. Equation 2.18) pulls out partial derivatives common to the latter two
terms and replaces them with the names of their stored variable forms. The
partial derivatives in the sum are all 1 by the definition of the a index. The
remaining partial derivative inside the parentheses reduces to 1 when j gates























































2.5 LSTM as a special case of LSTM-g
The following shows that LSTM is a special case of LSTM-g in the
sense that when LSTM-g is applied to a particular class of network architec-
tures, the two algorithms produce identical weight changes. For notational
simplicity, this derivation addresses the case where the target LSTM archi-
tecture has only one memory cell per block; this explanation can be trivially
extended to the case where the architecture has multiple memory cells per
block, though this unnecessarily complicates the notation. The input layer
projects weighted connections forward to four distinct layers of units (see
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Figure 2.2), which are activated in the following order during a time-step,
just as in LSTM: the input gate layer ι, the forget gate layer ϕ, the memory
cell layer c, and the output gate layer ω. Each of these layers has the same
number of units; a group of parallel units are associated via the pattern of
network connectivity and collectively function like an LSTM memory block.
Inputs to each cell in the memory cell layer are gated by the associated input
gate unit. The memory cell layer is the only layer in which each unit has a di-
rect self-connection; these each have a fixed weight of 1 and are gated by the
appropriate forget gate. A final output layer receives weighted connections
from the memory cell layer, which are gated by the output gates.
With this simple LSTM network, LSTM-g produces the same weight
changes as LSTM. On a similar architecture augmented with peephole con-
nections, the error responsibilities would differ, as LSTM-g is able to use er-
ror back-propagated from the output gates across these connections, whereas
LSTM does not. This is discussed further in Section 2.6.
2.5.1 State and activation equivalence
The following demonstrates the equivalence of the activation dynamics




The first goal is to show that the activation for each gate unit (i.e.,
for a general unit λj where λ ∈ {ι, ϕ, ω}) is the same here as it is in LSTM.
Starting from the LSTM-g state definition (Equation 2.50, cf. Equation 2.15),
Equation 2.51 gets rid of the first term because the activations of the gate
units are stateless due to their lack of self connections, meaning wλjλj = 0. On
this architecture, the only connections into any of the gate units come from
the input layer and are ungated, so all the gλji terms are 1 (Equation 2.52).
What remains is the definition of the net input to a normal LSTM unit
(Equation 2.53, cf. Equation 2.1).
sλj = gλjλj wλjλj ŝλj +
∑
i 6=j









= xλj for λ ∈ {ι, ϕ, ω} (2.53)
2.5.1.2 Output units
The situation is similar for the output units θj. Starting from the
same LSTM-g state equation (Equation 2.54, cf. Equation 2.15), the first
term drops out due to lack of output unit self-connections (Equation 2.55).
Since the connections into the output units come from the memory cells,
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each connection is gated by its corresponding output gate (Equation 2.56).
Equation 2.57 regroups the terms, and Equation 2.58 substitutes the LSTM
memory cell activation for the output gate activation times the LSTM-g
memory cell activation (by Equation 2.4). The result is equal to the net
input of an LSTM output unit (Equation 2.59, cf. Equation 2.1).
sθj = gθjθj wθjθj ŝθj +
∑
i∈c


















The preceding proves the equivalence of LSTM’s xλj and sλj in LSTM-g
for all units except memory cells. It follows directly for these units that the
activation yλj in LSTM is equivalent to the quantity of the same name in
LSTM-g (Equation 2.60, cf. Equation 2.16), assuming equivalent squashing
functions fλj (Equation 2.61, cf. Equation 2.2).
yλj = fλj(sλj) (2.60)
= fλj(xλj) for λ ∈ {ι, ϕ, ω, θ} (2.61)
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2.5.1.3 Memory cells
The next goal is to demonstrate the equivalence of memory cell states
in LSTM and LSTM-g. Starting again from the unit state equation for
LSTM-g (Equation 2.62, cf. Equation 2.15), Equation 2.63 substitutes the
self-connection weight with its value of 1 and replaces the self-connection gate
with the associated forget gate. Moving to Equation 2.64 requires recognizing
that all of the connections coming into the memory cell in question are gated
by the memory cell’s associated input gate, so gcji = yιj∀i and the term can
move outside the sum. The remaining sum is equal to the net (ungated)
input to the memory cell, resulting in the equation for LSTM memory cell
states (Equation 2.65, cf. Equation 2.3).
scj = gcjcj wcjcj ŝcj +
∑
i 6=cj
gcji wcji yi (2.62)
= yϕj ŝcj +
∑
i 6=cj
gcji wcji yi (2.63)




= yϕj ŝcj + yιj xcj (2.65)
The activation variable ycj does not line up directly in LSTM-g and
LSTM, since LSTM requires the output gate to modulate the activation of
the memory cell directly, while LSTM-g defers the modulation until the acti-
vation is passed on through a gated connection. The distinction has already
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been noted and appropriately dealt with in the discussion of Equation 2.57
and is not problematic for the proof at hand.
2.5.2 Weight change equivalence
The previous section showed the equivalence of activation dynamics
when LSTM-g is used on the LSTM architecture. The following section
shows the equivalence of the weight changes performed by each algorithm.
2.5.2.1 Output units
Since the output units in LSTM-g get the same error responsibility
from the environment as in LSTM, the proof need only consider whether
each connection in question has the same eligibility trace in the two schemes;
proving this will trivially show weight change equivalence. Only the general
LSTM-g eligibility trace equation is relevant, as the output units perform no
gating (Equation 2.66, cf. Equation 2.17). The first term drops out because
the output units have no self-connections (Equation 2.67). Since the connec-
tion in question is from the memory cell layer, the gating term becomes the
output gate activation (Equation 2.68). The two remaining factors are equal
to LSTM’s definition of the memory cell activation (Equation 2.69), which is
consistent with LSTM using only the sending unit’s activation as an output
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unit eligibility trace (Equation 2.70, cf. Equation 2.5).
εji = gjj wjj ε̂ji + gji yi (2.66)
= gji yi (2.67)




To prove equivalent changes to weights into the output gate units,
Equation 2.71 begins with the generalized eligibility trace equation from
LSTM-g (cf. Equation 2.17). Output gate units have no self-connections,
so the first term drops out (Equation 2.72). The incoming connections to
the output gate are not gated, so the gating term is 1 (Equation 2.73). The
result is the most recent activity of the sending unit on this connection, which
is the same eligibility trace as in LSTM (Equation 2.74, cf. Equation 2.5).
εji = gjj wjj ε̂ji + gji yi (2.71)




Next, Equation 2.75 begins with the extended eligibility traces for out-
put gates, starting from LSTM-g (cf. Equation 2.18). Output gates only
modulate connections to the output layer, implying k ∈ θ, and none of these
units have self-connections; thus, the first term outside the parentheses drops,
as does the first term inside the parentheses (Equation 2.76). Each output
gate will modulate only a single connection into each output unit—the con-
nection from its associated memory cell to the output unit in question—so
the sum reduces to a single term (Equation 2.77).


















= f ′j(sj) εji wθkcj ycj (2.77)
Finally, starting from the LSTM-g weight change (Equation 2.78, cf.
Equation 2.24), simplification reveals the equation for LSTM weight change.
Equation 2.79 shows that for output gates, which project no weighted con-
nections, the set Pj is empty, making δPj zero and eliminating the first term.
For output gates, the set Gj is precisely the set of output units θ; thus,
Equation 2.80 replaces the eligibility trace term with the simplified version
from Equation 2.77, moving common terms in the sum to the outside. Re-
arranging the equation reveals a term (in parentheses, Equation 2.81) that
is equal to LSTM’s formulation of the error responsibility for an output gate
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(Equation 2.11). Making that replacement and the replacement of the eligi-
bility trace (Equation 2.82) produces the exact weight change prescribed by
LSTM (Equation 2.83, cf. Equation 2.13).
























= α δωj εωji (2.82)
= ∆wωji (2.83)
2.5.2.3 Memory cells
As with the output units, the proof for the memory cells need only
consider the basic eligibility trace (Equation 2.84, cf. Equation 2.17), since
the memory cells perform no gating functions. Equation 2.85 notes that
the self-connection weight is 1, and the self-connection gate is the associated
forget gate. Equation 2.86 shows that the input connection must be gated
by the appropriate input gate, revealing precisely the form of the eligibility
trace from LSTM (Equation 2.87, cf. Equation 2.6).
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εji = gjj wjj ε̂ji + gji yi (2.84)
= yϕj ε̂ji + gji yi (2.85)
= yϕj ε̂ji + yιj yi (2.86)
= εcji (2.87)
Again due to the lack of gating, the proof need only consider δj =
δPj (Equation 2.88, cf. Equation 2.21). Recognizing that all connections
forward are gated by the associated output gate, Equation 2.89 replaces all
the gkj terms in the sum with yωj , making this a factor outside the sum.
Equation 2.90 simply renames the derivative and weight terms based on the






δk gkj wkj (2.88)









Starting with the weight change equation from LSTM-g (Equation 2.92,
cf. Equation 2.24), Equation 2.93 removes the second term since Gj is empty,
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and Equation 2.94 substitutes the equal quantities derived earlier to re-
produce LSTM’s weight change for memory cells (Equation 2.95, cf. Equa-
tion 2.13).






= α δPj εji (2.93)
= α δcj εcji (2.94)
= ∆wcji (2.95)
2.5.2.4 Forget gates
Similarly for forget gates, the general LSTM-g eligibility trace (Equa-
tion 2.96, cf. Equation 2.17) can be simplified by noting that the forget gates
themselves do not self-connect (Equation 2.97), and that the inputs are not
gated (Equation 2.98).
εji = gjj wjj ε̂ji + gji yi (2.96)
= gji yi (2.97)
= yi (2.98)
The extended eligibility trace (Equation 2.99, cf. Equation 2.18) can
be simplified by noting first that the only relevant k is the single memory
cell whose self-connection this unit gates, which suggests rewriting the first
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gate term as the forget gate activation. In the parentheses, the derivative
term and wkk both go to 1, and since there are no non-self-connections that
this unit gates, the sum is empty (Equation 2.100). Reorganizing and re-
naming some terms—as well as replacing the eligibility trace as calculated in
Equation 2.98—reveals the form in Equation 2.101. The inductive assump-
tion that the eligibility trace from the previous time-step, ε̂
cj
ji , is equal to
the previous LSTM eligibility trace, ε̂ϕji (Equation 2.102), reveals that the
eligibility traces are the same for the current step as well (Equation 2.103,
cf. Equation 2.7).




















j(sj) εji ŝcj (2.100)
= yϕj ε̂
cj









As it was for the output gates, δPj is zero (Equation 2.104, cf. Equa-
tion 2.24), since Pj is empty for the forget gates, resulting in Equation 2.105.
Here, Gj contains only the memory cell whose self-connection this unit gates
(Equation 2.106). As shown earlier, the eligibility traces are equal (Equa-
tion 2.107), and δcj = δϕj as shown in Equation 2.12, revealing LSTM’s
weight change for forget gates (Equation 2.108, cf. Equation 2.13).
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= α δcj ε
cj
ji (2.106)
= α δϕj εϕji (2.107)
= ∆wϕji (2.108)
2.5.2.5 Input gates
For input gates, as for forget gates, the LSTM-g eligibility trace (Equa-
tion 2.109, cf. Equation 2.17) is simplified by dropping the first term, since
input gates do not self-connect (Equation 2.110), and letting gji go to 1, since
the inputs are not gated (Equation 2.111).
εji = gjj wjj ε̂ji + gji yi (2.109)
= gji yi (2.110)
= yi (2.111)
Equation 2.112 again begins with the extended eligibility trace (cf.
Equation 2.18), where the only k in play is the single memory cell whose input
connections are modulated by this input gate. Thus, the first gain term can
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be replaced by the forget gate activation, and the derivative term inside the
parentheses goes to zero (Equation 2.113). Next, Equation 2.114 renames the
f ′j term appropriately, replaces the eligibility trace with its simplification from
Equation 2.111, and recognizes that the remaining sum is in fact the ungated
net input to the memory cell in question. Under the inductive assumption
that the previous step’s eligibility traces are equal (Equation 2.115), those of
the current step are equal as well (Equation 2.116, cf. Equation 2.8).





























(xιj) yi xcj (2.114)





Starting again with the unified LSTM-g weight update equation (Equa-
tion 2.117, cf. Equation 2.24), Equation 2.118 drops the first term since δPj
is zero. Equation 2.119 reflects the fact that the only cell in the set Gj is the
associated memory cell cj of this input gate, simplifying the sum to a single
term. Using Equation 2.12, Equation 2.120 can be obtained by replacing δcj
with διj (which is equivalent for this network), as well as replacing ε
cj
ji accord-
ing to Equation 2.116. The result is precisely the weight change specified by
LSTM for input gate connections (Equation 2.121, cf. Equation 2.13).
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= α δcj ε
cj
ji (2.119)
= α διj ειji (2.120)
= ∆wιji (2.121)
This section has shown that every unit in a canonical LSTM network
architecture calculates identical activations and weight updates under LSTM
and LSTM-g, thus concluding the proof that LSTM is a special case of
LSTM-g.
2.6 Comparison of LSTM and LSTM-g
As stated in Section 2.3 and proved in Section 2.5, an LSTM-g net-
work with the same architecture as an LSTM network will produce the same
weight changes as LSTM training would, provided that peephole connec-
tions are not present. When peephole connections are added to the LSTM
architecture, however, LSTM-g utilizes a source of error that LSTM training
neglects: error responsibilities back-propagated from the output gates across
the peephole connections to the associated memory cells and beyond. To
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demonstrate this, the next paragraphs calculate the error responsibility for
a memory cell j in an LSTM-g network and compare the answer to the error
responsibility for that same unit as prescribed by LSTM training.
Beginning with the generic error responsibility equation from LSTM-g
(Equation 2.23), the cell in question is the architectural equivalent of a mem-
ory cell, and as such, it performs no gating functions. Thus, the set of gated
cells Gj is empty and δGj is zero, leaving δPj alone as the error responsibility.
Equation 2.122 substitutes Equation 2.21 for δPj . The constituents of Pj can
be determined by recalling that the memory cell in question projects connec-
tions to all the output units and sends peephole connections to its controlling
input gate, forget gate, and output gate. From this set of receiving units,
only the output units and the output gate are downstream from the memory
cell, so they comprise Pj. Taking each type of unit in Pj individually, Equa-
tion 2.123 expands the sum. Finally, Equation 2.14 shows that, because the
peephole connection to the output gate is not gated, the gωjcj term goes to
1; in addition, all the output connections are gated by the output gate, so
every gθkcj term becomes yωj , and the term can move outside the sum. The
resulting Equation 2.124 should be equal to δcj as shown in Equation 2.125
(derived from Equation 2.12) to make LSTM-g equivalent to LSTM training
in this case.
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Upon inspection, it becomes clear that LSTM-g includes a bit of ex-
tra back-propagated error—as indicated by the term δωj wωjcj—originating
from the output gate. Besides giving a more accurate weight update for con-
nections into memory cell j, this change in error will be captured in δj and
passed upstream to the forget gates and input gates. As demonstrated in Sec-
tion 2.7, this extra information helps LSTM-g perform slightly better than
the original algorithm on an LSTM architecture with peephole connections.
2.7 Experiments
Examining the effectiveness of LSTM-g involves performing a number of
experimental comparisons using various neural network architectures trained
with either the original LSTM algorithm or the LSTM-g algorithm from
Section 2.3, as detailed in the following sections.
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2.7.1 Distracted sequence recall on the standard architecture
The first set of experiments trains different neural networks on a task
called the distracted sequence recall task. This task is a variation of the
temporal order task, which is arguably the most challenging task demon-
strated by Hochreiter and Schmidhuber (1997). The distracted sequence re-
call task involves 10 symbols, each represented locally by a single active unit
in an input layer of 10 units: 4 target symbols, which must be recognized
and remembered by the network, 4 distractor symbols, which never need to
be remembered, and 2 prompt symbols, which direct the network to give an
answer. A single trial consists of a presentation of a temporal sequence of 24
input symbols. The first 22 consist of 2 randomly chosen target symbols and
20 randomly chosen distractor symbols, all in random order; the remaining
2 symbols are the prompts, which direct the network to produce the first
and second targets in the sequence, in order, regardless of when they oc-
curred. The targets may appear at any point in the sequence, so the network
cannot rely on their temporal position as a cue; rather, the network must
recognize the symbols as targets and preferentially save them, along with
temporal order information, to produce the correct output sequence. The
network is trained to produce no output for all symbols except the prompts,
and for each prompt symbol, the network must produce the output symbol
that corresponds to the appropriate target from the sequence.
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The major difference between the temporal order task and the dis-
tracted sequence recall task is as follows. In the former, the network is re-
quired to activate one of 16 output units, each of which represents a possible
ordered sequence of both target symbols. In contrast, the latter task requires
the network to activate one of only 4 output units, each representing a single
target symbol; the network must activate the correct output unit for each of
the targets, in the same order they were observed. Requiring the network to
produce outputs in sequence adds a layer of difficulty; however, extra gener-
alization power may be imparted by the fact that the network is now using
the same output weights to indicate the presence of a target, regardless of its
position in the sequence. Because the temporal order task was found to be
unsolvable by known architectures other than the LSTM architecture when
trained by gradient descent-based methods (Hochreiter and Schmidhuber,
1997), the comparisons here do not include methods other than LSTM and
LSTM-g. Further, the comparisons do not include second-order networks
trained with BPTT, RTRL, or other such methods, restricting the focus to
spatially and temporally local training methods.
The first experiment examines the impact of the extra error informa-
tion utilized by LSTM-g and involves training two types of networks on the
distracted sequence recall task. The first network serves as a control and is
a typical LSTM network with forget gates, peephole connections, and direct
input-to-output connections (see Figure 2.2), and is trained by the LSTM
algorithm. The second network has the same architecture as the first, but
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is trained by the LSTM-g algorithm, allowing it to take advantage of back-
propagated peephole connection error terms.
All runs of each network use the same basic approach and parameters:
a single unit in the input layer for each of the 10 input symbols, 8 units in
the memory cell layer and associated gate layers, 4 units in the output layer
for the target symbols, and a learning rate α = 0.1. Both networks are aug-
mented with peephole connections and direct input-to-output connections.
Thus, both algorithms are training networks with 416 weights. Networks are
allowed to train on random instances of the distracted sequence recall task
until they achieve the performance criterion of 95% accuracy on a test set of
1000 randomly selected sequences that the network had never encountered
during training. To get credit for processing a sequence correctly, the network
is required to keep all output units below an activation level of 0.5 during all
symbols in the sequence except prompts, activating only the correct target
symbol in these cases—meaning that all units must have activations on the
same side of 0.5 as the target associated with the prompt. This correctness
criterion is used both for networks trained by the LSTM algorithm and for
those trained by the LSTM-g algorithm to ensure that the two types are
compared on an equal footing. Each network type is run 50 times, using
randomized initial weights in the range [−0.1, 0.1).
Figure 2.3 compares the number of trials required to train the two





























































































































LSTM Peephole LSTM-g Peephole
Figure 2.3: Plot of the results of an experiment that pitted LSTM-g against
LSTM, each training an identical standard peephole LSTM architecture to
perform the distracted sequence recall task. Small points are individual net-
work runs, jittered to highlight their density. The large black point for each
network type is the mean over all 50 runs, with standard error (small bars)
and standard deviation (large bars). The results show that LSTM-g’s uti-
lization of extra error information is clearly beneficial.
pected, but there are differences in how quickly they achieve this. In partic-
ular, LSTM-g is able to train the LSTM network architecture significantly
faster than the original algorithm (as evaluated by a Welch two-sample t-test
after removing outliers greater than 2 standard deviations from the sample
mean, with t ≈ 5.1, df ≈ 80.9, p < 10−5). This demonstrates that LSTM-g
can provide a clear advantage over LSTM in terms of the amount of training
required, even on an LSTM-compatible architecture.
66
2.7.2 Distracted sequence recall on a customized architecture
The second experiment investigates the relative performance of the
standard LSTM architecture compared to other network architectures that
would require modifications to the LSTM training paradigm. This experi-
ment involves training three additional types of networks on the same dis-
tracted sequence recall task. The first network serves as the control and
utilizes the LSTM algorithm to train a standard LSTM architecture that is
the same as in the previous experiment except for the addition of recurrent
connections from all (output-gated) memory cells to all the gate units. This
architecture is termed gated recurrence architecture and is depicted in
Figure 2.4(a). The second network also uses the gated recurrence architecture
but is trained by LSTM-g. The third network is a new ungated recurrence
architecture, shown in Figure 2.4(b), which starts with the standard LSTM
architecture and adds direct, ungated connections from each memory cell to
all gate units. These connections come from the ungated memory cell output
like peephole connections would, but unlike peephole connections, these are
projected to gate units both inside and outside of the local memory block.
The intuition behind this architecture comes from the idea that a memory
cell should be able to communicate its contents not only to its controlling
gates but also to the other memory blocks in the hidden layer, while still
hiding these contents from downstream units. Such communication would
intuitively be a major boon for sequential storage and retrieval tasks be-
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cause it allows a memory block to choose what to store based on what is
already stored in other blocks, even if the contents of those blocks are not
yet ripe for consideration in calculating the network output. These ungated
cell-to-gate connections are a direct generalization of peephole connections,
but the new architecture that results could only be trained by the LSTM
algorithm if it were modified to suit the architecture. As such, the following
presents only the results of training the ungated recurrence architecture with
LSTM-g, which requires no special treatment of these ungated cell-to-gate
connections.
Each of the three networks uses the same approach and parameters as in
the previous experiment. This means both types of networks using the gated
recurrence architecture have 608 trainable connections, and the ungated re-
currence architecture has only 584 because the 24 peephole connections used
in the gated recurrence architecture would be redundant.2
Though these networks are more complex than those in the first exper-
iment, they are able to learn the task more quickly. Figure 2.5 shows that
for each run, the number of trials necessary before each of three networks
reaches the performance criterion. Again, LSTM-g appears to have a slight
speed advantage over LSTM when applied to the LSTM-compatible gated
2The experiments reported here were also run with a variant of the gated recurrence
architecture without the 24 peephole connections, leaving it with the same 584 weights
as the ungated recurrence architecture; however, the lack of peephole connections caused
a severe learning slowdown. In the interest of comparing LSTM-g against the strongest
possible control, the following paragraphs report only the results from the gated recurrence
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Figure 2.4: The network architectures used in the second experiment (c.f.
Figure 2.2). In (a), the previous LSTM architecture is augmented with a full
complement of recurrent connections from each memory cell to each gate, re-
gardless of memory block associations; all these connections are gated by the
appropriate output gate. In (b), the architecture’s peephole connections are
replaced with a full complement of ungated connections from each memory
cell to every gate. This second architectural variant is incompatible with the
LSTM training algorithm, as it requires all connections out of the memory
















































































































































































LSTM Gated Arch LSTM-g Gated Arch LSTM-g Ungated Arch
Figure 2.5: Plot of the results on the distracted sequence recall task for
three networks: an LSTM network augmented with peephole connections
and gated recurrent connections from all memory cells to all gates, trained
by either LSTM or LSTM-g; and an LSTM-g network with ungated recurrent
connections from all memory cells to all gates. The ungated recurrence net-
work, trainable only with LSTM-g, clearly reaches the performance criterion
after less training than the comparable gated recurrence network as trained
by either LSTM or LSTM-g.
recurrence architecture, though this difference narrowly misses statistical sig-
nificance (t ≈ 1.8, df ≈ 87.9, p < 0.08). More interesting is the improvement
that LSTM-g achieves on the novel ungated recurrence architecture, which
reaches significance easily compared to both the gated recurrence architec-
ture trained with LSTM (t ≈ 15.3, df ≈ 79.6, p < 10−15) and with LSTM-g
(t ≈ 10.2, df ≈ 69.6, p < 10−14). LSTM-g is able to train the ungated
recurrence architecture faster than either it or LSTM can train the gated
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recurrence architecture. This difference illustrates the potential benefits of
the wide range of customized architectures that LSTM-g can train.
2.7.3 Language recognition on a two-stage architecture
The final experiment adopts a more involved and substantially different
language recognition task, similar to those studied recently using other
neural network models (Monner and Reggia, 2009). In this task, a network is
given an English sentence as input and is expected to produce a set of pred-
icates describing that sentence as output. The input sentence is represented
as a temporal sequence of phonemes, each of which is a vector of binary
acoustic features, borrowed directly from Weems and Reggia (2006). The
network should produce as output a temporal sequence of predicates that
bind key concepts in the sentence into coherent entities. For example, for
the input sentence the red pyramid is on the blue block, the network should
produce the predicates (red X), (pyramid X), (blue Y), (block Y), and
(on X Y). The variables are simply identifiers used to associate the various
predicates with each other; in this example, the three predicates containing
variable X come together to signify that a single object in the world is a red
pyramid that is on top of something else. However, these predicate repre-
sentations are not grounded, since they do not correspond to objects in a
world that the network can observe; the issue of grounding is addressed in
Chapter 4.
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In the actual output representation used by the network, each predicate
type is represented as a single one in a vector of zeros, and the variables
required by each predicate are also represented in this way. In other words, a
network performing this task requires a set of output neurons to represent the
types of predicates, with each unit standing for a single predicate type, and
two additional independent sets of neurons that each represent a variable,
since there can be at most two variables involved in any predicate. The task
demands that the network produce the required predicates in a temporal
fashion to avoid imposing architectural limits on the number of predicates
that a given input sentence could entail.
Part of the appeal of this task is that it is hierarchically decompos-
able. To discover a readily generalizable solution, common wisdom suggests
that the best strategy for the network to use is to aggregate the incoming
phonemes incrementally into morphemes, words, phrases, and finally, entire
sentences. The intuition is that architectures capable of directly supporting
this type of hierarchical decomposition would be superior to those that do
not. Testing this notion involves a two-stage architecture, shown in Fig-
ure 2.6. At first it may appear complex, but it is essentially the standard
LSTM architecture with peephole connections, except with a second hid-
den layer of memory block assemblies in series with the first. LSTM cannot
efficiently train such an architecture because the back-propagated error sig-
nals would be truncated and never reach the earlier layer of memory blocks.
LSTM-g, on the other hand, trains the two-stage architecture without diffi-
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culty. A standard LSTM network with peephole connections (see Figure 2.2)
serves as a control to the two-stage architecture trained by LSTM-g, with
its parameters appropriately adjusted to match the resources of the latter
network as closely as possible.
Both networks in this experiment use essentially the same parameters
as in the previous two experiments—the only difference is in the size of the
networks. The two-stage architecture has 34 input units (corresponding to
the size of the phoneme feature vectors used as input), 40 memory blocks
in the first stage, 40 additional memory blocks in the second stage, and 14
output units, giving a total of 13,676 trainable connections. The standard
LSTM control has the same 34 input units and 14 output units, with a
single hidden layer of 87 memory blocks, giving it a slight edge with 7 more
total memory blocks and 13,787 trainable connections. These numbers were
selected to give the two networks parity in terms of computational resources,
to the extent that the architecture designs and problem constraints allow.
During a single trial in the language recognition task, the network being
tested is given each individual phoneme from a sentence as input in consec-
utive time-steps, and after the entire input sequence has been processed, the
network must output one complete predicate on each subsequent time-step,
until the network produces a special “done” predicate to signify that it is
finished producing relevant predicates. The networks are trained to produce
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Figure 2.6: The two-stage network architecture, used in the third experi-
ment. This architecture is a variant of the standard LSTM architecture with
peephole connections (Figure 2.2) that has a second layer of memory block
assemblies in series with the first. The traditional LSTM training algorithm
cannot effectively train this architecture due to the truncation of error sig-
nals, which would never reach the earlier layer of memory blocks. Intuition
suggests that the two self-recurrent layers allow this network to excel at hi-
erarchically decomposable tasks such as the language recognition task.
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a way that correct predicates produced in any order count as correct answers.
A predicate is deemed to be correct if all units have activations on the cor-
rect side of 0.5. The testing program also records the number of unrelated
predicates that the networks generate; however, this number closely tracks
the inverse of the fraction of correct predicates produced, and as such, the
reports that follow only include the number correct.
A small, mildly context-sensitive grammar generates the sentences and
corresponding predicates for this simple version of the language recognition
task. The sentences contain combinations of 10 different words, suggesting
meanings involving 8 different types of predicates with up to 3 distinct ob-
jects referenced per sentence. The simplest sentences require only 3 output
predicates to express their meanings, while the most complex require the
networks to produce as many as 9 predicates in sequence as output. Thirty-
two copies of each network train independently on this task. On each run,
the network in question begins with random weights and is allowed to train
through 1 million trials. The performance of the network is gauged periodi-
cally on a battery of 100 test sentences that the network has never previously
encountered during training. The duration of training is more than sufficient
to ensure that all networks reach their peak performance levels.
Figure 2.7 shows a comparison of the peak performance rates of the two
types of networks, based on the fraction of correct predicates produced on the


































































































LSTM Standard LSTM-g Two-Stage
Figure 2.7: Plot of the performance results on the language recognition
task produced by a standard LSTM network and the two-stage architecture
trained by LSTM-g. The standard LSTM networks were able to produce
approximately 87% of predicates correctly at peak performance, while the
two-stage LSTM-g networks garnered 94% on average.
to achieve significantly better generalization performance than the standard
LSTM network on average (t ≈ 9.4, df ≈ 57.9, p < 10−12). In addition, the
two-stage network was able to achieve this performance much more quickly
than the control. Figure 2.8 plots the number of trials required for each
network to produce 80% of predicates correctly; this threshold was chosen
because every run of every network was able to achieve this performance level.
The two-stage network required approximately 4 times fewer trials to reach
the 80% performance criterion, which is a significant difference (t ≈ 10.9,
df ≈ 31.4, p < 10−11). These results underscore the value of using LSTM-g





























































































LSTM Standard LSTM-g Two-Stage
Figure 2.8: Plot of the training duration required for each type of network
to reach the criterion of producing 80% of the required predicates for input
sentences. The standard LSTM network required an average of about 220,000
trials to reach this performance criterion, while the two-stage network trained
by LSTM-g required fewer than 60,000.
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2.8 Discussion
The original LSTM architecture and the associated training algorithm
was an important advance in gradient training methods for recurrent neural
networks that must learn to handle temporal input and output series, even
across long time lags. While the LSTM architecture and extensions thereof
have proven useful in a variety of contexts, the LSTM training algorithm
has often been replaced in these studies by the nonlocal BPTT, which was
necessary to train more complex network architectures. Thus, the original
LSTM training algorithm was limited in scope to a small family of second-
order recurrent neural architectures. This chapter has introduced LSTM-g, a
generalized algorithm that provides the power, speed, and spatial and tempo-
ral locality of the LSTM algorithm, while also being applicable to arbitrary
second-order recurrent neural networks.
In addition to the increased architectural applicability it provides com-
pared to the original training algorithm, LSTM-g makes use of extra back-
propagated error when applied to the canonical LSTM network architecture
with peephole connections. This error can be put to good use, with LSTM-g
converging after less training than the LSTM training algorithm required in
experiments that utilize the standard LSTM network architecture. Further,
customized network architectures trained with LSTM-g can produce better
performance than either LSTM or LSTM-g can produce when restricted to
the standard architecture. In light of previous research that shows LSTM to
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outperform other recurrent network architectures when using training meth-
ods of comparable computational complexity (Hochreiter and Schmidhuber,
1997), the results contained herein suggest that LSTM-g may find produc-
tive application in many areas where customizable or dynamically changing
network architectures are desirable.
LSTM-g is designed to provide a robust training algorithm for second-
order neural networks where maintaining brain-like spatial and temporal lo-
cality is essential. In the future, however, it will likely be worth investigating
whether LSTM-g may also be of use in situations where spatial and tempo-
ral locality are not hard requirements—situations in which BPTT, RTRL,
DEKF, or other methods are generally used to train second-order network
architectures. While it is unlikely that LSTM-g would outperform these
algorithms in terms of final error rates, it is plausible that the locality prop-
erties of LSTM-g would lead to a better performance-to-computation ratio,
resulting in faster convergence in terms of required computation time, and
possibly to the formation of qualitatively different types of internal represen-
tations. Regardless of the outcome of such comparisons, LSTM-g broadens




Modeling Critical Period Effects1
3.1 Introduction
Given the creation and initial testing of the generalized long short-term
memory (LSTM-g) in Chapter 2, the extent to which the type of learning
produced by the algorithm resembles human learning remains to be inves-
tigated. This question’s importance is immediately clear for applications
modeling human behaviors, like the neurocomputational language models
that are the main focus of this dissertation. However, the question also
has relevance for machine learning in general. Many machine learning algo-
rithms, especially when they fail, often produce results that are inscrutable
to humans, who have trouble following the chain of reasoning the machine
uses to derive its answer. The extent to which a particular algorithm learns
in a human-like way impacts humans’ ability to relate to the results that the
algorithm produces. This is one reason to prefer neural network algorithms—
which depend on a distributed structure that resembles the human brain—to
strict rule-based algorithms: The results produced tend to be softer, more
graded, or more human-like than those produced by rules. But even among
1The research described in this chapter is joint work with Karen Vatz, Giovanna
Morini, So-One Hwang, and Robert DeKeyser (Monner et al., under review).
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neural network algorithms, one must consider the extent of this analogy. Do
the networks suffer from the same learning biases, deficits, and artifacts that
humans experience? This chapter explores this question with two neural
network models that learn gender assignment and gender agreement in mul-
tiple languages with the overarching goal of reproducing a well-known human
learning artifact called the critical period.
The term critical period is often used by language researchers to
describe the observation that people who learn a second language (L2) later
in life tend to have poorer ultimate attainment than those who learn the same
language earlier in life. Cross-linguistically, there is a clear downward trend in
many, although not all, measures of language proficiency as age of acquisition
increases (DeKeyser, in press). These declines are not necessarily limited to
an early period in the lifespan which is critical for language acquisition, as was
originally thought. This phenomenon has been referred to by many names,
usually based on the author’s thoughts on the phenomenon’s likely cause.
Those who suspect some human maturational process to be responsible often
refer to a critical period in language learning or age effects on language
acquisition. Others, who view the issue as a problem inherent in the process
of learning, speak of cross-linguistic interference or entrenchment effects. Still
others couch the problem in terms of individual differences of the language
learners and quality and form of the L2 input. While there is support for all
of these accounts of this phenomenon, it is generally difficult to study any
of the potential causes in isolation. Without committing to any particular
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view of the relative contributions of the causes or temporal durations of the
effects, this chapter will refer collectively to age-correlated phenomena that
impede second language acqusition as “critical period effects.”
The research described in this chapter uses neural network models to
investigate the individual and compound effects that two of these potential
causes of critical period effects have on ultimate attainment of a learner’s first
and second languages. The first factor of study, entrenchment, can best
be understood as previous knowledge of the first language that is difficult to
change and can perhaps only be altered slowly, thus interfering with the rapid
acquisition of newly available information about the second language. In this
scenario, the longer that learners are exposed to their first language (L1)
before a second language is introduced, the more L1 becomes entrenched,
making L2 more difficult to learn.
The second factor examined is memory development—specifically,
the aspects of working memory capacity and long-term memory capacity,
as implemented by the periodic addition of new units and connections, re-
spectively, to the neural network models. Working memory development is
particularly interesting in light of evidence that the period of rapid growth of
working memory capacity in children (Gathercole, 1999) coincides with the
period of rapid deterioration of L2 learning ability, a theory that is usually
known as the “less is more” hypothesis (Newport, 1988, 1990; Goldowsky
and Newport, 1993).
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Using only experimentation on human subjects, it is difficult to get a
complete picture of the relative contributions of entrenchment and memory
development. While there are exceptions, specifically in the sign language
domain, language learning almost invariably starts very early in life, causing
L1 acquisition and early L2 acquisition to coincide with many aspects of
development. Thus, the contributions of these two factors to the observed
differences in ultimate attainment between early and late L2 learners cannot
be readily separated from each other. A computational model, on the other
hand, enables study of the interaction of the two chosen factors from all sides,
describing the effects of each in isolation as well as their combined impact.
Of course, at present, a computer model cannot learn an entire natural
language as human learners can. As such, the models presented here learn the
linguistic subtasks of gender assignment (learning to attribute gender to
words) and gender agreement (learning to recognize phrases where related
words all have the same gender). These gender-related tasks were chosen for
two reasons: Native and non-native speakers of a language tend to differ
significantly on these tasks, and ultimate attainment tends to vary with age
of acquisition. The models described here learn to perform gender assign-
ment and gender agreement tasks from naturalistic training data based on
word co-occurrence, without having any built-in knowledge of the existence
or form of grammatical gender and without being given explicit instruction
in the genders of particular words or phrases. The goal is that these models
will provide a better understanding of how the two potential factors stud-
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ied here—entrenchment and memory development—contribute individually
and in tandem to differences in ultimate language attainment. Comparing
the patterns of attainment of the models with those of human learners can
also begin to answer the important question of the extent to which results
produced by LSTM-g will be relatable and intelligible to humans.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2
reviews previous research on critical period effects and its relation to the
acquisition of grammatical gender, as well as hypotheses relating this phe-
nomenon to working memory and to L1 entrenchment. Section 3.3 describes
the base neural network used in the models, as well as the variations used
in the experimental conditions. Section 3.4 illustrates separate experiments
and results for the gender assignment and gender agreement tasks. Finally,
Section 3.5 discusses the implications of the simulation results.
3.2 Background
3.2.1 Critical period effects
As mentioned in Section 3.1, during the past few decades, researchers
have accumulated a preponderance of evidence suggesting that learning a
second language becomes increasingly difficult with age, resulting in poorer
ultimate attainment—compared to native speakers—for individuals who be-
gin learning a language later in life (see Hyltenstam and Abrahamsson, 2003,
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for an overview). This effect was first termed the critical period, indicating
the period of time up until about age five during which children learning
a second language do so with minimal impairment and no noticeable ac-
cent. Subsequent research has shown that a learner’s ability to attain new
languages continue to decline throughout the lifespan.
The potential causes of this phenomenon are many, and the data are
difficult to disentangle due to unavoidable confounds associated with the
development and maturation of the learners being studied (DeKeyser and
Larson-Hall, 2005). Oft-cited maturational explanations of critical period
effects include those at the level of neurobiology: hemispheric specialization
(Lenneberg, 1967), myelination (Long, 1990), and neuro- and synaptogene-
sis (Uylings, 2006); and those at the level of psychology: working memory
development (Newport, 1990), susceptibility to interference (Iverson et al.,
2003), and progression from procedural to declarative learning (DeKeyser,
2000; Paradis, 2009; Ullman, 2004). Explanations that do not rely on the
development of the learner include entrenchment of the L1 (MacWhinney,
2006), learner motivation to sound native (Bley-Vroman, 1988), amount of
practice in the L2 (Jia et al., 2002; Jia and Aaronson, 2003), amount of for-
mal education in the L2 (Hakuta et al., 2003), and the inherent variability
of individuals (Abrahamsson and Hyltenstam, 2008; DeKeyser et al., 2010).
Since the various developmental explanations tend to correlate with
each other and also with many of the nondevelopmental variables, experi-
mental studies on human subjects that facilitate clean separation of all these
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theories are generally only possible in rare and specialized circumstances such
as late acquisition of a native sign language (Mayberry et al., 2002). This
confluence of confounds makes the issue ripe for computational simulations
in which each factor can be controlled independently.
3.2.2 Grammatical gender
The size of the observed critical period effect varies across different
types of linguistic competence. For example, the syntactic proficiency of a
late learner seems to suffer less than morphological proficiency (Johnson and
Newport, 1989). Low-level details of phonology, such as specific voice onset
time (Abrahamsson and Hyltenstam, 2009), seem to be particularly difficult
for late learners to master. Successfully modeling critical period effects, then,
requires choosing a linguistic competency that is not only simple enough to
model but also degrades as L2 age-of-onset increases.
The linguistic phenomenon that the models will learn about is gram-
matical gender, which refers to an arbitrary partitioning of words into classes
referred to as genders. Several studies suggest that grammatical gender is
subject to critical period effects. Late learners of French (Guillelmon and
Grosjean, 2001), Spanish (Lew-Williams and Fernald, 2010), and German
(Scherag et al., 2004) have all been shown to be slower than native speakers
when processing gender agreement relations. Even children who start learn-
ing L2 French at an early age show accuracy deficits in gender assignment
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English: The little book is white.
The little table is white.
French: Le petit livre (masc.) est blanc.
La petite table (fem.) est blanche.
Spanish: El libro (masc.) pequeño es blanco.
La mesa (fem.) pequeña es blanca.
Figure 3.1: Examples of gender agreement.
and agreement tasks when compared with native speakers (Holmes and de la
Bâtie, 1999; Lapkin and Swain, 1977; Harley, 1979). These results and many
others show that grammatical gender is subject to robust critical period ef-
fects and is thus an excellent candidate for computational modeling.
In particular, the models presented here will be learning to perform
gender assignment and gender agreement tasks in two languages, French and
Spanish. These languages have similar gender systems in that both have two
gender classes for nouns, labeled “masculine” and “feminine,” and determin-
ers, adjectives, and pronouns related to these nouns take different forms to
agree with the gender of the noun; see Figure 3.1 for an example. In both
languages, the gender of a noun is highly predictable from its phonological
form, though this predictability is more reliable in Spanish, due in part to
the simplicity of the rules (Surridge, 1993, 1995; Teschner and Russell, 1984).
Morphological and semantic cues are also predictive above and beyond the
phonological form (Surridge, 1989).
Grammatical gender in other languages is sometimes nonexistent, as in
English, and sometimes more complex, involving more gender classes, more
marked works, or fewer reliable cues to a word’s gender (Corbett, 1991).
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French and Spanish, however, are an ideal combination for a first attempt at
modeling critical period effects, due both to their simplicity and the imme-
diate availability of human expertise in both languages.
3.2.3 Memory development
Working memory is the name given to humans’ ability to store in-
formation for a short time to use in near-term processing. Working memory
capacity is a fuzzy psychological measure of the number of separate items
that can be held in memory at once and successfully recalled. A higher
working memory capacity is generally associated with improved performance
on a wide variety of tasks (Baddeley, 2003) and is often described as a key
component of general intelligence (Duncan et al., 2000).
Psychological measures of working memory capacity show that it grows
rapidly throughout childhood until plateauing in late adolescence (Gather-
cole, 1999). As mentioned in Section 3.1, this rapid growth accompanies a
similarly rapid decrease in the final proficiency of languages introduced at
these ages. It is initially puzzling that these two measures would have in-
verse trajectories. The “less is more” hypothesis (Newport, 1990) provides
a solution to this puzzle by insisting that smaller working memory capacity
is essential to fully internalizing the morphological, generative structure of
language. The idea is that a smaller working memory capacity provides a
bottleneck to force the learner to analyze linguistic input in smaller chunks,
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making low-level morphological features more salient and thus more easily
internalized. Learners who are first exposed to a language when their work-
ing memory capacities are larger, in contrast, process larger bits of language
as “unanalyzed wholes,” thus missing some of the compositional structure.
The neural network models presented in this chapter undergo memory
development, in the form of changes in both working memory capacity and
long-term memory capacity, to examine the effects of maturation on criti-
cal period effects. In a recurrent neural network, the equivalent of working
memory is the retention of activation across time-steps due to recurrent con-
nectivity. The amount of activity that can be maintained is proportional to
the total number of units that can hold activation. Thus, changes in work-
ing memory capacity can be modeled in a neural network as changes in the
number of units in the hidden layers. Of course, when varying the number
of units, one is generally forced to also vary the number of connections be-
tween units. Since these connections are modified slowly, they correspond to
the network’s long-term memory. The combination of experimental condi-
tions detailed in Section 3.3.2 is designed to tease apart the contributions of
changes in working memory capacity and long-term memory capacity.
3.2.4 Past computational modeling approaches
As discussed in Section 3.1, it is often difficult to experimentally sep-
arate the various possible causes of age effects when performing empirical
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research on human subjects. Computational modeling has a key advantage
in its ability to independently manipulate a number of variables and to ob-
serve their main effects and interactions. Early attempts at computational
modeling of critical period effects (Goldowsky and Newport, 1993) show sup-
port for the “less is more” hypothesis in that a model with a smaller working
memory was better able to learn certain grammatical patterns; this conclu-
sion was supported by later studies, computational and otherwise (Cochran
et al., 1999; Kareev et al., 1997; Kersten and Earles, 2001).
Previous neural network models that have dealt with aspects of mem-
ory development have used varying approaches to limiting working memory.
Elman (1993) trained simple recurrent networks (SRNs) on a complex sub-
set of English. This type of network uses recurrent connections to allow
the network to access its own previous states, creating an analog of working
memory. Elman found that these networks had better eventual performance
when this working memory was initially limited to a discrete window of a few
steps and gradually increased, consistent with the “less is more” hypothesis.
While others have failed to find a difference between developing and mature
networks on similar tasks (e.g., Rohde and Plaut, 1999), Elman’s study shows
one way in which working memory capacity can be modeled in a neural net-
work. The models presented here use a different approach, directly limiting
the number of units whose maintained activations provide access to previous
states, as opposed to limiting the network’s temporal window of access to
these states. This approach is, in a sense, similar to that of the DevLex
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models of word and meaning acquisition (Li et al., 2004, 2007), which utilize
growing self-organizing maps to represent semantics and phonology. These
maps grow by adding new units to accommodate storage of new lexical and
semantic representations; as such, the growth involved more closely resembles
long-term memory growth. The models in this chapter, in contrast, grow by
adding new units that form the substrate for working memory.
There have also been a few notable neural network models that involve
grammatical gender. MacWhinney et al. (1989) presented two neural network
models of the acquisition of gender, case, and number in German. Both of
these models learned to predict the article associated with a given noun, one
using hand-coded semantic, phonological, morphological, and case cues, and
the other using only observable data in the form of a complete phonological
representation of the input noun along with some semantic and case cues.
Both models succeeded at learning the nouns they were trained on and also
generalized very well to new nouns. The second model, without the hand-
coded cues, outperformed the first. Unfortunately, the static phonological
representations in this model only allow it to be applied to words of two
syllables or fewer. The models developed here, on the other hand, employ
temporal phonological representations that allow any word of virtually any
spoken language to be encoded.
Another neural network model of grammatical gender was advanced
by Sokolik and Smith (1992), who trained a feed-forward neural network to
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identify a corpus of French nouns as either masculine or feminine. Their
study, however, has been widely criticized (Carroll, 1995; Matthews, 1999)
for, among other things, using orthographic input, giving explicit gender
feedback, and building in language-specific knowledge about gender classes.
The approach demonstrated in this chapter addresses these and other con-
cerns, resulting in models that utilize only the information actually available
to language learners.
3.3 Methods
3.3.1 Neural network methods
The models described in this chapter approximate a language learner
using a long short-term memory neural network (LSTM; Hochreiter and
Schmidhuber, 1997; Gers and Cummins, 2000; Gers and Schmidhuber, 2001)
trained with the LSTM-g algorithm described in Chapter 2. The specifics of
the models, including the number of hidden layers and the number and type
of outputs, vary between the models designed for the gender assignment and
gender agreement tasks, and as such are described in detail for each case in
Section 3.4. However, the basic input and processing of the models is the
same. Since the aim of these models is to learn gender properties from speech
stimuli, they are each given an input layer able to represent one phoneme of
speech at a time. The network hears a sequence of such phonemes, one after
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another, with the sequence as a whole representing a word or noun phrase.
This process is analogous to listening to spoken sentence fragments.
The experiments that follow use these neural network models to under-
stand any critical period effects that arise due to the effects of entrenchment
and aspects of memory development. The first of these two factors is straight-
forward to implement: Simply teach a network to perform the same task in
two languages. Varying the amount of time before the L2 is introduced also
varies the expected amount of entrenchment of the L1. The second fac-
tor is developmental, and involves changes to a neural network’s structure
and connectivity over the course of the experiment, above and beyond the
connection-weight changes that occur during normal training. The different
development conditions and their effects on the neural architecture of the
models are discussed in the next section.
3.3.2 Development and network architecture
Most neural network models have a fixed number of units and connec-
tions for the duration of training. Training such a network, starting from
randomly assigned connection weights, is tantamount to waiting until a hu-
man learner is an adult, or at least fully neurologically developed in the
relevant areas, before exposing him or her to any language stimuli. Address-
ing cases where language learning happens along with development requires
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the examination of situations where the network structure develops during
training. The following paragraphs explain a few ways of doing this.
The default case just described, where all of the network’s units and
connections are present at the start of training, is termed the no growth
condition. In a second unit growth condition, the network begins with a
much smaller number of units and connections (see Figure 3.2). During the
training regimen, new units and their associated connections are gradually
added to the network until it reaches maturity with its maximum number of
units and connections, equivalent to the numbers present in the no growth
condition. Here, a new unit being added to the network is not necessar-
ily analogous to neurogenesis in humans; an alternative is that some of the
new connections, created through a process analogous to dendritic outgrowth
(Uylings, 2006), happen to project to existing units outside the current con-
nected component of the network, thus recruiting them for use in the current
task.
In this type of recurrent neural network, the persistent activations of
units are the basis of working memory. The network recruits new units during
the maturation process, increasing the amount of information it can process
at any given instant. One would reasonably expect this to correlate with
an increase in cognitive measures of working memory capacity during train-
ing. Since these networks start with a small working memory and increase










Initial State Final State...  Unit Growth  ...
Figure 3.2: A depiction of a network from the unit growth condition at
various states of maturity. On the left is the network’s initial state, with few
units in the hidden layer (delineated by the gray box). As time passes, the
network begins to recruit new units and their associated connections for this
layer (dashed lines), finally ending up in its mature state on the right, where
the number of units and connections is equivalent to a network from the no
growth condition.
more” hypothesis. This hypothesis admits two distinct and independently
controllable factors that could lead to better final language performance:
(1) starting with a small working memory, and (2) allocation of new working
memory resources during learning. The unit growth condition possesses both
factors, so separate investigation of these factors requires a third network de-
velopment condition, termed unit replacement, that has only the second
factor. In this condition, depicted in Figure 3.3, the network starts in the
same state as the no growth condition, with its full complement of units and
connections, and thus its full working memory capacity. Periodically, units
and their associated connections are removed from the network and replaced











Figure 3.3: A network from the unit replacement condition starts with a full
complement of units that are periodically removed and replaced with fresh
units and untrained connections.
commensurate with the rate at which units are added in the unit growth
condition. Thus, in both conditions fresh resources are introduced over time
at the same rate, but where the unit growth condition uses these resources to
grow the network from its initially small size, the unit replacement condition
accepts these fresh resources and discards an equal amount of its existing,
trained resources, thereby maintaining a constant size. Since the effective
size of the working memory does not change in the unit replacement condi-
tion, it will help determine if periodic introduction of fresh working memory
resources alone, without starting small, can produce any significant benefits.
The unit growth condition described earlier confounds two variables of
interest on the cognitive level. The new units that each network recruits
must be wired up using new connections. These connections, of course, are
the basis of long-term memory capacity in a neural network. Thus, a network
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from the unit growth condition adds both working memory and long-term
memory capacity during training. Teasing apart these variables necessitates
a fourth condition, termed the connection growth condition, in which all
units are present from the beginning but few of the possible connections ex-
ist (see Figure 3.4). Since all units are incorporated via active connections
from the beginning, the network’s working memory capacity is fully devel-
oped from the start. During training, the network grows new connections
at the same rate as in the unit growth condition, giving the network access
to new long-term memory storage and allowing direct measurement of the
effects of long-term memory maturation. In addition, this facilitates indirect
assessment of the contributions of working memory maturation (and com-
pound effects) by subtractive analysis with the unit growth and no growth
conditions.
3.4 Experiments and results
3.4.1 Gender assignment task
The first set of experiments investigates how well a neural network
model can learn to perform a gender assignment task using realistic sources
of information. This model, termed the article-prediction model, takes
single nouns as input and uses that information to predict which determiners
can appear with the noun. Since nouns rarely occur without determiners in










Initial State Final State...  Connection Growth  ...
Figure 3.4: Diagram of a network from the connection growth condition.
This network begins with a full complement of units in the hidden layer
(gray box), but they are sparsely connected to the other units. As time
passes, these units develop new connections with other units, finally ending
up in a mature state where the number of connections equals that found in
networks from the no growth and unit growth conditions.
data are readily available to any learner by simply listening to everyday
speech. After training, the article-prediction model is tested by presenting it
with nouns and asking it to predict the associated determiners. The gender
of the most strongly predicted determiner is taken to be the model’s gender
assignment for the input noun.
This approach resembles that taken by the third model from MacWhin-
ney et al. (1989) in that both models use the complete phonological form of a
noun to predict the article to be used with that noun. The article-prediction
model diverges from this earlier model in a few important ways. First, it es-
chews semantic features to investigate what can be learned from phonology
alone. Second, the article-prediction model represents each input noun as a
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temporal sequence of phonemes instead of a single phonological pattern, the
latter of which will always have trouble representing long words or those that
do not conform to the prespecified representational form. In addition, this
approach corrects the most severe issues with the model of gender assignment
by Sokolik and Smith (1992). Where their approach was criticized (Carroll,
1995; Matthews, 1999) for using orthographic input, the article-prediction
model uses phonemic input instead. Where their network came a priori
equipped with knowledge of the genders of the training language—and indeed
the knowledge that grammatical gender exists at all—the article-prediction
model has no such built-in knowledge. Finally, where their model required
explicit feedback about the genders of individual words, the article-prediction
model relies instead upon the co-occurrence of gendered articles with nouns
to deduce gender assignments. As a result of these differences, the article-
prediction model is more closely aligned with the real-world circumstances
of human language learning in most contexts.
An input noun is presented to the network as a temporal sequence of
phonemes. Each such phoneme is represented as a set of binary auditory
features, with the activations of the network’s input layer adjusted to reflect
the feature set of each phoneme in turn. The model uses this representation
because such features are universal in the sense that various configurations
of these features can represent virtually any phoneme. As such, units repre-
senting these features could potentially be a built-in component of the brain
of a language learner or could be learned. That said, the model only includes
99
enough features here to distinguish all phonemes in the target languages;
this set of phonemes and features is detailed in Table 3.1. After processing
an entire sequence of phonemes that represents the input noun, the network
activates output-layer units corresponding to its predictions of determiners
compatible with that input noun. The network learns to perform this be-
havior by observing determiner-noun pairings and adjusting its connection
weights accordingly.
Figure 3.5 shows the general architecture of the networks trained to
perform this gender assignment task. The networks have an input layer of
units corresponding to the features that make up the input phonemes. Units
in the input layer project to units in a single hidden layer of memory cells.
The intrinsic self-recurrence of the memory cells forms the substrate for work-
ing memory in the network. Finally, the hidden layer projects forward to the
output layer, which consists of 9 units representing the definite and indefinite
singular determiners of the target languages: le, la, l’, un, and une in French
and el, la, un, and una in Spanish. This should not be interpreted as an
assertion that units representing these words could be built into the brains
of language learners, nor that the words are represented in single units. How-
ever, since these determiners form a small closed class of words, it is not too
large a leap to presume that the learner represents these frequent determiners
as distinct entities before much gender learning takes place. The single-unit
representation for each determiner is the simplest possible in this context,
though other representations would likely work as well. This model specifi-
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h − + + − − − − − − − − − − + + − + − −
J − + + − − − − + − − − − − + + − − − −
E − + + − − − − + − − − − − + − − − + −
e − + + − − − − + − − − − − + − − − + +
@ − + + − − − − + − − − − − + − − + − −
a − + + − − − − + − − − − − + − + + + −
i − + + − − − − + − − − − − + + − − + +
O − + + − − − − + + + − − − + − − + + −
o − + + − − − − + + + − − − + − − + + +
y − + + − − − − + + + − − − + + − − + +
u − + + − − − − + + + − − − + + − + + +
æ − + + − − − − + + + − − − + − − − + −
φ − + + − − − − + + + − − − + − − − + +
Ẽ − + + − + − − + − − − − − + − − − + −
ã − + + − + − − + − − − − − + − + + + −
Õ − + + − + − − + + + − − − + − − + + −
æ̃ − + + − + − − + + + − − − + − − − + −
k + − − − − − − − − − − − − + + − + − −
t + − − − − − − − − − + + − − − − − − −
p + − − − − − − − + − − − − − − − − − −
g + − − − − − − + − − − − − + + − + − −
d + − − − − − − + − − + + − − − − − − −
b + − − − − − − + + − − − − − − − − − −
G + − + − − − − + − − − − − + + − + − −
D + − + − − − − + − − + + − − − − − − −
T + − + − − − − − − − + + − − − − − − −
B + − + − − − − + + − − − − − − − − − −
S + − + + − − − − − − + − + − − − − − −
s + − + + − − − − − − + + − − − − − − −
f + − + + − − − − + − − − − − − − − − −
ö + − + + − − − + − − − − − + − − + − −
Z + − + + − − − + − − + − + − − − − − −
z + − + + − − − + − − + + − − − − − − −
v + − + + − − − + + − − − − − − − − − −
L + + − − − + − + − − − − − + + − − − −
l + + − − − + − + − − + + − − − − − − −
ñ + + − − + − − + − − − − − + + − − − −
ï + + − − + − − + − − − − − + + − + − −
n + + − − + − − + − − + + − − − − − − −
m + + − − + − − + + − − − − − − − − − −
j + + + − − − − + − − − − − + + − − − −
ô + + + − − − − + − − + + − − − − − − −
w + + + − − − − + + − − − − + + − + − −
r + + + − − − + + − − + + − − − − − − −
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Input Layer / Auditory Phoneme Features (19)
Output Layer / Determiners (9)
Hidden Layer (30)
Figure 3.5: The network architecture of the article-prediction model used
in the gender assignment task. The network takes features of auditory
phonemes as input, passes them through a hidden layer of self-recurrent
memory cells, and maps a sequence of such inputs onto an output layer of
units representing singular definite and indefinite determiners in two lan-
guages. Since this is an LSTM network, the hidden layer is a group of
memory blocks, each of which consists of a memory cell and several multi-
plicative gates; for simpler presentation than in Chapter 2, the memory cells
and gate units are not depicted as separate layers. The self-connection shown
on the hidden layer signifies that individual memory cells in this layer are
self-recurrent, remembering their activations from the previous step. The
network has approximately 5,000 trainable connection weights.
cally avoids using a feature-based determiner representation because features
like gender and definiteness are not explicitly present in speech signals.
For this set of experiments, the input data for the model consists of
the 600 French words from the Sokolik and Smith (1992) paper as well as
600 equivalent words from Spanish. Each trial during training starts by se-
lecting a language and then selecting a noun at random from that language’s
corpus. The noun is paired with either a gender-matched definite or indefi-
nite determiner from the appropriate language to form a simple noun phrase.
The noun is given as input to the network, which then predicts applicable
determiners and adjusts its weights in such a way that, in the future, it will
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be more likely to predict the determiner that actually co-occurred with the
input noun. A network is considered to have assigned the correct gender
for an input noun if an article of the appropriate gender is most active af-
ter presentation. While stronger criteria are possible, this choice reflects the
common practice of testing human learners on forced-choice gender assign-
ment tasks; furthermore, this choice ensures that any deficits observed in the
models cannot be attributed to overly strong assignment criteria.
To determine a baseline level of performance on the gender assignment
task, the first round of networks learned the task in either French or Spanish
only. The networks’ performance results are shown in Figure 3.6. As one
would expect, networks trained on French alone scored well in excess of 90%
after training, while scoring at chance on Spanish; similarly, Spanish-trained
networks performed well on their native language and at chance on French. It
is worth noting that Spanish performance was consistently a few percentage
points better than French performance, likely due to the phonemic cues to
gender assignment in Spanish being simpler and more reliable than those in
French. Performance was consistent across the four development conditions,
suggesting that network development alone has little impact on outcomes for
the gender assignment task, at least in the first language.
With a baseline level of performance established for networks that are
native to either French or Spanish, the investigation turned to the perfor-









































































Figure 3.6: Results for monolingual networks, of all four developmental va-
rieties, on the gender assignment task. Thirty separate networks learned
the task in each developmental condition for each language. Each network
was trained for 2 million trials in one language, and then evaluated on both
languages.
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100% L1 Training 50% L1 Training / 50% L2 Training
t Trials, for Various t 2 Million Trials
Period 1 Period 2
Figure 3.7: Diagram of the training schedule, consisting of two periods, for
a generalized condition parametrized by a single variable t. In period 1, the
network is trained on t trials in L1 exclusively. Training then proceeds to
period 2 with a mixed training schedule of both L1 and L2 trials where the
language of each trial is chosen with uniform probability. A true bilingual
network, for which neither language is ever prioritized, can be simulated with
t = 0; larger values of t correspond to later learners of their L2.
designed to assess the role of L1 entrenchment. Each condition varies the
length of time t that the network spends learning the task on L1 alone be-
fore L2 is introduced. Each condition has two periods, with the first period
varying in duration (see Figure 3.7). Period 1 consists of training only in L1
for t trials, where t varies widely across conditions. Immediately following
this is period 2, in which L1 and L2 trials are mixed with equal probability.
The duration of period 2 is always 2 million trials in an effort to ensure that
the networks have time to reach peak performance on both languages.
A network whose training regimen has t = 0 is a native bilingual in the
sense that L1 and L2 are presented at precisely the same time, and in the
same proportions. Thus, such a network should exhibit no L1 entrenchment.
Networks trained with higher values of t, having had a longer time with
exposure only to L1, should exhibit more entrenchment. The prevailing ideas
about L1 entrenchment offer a number of predictions about the final, peak
L1 and L2 performance of the networks:
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1. Networks should maintain relatively consistent final L1 performance
regardless of the value of t;
2. Networks trained with t = 0, as native bilinguals, should not exhibit
impairment in either language with respect to the other; and,
3. Networks should show increasing degradation of final L2 performance
as t increases, at least until the networks have mastered L1 to a point
at which the effect of entrenchment saturates.
These predictions can be investigated by plotting the final L1 and L2
performance of fully trained networks on the gender assignment task versus
the value of t with which they were trained. Thirty separate networks train
with each of 15 values of t (see Figure 3.8), as well as each of the four matu-
ration conditions and each of two languages; thus, a total of 3,600 networks
are trained to produce the following figures. For conditions in which the
network matures during training, each of these networks begins training in
its most immature state and develops over the course of the first 400,000 tri-
als, at which point it reaches maturity—that is, architectural parity with the
networks in the no growth condition. Thus, some networks in the connection
growth and unit growth conditions (i.e., those with t = 0) are first exposed
to L2 in their most immature state, while others (i.e., t ≥ 400,000) are not
exposed to L2 until after reaching maturity.
After both training periods are complete, one can record the fraction
of inputs that each network assigns the correct gender, for both L1 and L2.
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Figure 3.8: Values of t used in the assignment experiments, in thousands of
trials. The values are spaced closer together at the beginning of the spectrum
because that is where the large performance changes tend to happen.
The graphs shown in this section and the next depict the final performance
of the networks on the y-axis versus the value of t—that is, the duration
of the L1-only training period and thus the delay before L2 onset relative
to L1—on the x-axis. Thus, the expected L1 entrenchment increases from
negligible to maximal as one moves from left to right in each figure; another
way of saying this is that the networks towards the left of the x-axis are
closer to true bilinguals, whereas the networks closer to the right edge are
late L2 learners. The y-axis values always depict final performance after
the conclusion of training. These graphs show fitted curves for each of the
different network maturation conditions, and for each such curve, the shaded
area behind it represents the 95% confidence interval.
Investigating the first prediction requires examining the performance
of the various networks in their native language (Figure 3.9). The prediction
of relatively consistent performance across all values of t (i.e., levels of L1
entrenchment) appears to be largely borne out, as none of the individual
curves differ by more that a couple percentage points as they move from
left to right. As with the monolingual networks, French appears to be a bit
harder to learn than Spanish, again likely due to the more regular nature of
Spanish’s phonetic gender cues. Differences in Spanish performance between
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Figure 3.9: Final performance (fraction of test trials correctly answered) for
bilingual networks tested on the gender assignment task in their native lan-
guage after training was complete. The x-axis varies the time each network
spent with its native language in isolation before the second language was
introduced.
the different maturational variants of Spanish-native networks were minimal,
while the French-native networks that grew their working memory capacity
during training showed a slight disadvantage but the same general pattern
of nearly flat performance across all values of t.
Figure 3.10 depicts each network’s performance on its second language.
A comparison of the performance of networks with t = 0 on the x-axis to
the performance levels from the native languages in Figure 3.9 shows that,
for most of the maturational conditions, the true bilingual networks (those
with t = 0) perform as well as any tested network in both languages, lending
support to the second prediction.
108



































0 200 400 600 800
Spanish as L2






Figure 3.10: Final performance (fraction of test trials correctly answered) for
bilingual networks tested on the gender assignment task in their second lan-
guage after training was complete. The x-axis varies the time each network
spent with its native language in isolation before the second language was
introduced.
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Moving on to the third prediction, Figure 3.10 reveals a t-related per-
formance deficit in the no growth condition for L2 French; increasing Spanish
exposure before French is introduced causes the final French performance of
the network to decrease at a rate that is at first rapid but eventually slows
for larger delays. The maturational properties in play for the connection
growth and unit growth conditions, however, appear to have helped these
networks compensate for the expected declines in French performance due to
Spanish entrenchment. Networks in the unit replacement condition tended
to perform at levels comparable to the no growth networks, suggesting that
introduction of new working-memory resources without starting small may
not be sufficient to gain a significant reprieve from the deleterious effects of
increasing L1 entrenchment. On the right-hand graph, where French was the
L1 and Spanish the L2, no appreciable t-related performance decreases were
observed. This appears to be due again to the relative ease of the task for
Spanish as compared to French.
At least in the case of French as an L2, the data shown in Figure 3.10
support both the predictions of performance declining due to increased en-
trenchment and of maturation during learning helping to overcome these
difficulties.
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3.4.2 Gender agreement task
The second set of experiments explores how a neural network model per-
forms on a gender agreement task. During a trial, the phoneme-prediction
model receives a noun phrase (e.g., el mecanismo interno in Spanish) pre-
sented as an unsegmented sequence of phonemes (e.g., [elmekanismointerno])
as input. The model’s job at every point in this phoneme sequence is to pre-
dict the next few phonemes that it will hear. As such, the model could use
everyday speech as both the input and the training signal. After training,
the network’s gender agreement performance is evaluated using noun phrases
of the form determiner-noun-adjective—common constructions in the target
languages of Spanish and French. To determine gender agreement, one gives
the network the determiner and noun as input, followed by the portion of the
adjective that is gender-neutral, and asks the network to predict the correct
ending for the adjective. If the network predicts the gender-appropriate end-
ing more strongly than the gender-inappropriate ending, its answer counts
as correct.
The noun phrases serving as training data for the gender agreement task
were extracted from the complete text of the French and Spanish versions
of Wikipedia (2011). TreeTagger (Schmid, 1994) applied a part-of-speech
tag to each word in either corpus. Noun phrases—of the forms determiner-
noun, determiner-noun-adjective, and the less frequent determiner-adjective-
noun, where the determiner is one from Figure 3.11—were extracted from the
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French: Spanish:
la, le, l’, un, une, ce, cette, cet,
aucun, aucune, chaque, tel, telle,
sa, son, ma, mon, ta, ton, notre,
votre, leur
el, la, un, una, este, esta, ese, esa,
aquel, aquella, ningún, ninguno,
ninguna, cualquier, cualquiera,
cada, su, tu, mi, nuestra, nuestro,
vuestra, vuestro
Figure 3.11: Determiners used in the gender agreement task.
resulting output. This list of noun phrases was filtered, removing any phrases
containing words that were not in the appropriate language dictionaries—
Lexique 3 for French (New, 2006) and CUMBRE for Spanish (2010). Finally,
the lists were truncated to the most frequent 100,000 noun phrases for each
language. These phrases comprise the training data. Each training trial
chooses a phrase probabilistically, based on the phrases’ corpus frequencies,
to use as the input—and training signal—for the network on that trial.
Figure 3.12 depicts the architecture of the networks trained on the
gender agreement task. The input layer is the same as it was for the gender
assignment experiments, with each input unit corresponding to a binary au-
ditory feature of a phoneme. This model, however, has two hidden layers of
memory cells instead of one. This is because the gender agreement task in-
volves two separate levels of segmentation of the input. To perform the task
effectively, a learner would generally need to divide the phoneme sequence
first into morphemes and words and, at a higher level, into noun phrases
in which gender agreement must be maintained. Previous experiments with
these types of networks on language tasks (Monner and Reggia, in press a)
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Input / Auditory Phoneme Features (19)
Output II / Auditory Phoneme Features (19)
Hidden Layer I (30)
Hidden Layer II (30)
Output I / Auditory Phoneme Features (19)
Figure 3.12: The network architecture of the phoneme-prediction model used
in the gender agreement task. The network takes auditory phoneme features
as input and passes them through a series of two hidden layers of memory
cells. After processing each input phoneme, the network uses its two output
layers to predict the next two phonemes that it will be given as input. The
network has approximately 10,000 trainable connection weights.
have shown a network with two hidden layers to be more effective in this case
than networks with a single hidden layer.
The network’s output layers are each identical to the input layer be-
cause the network is predicting upcoming phonemes. There are two such
output layers because the network must predict not only the next phoneme
that will occur in the input, but the phoneme after that as well. The network
makes predictions of two future phonemes because some of the gendered ad-
jective endings consist of two phonemes. For example, the French adjective
for the English word particular is particulier [paötikylje] in the masculine and
particuliére [paötikyljEö] in the feminine; the phonetic spellings make plain
that the gendered endings of these adjectives differ across two phonemes, with
[-e] ending the masculine form and [-Eö] ending the feminine form. Since the
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network can only be allowed to see the gender-neutral portion of the phoneme
sequence—[paötikylj-]—without giving away the gendered form intended by
the speaker, the network must predict two subsequent phonemes (either of
which may be null if subsequent phonemes do not exist) to capture gendered
endings with two phonemes such as [-Eö].
The performance evaluation on the gender agreement task after train-
ing uses only phrases of the determiner-noun-adjective form because it is the
only form that is adjective-final. The testing paradigm requires an adjective-
final form because the network must predict the gender-appropriate ending of
the last word, and only adjectives generally have two distinct gendered end-
ings. Gender-neutral adjectives and adjectives where the two gendered forms
are orthographically distinct but phonetically identical (e.g., in French, the
masculine architectural and the feminine architecturale are both pronounced
[aöSitEktyöal]) are present during gender agreement training but ignored dur-
ing the performance evaluation.
To determine a baseline level of performance on the gender agreement
task, sets of networks trained on either French or Spanish only. Their per-
formance results are shown in Figure 3.13. As was the case with the gender
assignment task from the previous section, networks trained on French do
well on French and perform at chance on Spanish. Networks trained on












































































Figure 3.13: Results for monolingual networks, of all three developmental
varieties, on the gender agreement task. Thirty separate networks learned
the task in each developmental condition for each language. Each network
was trained for 2 million trials in one language, and then evaluated on both
languages.
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Figure 3.14: Values of t used in the agreement experiments (in thousands of
trials). Since little change was observed for large values of t, the interval was
expanded from the assignment experiments to allow the use of one less value
of t and thereby save on simulation time.
The investigation of bilingual networks involves the same experimental
setup as on the gender assignment task to investigate the effects of L1 en-
trenchment alone (i.e., the no growth condition) and together with network
maturation (i.e., the unit growth, unit replacement, and connection growth
conditions) on the gender agreement task. As before, training consists of
two periods, the first consisting of t trials in which inputs come exclusively
from the designated L1, and the second consisting of 2 million trials where
inputs may be drawn from either language. Thirty networks learned the task
in each maturation condition and for each value of t—the duration of the
initial L1-only training period—in Figure 3.14.
Figure 3.15 shows the networks’ performance on their first languages,
broken out by language and maturation condition as before. As expected,
performance is approximately flat with respect to changing t across all the
conditions.
Figure 3.16 shows the final performance scores on L2 for networks in
each condition of the gender agreement task as a function of t on the x-axis.
The results for both languages here are similar to that observed in the gender
assignment task for the case of L2 French. The mature networks in the no
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Figure 3.15: Final performance (fraction of test trials correctly answered) for
bilingual networks tested on the gender agreement task in their native lan-
guage after training was complete. The x-axis varies the time each network
spent with its native language in isolation before the second language was
introduced.
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growth condition show a marked susceptibility to L1 entrenchment, with L2
performance decreasing by as much as 17% as t is increased, delaying the
onset of L2 relative to L1. However, the networks in the unit growth condi-
tion were largely able to mitigate this performance decrease by introducing
new units and connections during learning. Performance of networks in the
connection growth condition fall between these two. The addition of new
connections to the networks appears to successfully stave off entrenchment
effects when the level of entrenchment is small, but for values of t > 200,000
the entrenchment effects again start to become apparent. This suggests that
addition of new units and new connections both help to counteract deficits
due to entrenchment. Viewed from the cognitive perspective, growth in long-
term memory capacity—in the connection growth condition—during training
helped to mitigate the effects of L1 entrenchment, as did growth in work-
ing memory capacity, as evidenced by the superior performance of the unit
growth condition over the connection growth condition for higher values of t.
However, as shown by the unit replacement networks again tending to track
the performance of the no growth networks, the addition of fresh neural re-
sources is not all that is required to reap a performance benefit. Instead,
it seems that starting small, either in terms of working memory capacity
or long-term memory capacity, or both, is an essential factor leading to the
performance increase.
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Figure 3.16: Final performance (fraction of test trials correctly answered) for
bilingual networks tested on the gender agreement task in their second lan-
guage after training was complete. The x-axis varies the time each network




With the exception of gender assignment in Spanish as an L2—by far
the easiest task—the data presented in Section 3.4 support the predictions
of established ideas of L1 entrenchment. The most dramatic of these can
be seen clearly in the no growth conditions, which show an initially steep
decline in learnability of the L2 task as time spent on the L1 task increases.
While this modeling approach does not directly implement cognitive
constructs such as working memory capacity, Section 3.3.2 argued that the
connection growth condition could be reasonably conceived as representing
growth from an initially small long-term memory capacity, and the unit
growth condition as growth of both long-term and working memory capaci-
ties from small beginning states. Allowing the networks to mature in either
of these conditions helped to mitigate the negative impacts of L1 entrench-
ment, especially for longer delays in L2 onset. The fact that the connection
growth condition generally improved upon the no growth condition suggests
that growth of long-term memory capacity may be a key maturational factor
during language learning. For the longest delays, the unit growth condition
appears to have had the greatest positive impact, which suggests that growth
of working memory capacity also has a positive influence in combating en-
trenchment effects.
The unit replacement condition, on the other hand, demonstrated the
effects of adding fresh long-term and working memory resources to the net-
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work without starting small and without changing the network’s overall size.
The fact that the networks in this condition did not do substantially better
than those in the no growth condition implies that the only thing lacking
in the unit replacement condition—beginning from resources of modest ca-
pacity or starting small—is an essential factor underlying the performance
gains made by the unit growth and connection growth networks. This lends
support to the “less is more” hypothesis and clarifies that both the initial
size and resource acquisition during training are crucial.
The “less is more” hypothesis is usually presented at the cognitive level,
suggesting that a system with limited cognitive resources will latch on to the
low-hanging organizational fruit, learning representations efficient enough to
accommodate its small memory capacity. This can serve as a boon later
on, when new memory capacity is added and the system can tackle more
complex stimuli. This proposal also makes intuitive sense at the level of
neural information processing for a variety of reasons. A network that has its
full complement of resources when learning begins naturally learns to use all
the resources at its disposal to widely distribute its learned interpretations of
its L1 experiences. If an L2 is introduced later, the distributed L1 experience
cannot be easily or quickly consolidated to make room for independent L2
learning. Instead, the L2 and L1 experiences intermix and interact, creating
L1 entrenchment effects seen as performance deficits in L2. On the other
hand, a network that begins training with more modest resources will be
forced to attempt to encode the L1 using only the limited resources available.
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Though these may initially be insufficient for a full understanding of L1, the
limitations will force the network to adopt more efficient and less widely
distributed encodings of the L1. This may entail segmenting the input into
smaller generative chunks, like phonemes and morphemes. This consolidation
of L1 knowledge in the resources that were added early leaves the later-added
neural resources free to adapt to novel data such as that presented by an L2.
If this reasoning is correct, starting with fewer resources and building
them up during language learning are key strategies to developing more mod-
ular representations for each language, which help to avoid the deleterious
effects of L1 entrenchment. In short, entrenchment contributes to observed
critical period effects, while childhood memory development helps to coun-
teract them. Of course, this should not be interpreted as an assertion that
the other purported causes of critical period effects, mentioned in Section 3.2,
are spurious; on the contrary, there exists credible evidence for each of them.
Rather, the purpose of this work is to help disentangle the confounded effects
of entrenchment and memory development, demonstrating how each might
contribute to the larger picture of age-correlated declines in second-language
attainment.
These results also support the notion that the LSTM-g algorithm trains
neural networks in a way that captures important artifacts of human learn-
ing, such as L1 entrenchment effects and the mollifying influence of memory
development. While LSTM-g is not the first neural network training algo-
rithm to reproduce some evidence of critical period effects, this confirmation
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helps to justify the use of LSTM-g for training neural networks that aim to
model human learning, such as those presented in subsequent chapters.
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Chapter 4
Grounding Language in Vision
4.1 Introduction
With the generalized neural network training algorithm from Chapter 2
in hand, and with the confirmation of the approach’s resemblance to human
learning provided by Chapter 3, this chapter begins to present the sentence-
level language modeling that is the main focus of this dissertation. The model
presented here completes the first half of the larger language acquisition task.
Through observation, it gains an understanding of spoken natural language
sentences that is grounded in terms of a visual micro-world. In this case, the
problem of grounding is that of forming one’s representation of language
in terms of other, nonlinguistic types of experience. Simple examples of
grounding include associating the word red with visual images of red things
or physically understanding the shape intended when hearing about a block.
Cognitive philosophers (e.g., Harnad, 1990) have argued convincingly that
grounding is essential to forming a true understanding of linguistic meanings,
as opposed to a mere understanding of how to manipulate linguistic symbols.
Most symbolic and statistical models of natural language processing do not
directly address this problem.
124
As in the previous chapter, the discussion presented here compares the
model’s learning to human learning. In this case, the analogy is tied directly
to theories of cognition, which expect human mental representations to have
the combinatorial power of symbol systems. More than twenty years ago,
Fodor and Pylyshyn famously rebuffed proponents of the burgeoning con-
nectionist movement, stating that “when construed as a cognitive theory,
[...] Connectionism appears to have fatal limitations” (1988, p. 48). Central
to their argument was the idea that classical theories of cognition, based on
combinatorial symbol systems, possessed a key component—systematicity—
that connectionist models seemed to lack. Systematicity, here, is the no-
tion that comprehension of a given situation is intrinsically connected to the
comprehension of related ones. Put another way, the ability to process novel
situations relies directly on skills learned from similar, previously processed
situations. Systematicity is routinely observed in human behavior, partic-
ularly in language. For example, if one understands the statement the girl
loves the boy, one certainly can also process the boy loves the girl. Fodor
and Pylyshyn argued that, practically by definition, a combinatorial sym-
bol system—one in which entities can be combined and composed according
to rules—is the only way to tractably describe systematicity as humans ex-
hibit it. Faced with the work of the connectionists of their time, Fodor and
Pylyshyn interpreted the movement as an attempt to replace classical cogni-
tive theory with neural networks that, on the face of it, lacked the ability to
operate on symbols systematically. They concluded that the only way neural
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networks could behave systematically was to directly implement a combina-
torial symbol system. This would relegate connectionism to an explanatory
level below—and in their view, unlikely to be relevant to—cognition.
Many of the connectionists responded to Fodor and Pylyshyn’s asser-
tions with neural network models demonstrating systematic behavior. How-
ever, most of these efforts were susceptible to the argument that they were
not systematic enough to contradict Fodor and Pylyshyn’s claims. This
disconnect was possible because Fodor and Pylyshyn had given no straight-
forward means to measure or otherwise evaluate systematic behavior. To
clarify matters, Hadley (1994) operationalized systematicity as it pertains
to the use of natural language. Hadley defined systematicity in terms of a
learner’s ability to generalize from experience to correctly process novel sen-
tences. To satisfy each new level of linguistic systematicity, a learner must
make ever-larger leaps from the examples on which it has been trained. This
concrete definition of systematicity is useful in that it includes only those
forms of systematic behavior in which humans are known to engage. At the
time, no connectionist model could achieve the highest level, strong semantic
systematicity, which bolstered the arguments of Fodor and Pylyshyn.
Shortly after these systematicity requirements were codified, however,
Hadley and Hayward (1997) and Hadley and Cardei (1999) advanced re-
lated models that met them. These models took simple sentences as input
and produced something like a propositional representation of each sentence’s
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meaning as output. The models were largely connectionist in form, consisting
primarily of simple processing elements and trainable weighted connections
between them, and in training utilizing Hebbian learning methods as well
as self-organizing maps (Kohonen, 1990). However, the models’ output lay-
ers possessed a “primitive, but combinatorially adequate conceptual scheme
prior to verbal training” (Hadley and Hayward, 1997, p. 33). This built-in
conceptual scheme consisted of single-node representations of each atomic
symbol as well as nodes for thematic roles and the binding of the two into
semantic compounds. Because all of the atomic symbols and all potential
bindings were innate, these models in fact subsumed the combinatorial sym-
bol systems whose mappings they were attempting to learn, imparting all the
related systematicity for free. Indeed, the stated goal of these models was
to “demonstrate that semantic systematicity is theoretically possible when
connectionist systems reflect some classical insights” (Hadley and Hayward,
1997, pp. 10–11). Seeing as they implemented classical symbol systems
in the most literal way possible—as part of the neural architecture itself—
these systems did not serve as counterexamples to the claims of Fodor and
Pylyshyn.
Recently, however, Frank et al. (2009) advanced a much more convinc-
ing neural network that they claimed was capable of demonstrating strong
semantic systematicity. Their model consisted of a simple recurrent network
(SRN; Elman, 1990) that learned distributed internal representations via er-
ror back-propagation (Rumelhart et al., 1986). Thus, the model was purely
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connectionist—precisely the type of model that Fodor and Pylyshyn seemed
to argue could not be systematic. The Frank et al. model learned to map
an input sentence to a situation vector—an analogical representation of
the network’s beliefs about possible states of the world. The situation vector
that the model produced in response to a given sentence was not directly in-
terpretable, as a symbolic output would be. However, by manipulating these
vectors, Frank et al. were able to quantify the network’s level of belief in any
particular state of the world. To explain their model’s systematic behavior,
Frank et al. said that it “comes to display systematicity by capitalizing on
structure present in the world, in language, and in the mapping from lan-
guage to events in the world” (Frank et al., 2009, p. 2). They claimed further
that their model counters Fodor and Pylyshyn’s assertion, since it does not
contain an innate embedded symbol system.
The Frank et al. model, though completely distributed and purely
connectionist in nature, appears to possess the same combinatorial properties
as a classical symbol system. But these combinatorial properties are largely
what defines such a symbol system, leading directly to the suspicion that the
Frank et al. model must in fact function as a symbol system, even though,
on the surface, it is far from obvious how it might do this. One might
hypothesize that the Frank et al. model implements a combinatorial symbol
system in a much more interesting way than previous attempts. Instead of
an innate, hard-wired neural symbol system like the one present in Hadley
and Hayward’s model, it seems much more likely that the Frank et al. model
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instantiates, through learning, a latent neural symbol system. The term
latent here means that the symbol system is not visible at the level of the
neural architecture; rather, it exists entirely as part of the learned internal
representations of the network. This would require the network to learn
distributed representations that it can manipulate in combinatorial ways,
thus gleaning the systematicity benefits of classical cognitive symbol systems
while preserving the distributed, incremental nature and graceful degradation
of connectionist representations. Frank et al. have not publicly analyzed their
model’s internal representations in ways that would reveal a latent symbol
system, complicating the evaluation of this hypothesis.
To examine the possibility of the emergence of a latent symbol system
through training in a neural network, the remainder of this chapter presents
a novel neural model that learns to ground a micro-language in a micro-world
(Monner and Reggia, 2011, under review). Section 4.3.1 first demonstrates
the model’s systematic behavior, and Section 4.3.2 subsequently presents
evidence that the trained network has created a latent symbol system inside
itself.
This model, termed the grounded-meaning model, has two parallel,
temporal input streams representing a visual scene and an auditory sentence.
It is tasked with interpreting the sentence it hears in the context of the vi-
sual scene, producing as output a corresponding propositional representation
of the meaning of the sentence. Put differently, the network needs to iden-
tify the intended referents and relations described in a given sentence and
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construct the sentence’s grounded meaning with respect to those referents.
During training, the network learns to segment the input sentence—presented
at the phoneme level—into morphemes, words, and phrases. It develops ef-
ficient working memory representations of the collection of objects in the
visual scene. It learns to map both singular and plural noun phrases onto
a referent or referents in the scene. Crucially, the model behaves system-
atically, generalizing not only to novel sentences and scenes but to objects
and descriptions never before encountered. By way of explaining this sys-
tematic behavior, Section 4.3.2 provides a detailed analysis of the internal
representations learned by the network, showing how it manipulates these




The grounded-meaning model learns to interpret a small subset of En-
glish in terms of a micro-world. Given input streams representing a visual
scene and an auditory sentence, the network must combine these streams to
create an output representation of the intended meaning of the speaker. By
way of explaining the task, this section describes each of the streams of infor-
mation that the network receives and produces: the input scene represented
by the visual stream, the input sentence represented by the auditory stream,
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and the output grounded meaning represented by the intention stream. Fig-
ure 4.1 depicts the general structure of the inputs and outputs of the task,
and the following sections explain each input and output sequence in detail.
4.2.1.1 Visual input stream
Each trial in the grounding task involves a randomly generated visual
scene. A scene, in this context, is an abstract representation of a collection
of up to four objects, each of which has three properties: a shape, a color,
and a size. Each of these properties is described by discrete values:
• Shape: block, pyramid, or cylinder
• Color: red, green, or blue
• Size: small, medium, or large
Thus, 27 unique objects are possible. In the text, scene objects are
denoted in a fixed-width font enclosed in square brackets, as, for example,
[small blue pyramid].
The model receives input corresponding to a list of objects in the scene,
each of which is identified by its property values and also by a unique, iden-
tifying number. The latter allows the model to discriminate between objects
that otherwise have identical attributes, allowing a given scene to contain
[large red block 1] and [large red block 2] simultaneously while al-
lowing the model to transparently refer to either. These objects are presented
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Neural Network Model
Collection of Predicates / “Meaning”
(Shape block 4)
(Color blue 4)
(Location near 1+2 4)
(Shape pyramid 1+2)
(Size small 1+2)







Collection of Objects / “Scene”
[small green pyramid 2]
[medium red cylinder 3]
[large blue block 4]
[small red pyramid 1]
Figure 4.1: An overview of the inputs and outputs that comprise the task.
The auditory input is depicted on the lower left and is comprised of a sentence
represented as a temporally ordered sequence of phonemes. The visual input
on the lower right consists of a collection of objects comprising a scene; in
practice, these objects are presented to the model in a random order, one at
a time. The output that the model is expected to produce is a meaning for
the input sentence comprised of predicates involving objects from the input
scene. In practice, the model must produce the predicates as a temporal
sequence, one predicate at a time, in the order in which their corresponding
phrases appear in the input sentence.
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[small blue pyramid 3] 1  0  0 0  0  1 0  0  1 0  0  1  0
Figure 4.2: Two examples of objects together with their associated neural
activity patterns. The first three groups of bits denote the size, color, and
shape of a given object, respectively. The final group of bits provides a single-
unit identifier for each object, which remains unique in a given scene; this
allows the network to transparently refer to any object, even in the presence
of objects with duplicate attributes.
to the model as neural activity patterns that combine single active units rep-
resenting each property value with a single active unit representing the unique
identifier. Figure 4.2 depicts two example objects and their associated neural
activity patterns as labeled binary vectors, where a 0 represents an inactive
neural unit and a 1 represents an active unit.
These neural activity patterns—each representing an object in the
scene—are presented to the visual input layer of the network in a temporal
sequence called the visual stream. During training, the network’s visual
pathway must learn to create distributed representations that can simulta-
neously encode several objects, maintaining the bindings between individual
objects and their (likely overlapping) attributes.
Clearly, the model could utilize more biologically faithful representa-
tions, such as a retinotopic depiction of the visual input. The grounded-
meaning model could be extended to work with such an input representation.
However, since the main concern here is language acquisition, it makes sense
to use the more computationally expedient representation just described,
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which is closer to symbolic than sensory in nature. Something akin to this
abstract object representation could be constructed by higher-level visual re-
gions in response to sensory input. The model receives a scene’s objects as
a temporal sequence, rather than a single aggregate neural activity pattern,
in part because this allows variation in the number of objects presented,
which is important in light of research on the capacity limitations of human
working memory (see Cowan et al., 2005, for a review). Working memory
research shows that, while there are practical limits on the number of ob-
ject representations an individual can maintain simultaneously, these limits
are not hard and fast. A static array of object input units would provide
this capacity limit a priori, while with a temporal representation, network
dynamics determine the capacity limitations for the model’s equivalent of
working memory.
The visual stream is presented in its entirety before the presentation of
the auditory stream begins. This way, the model needs to build a full working
memory representation of a scene before hearing a sentence about that scene.
This forces the model to consult its memory to ground the sentence, as
opposed to consulting the external scene directly. Thus, to perform well on
the task, the model must learn to maintain the important attributes of the
scene in working memory, using an efficient scene representation—one that
the network can later deconstruct and match against the auditory input.
134
4.2.1.2 Auditory input stream
After experiencing the visual stream, the model hears a sentence in-
volving some of the objects in the scene. Sentences are generated from a
simple, mildly context-sensitive grammar (Figure 4.3) that describes objects
from the scene and relations between them. Crucially for systematicity test-
ing, the grammar allows many ways to refer to any particular object. For
example, a [small blue pyramid] could be described as a small blue pyra-
mid, a blue pyramid, a small pyramid, or simply a pyramid. Notably, the
grammar allows plural references to groups of objects, such that the pyramid
from above might be paired with a [large blue pyramid] to be collectively
referred to as the blue pyramids ; or the original pyramid could be grouped
with a [small green cylinder] to be collectively described as the small
things because of their one common attribute. Examples of complete sen-
tences that the grammar can generate are the large pyramids are green, the
blue things are under the small red blocks, and the small green pyramid is on
the large red cylinder.
Each word in an input sentence is transcribed into a phoneme se-
quence; these are then concatenated to create a single unsegmented se-
quence of phonemes representing the entire sentence. For example, the
sentence the large cylinder is green is encoded as the phoneme sequence
[D@lAôÃsIl@ndÄIzgôin]. Each phoneme in such a sequence is input to the net-
work as a neural activity pattern representing some of the acoustic features
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S → NP VP
NP → the [Size] [Color] Shape
VP → Is Where | Is Color | Is Size
Is1 → is | are
Where2 → on NP | under NP | near NP
Size → small |medium | large
Color → red | blue | green
Shape → things | pyramid[s] | block[s] | cylinder[s]
Figure 4.3: The grammar used to generate the sentences. Terminals begin
with a lowercase letter, while nonterminals are in boldface and begin with an
uppercase letter. The symbol | separates alternative derivations, and terms
in brackets are optional.
1The evaluation chosen for the Is nonterminal must agree in number with its subject
NP.
2The object NP of on cannot describe a pyramid since, in the micro-world, pyramids
cannot support other objects due to their pointed tops. Similarly, the subject NP preced-
ing under cannot describe a pyramid. In other words: Nothing can be on a pyramid, and
a pyramid cannot be under anything. This restriction on pyramids will help to illustrate
how the network internalizes micro-world systematicity in Section 4.3.2.
of the phoneme that are known to be used for identification by human learn-
ers. Such features include voicing, affrication, and formant frequencies, and
are modeled after previous feature sets used in similar applications (Weems
and Reggia, 2006; Schulz and Reggia, 2004). The full list of phonemes and
features is given in Table 4.1. The features used here are more obviously
acoustic and auditory than the set used in Chapter 3 and provide a useful
contrast with the motor features that are used to describe the same set of
phonemes in Chapter 5. The model’s direct use of such features perhaps
pushes it a step away from the human auditory sensory system, which at its
basest level uses frequency-tuned neurons. However, these features have been
identified as playing crucial roles in phoneme recognition (Jakobson et al.,
1951; Singh, 1976; Paget, 1976), and the low-level auditory system is thought
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to contain similar representations (Phillips, 2001). The model developed in
this chapter adopts this more computationally tractable method of repre-
senting speech sounds. Importantly, this set of features—or more likely a
superset containing a few features that were not necessary here—represents
a language-agnostic basis in which speech sounds can be described. Since
the features can describe any phoneme, and the model can handle any se-
quence of such phonemes, a model based on these features could potentially
represent words and sentences from any spoken human language.
These patterns—representing the phonemes in the sentence—are pre-
sented at the auditory input layer of the network as a temporal sequence
termed the auditory stream. During training, the auditory pathway must
simultaneously learn to segment the auditory stream into morphemes and
words (for which boundaries are not included), pay attention to the syn-
tactic relations between these elements, and discover the cues that identify
objects and relations.
4.2.1.3 Intention output stream
After receiving both the visual and auditory streams, the network is
tasked with constructing the sentence’s meaning in the context of the scene.
To do this, the network must combine its auditory and visual working mem-
ory representations to generate a sequence of predicates—as activity pat-
terns over its output layer—called the intention stream. Each predicate
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Table 4.1: Binary Acoustic Features of Heard Phonemes
Phoneme




































in the intention stream corresponds to an attribute or relation mentioned
in the sentence. Predicates are represented in the model as neural activity
patterns, but they are denoted in the text using a fixed-width font enclosed
in parentheses, distinguishing them from the square-bracketed visual objects.
If a sentence refers to the visual object [small red cylinder 2] as small
cylinder, the network should produce the predicates (Size small 2) and
(Shape cylinder 2), but not (Color red 2), since this attribute was not
mentioned. If a sentence states that a blue block (referring to visual object
3) is near the small cylinder, the network must output the predicate (near
3 2). Figure 4.4 shows two examples of predicates from the intention stream
along with their associated neural activity patterns.
In general, the order of the predicates in the intention stream follows
the order inherent in the auditory stream. That is, the intention stream for
the blue block is near the green block will begin with predicates describing
the blue block, followed by predicates describing the relation near, and ending
with predicates for the green block. It may be that some objects in the scene,
or even most of them, are not referenced in the sentence that accompanies
it. In this case, these objects can be considered distractor stimuli, and while
they are present in the visual stream input, they are not included in the
target intention stream.
After a training trial, the network is shown the target intention stream.
Comparing this behavior to that of a human language learner requires the
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Figure 4.4: Two examples of predicates together with their neural activity
patterns. The first group of units denotes the type of the predicate. For
the attribute-based predicate types Size, Color, and Shape, the arguments
consist of an activated attribute value unit and one or more object identifier
units, all active in the first group of such units. For the Location pred-
icate, the arguments are a relational term like near or on and two object
identifiers—or groups of identifiers—with each argument activating specific
units in its own group of identifier units. Above, the first example conveys the
blueness of object 2, while the second example states that objects numbered
1 and 2 are both located on object 3.
assumption that the learner can, at least sometimes, derive the speaker’s
meaning from other sources—a task at which language learners seem to ex-
cel (Tomasello, 2003)—and that this meaning is available in something re-
sembling a propositional form. This is perhaps not the most plausible of
assumptions, and the final model presented in Chapter 5 does not require it.
4.2.1.4 Example trial
To concretize the input and output descriptions, this section presents
a full trial of the language grounding task—that is, a complete specification
of related visual and auditory input streams as well as the desired intention
stream output. Figure 4.5 describes an input scene, consisting of four objects,
and an input phoneme sequence for the sentence the small pyramids are near
the blue block. A correct intention stream for these inputs must contain
predicates denoting the objects numbered 1 and 2 as the small pyramids.
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(gloss: the small pyramids 
are near the blue block)
[small red pyramid 1]
[large blue block 4]
[medium red cylinder 3]
[small green pyramid 2]
(Size small 1+2)
(Shape pyramid 1+2)
(Location near 1+2 4)
(Color blue 4)
(Shape block 4)
Input Visual Stream Input Auditory Stream Intention Stream
[!"sm#lp$%&m&dz'%n$%!&bl(bl'k]
Figure 4.5: An example trial of the language grounding task. Stream ele-
ments are depicted in human-readable form, but are presented to the network
as sequences of neural activity patterns representing objects, phonemes, and
predicates, respectively.
The intention stream should indicate object 4 as the referent of the blue
block, containing predicates at the end of the sequence matching these two
attributes with the appropriate object identifier. For the relation between
the objects, the intention stream must contain a predicate representing the
Location as near, indicating that objects 1 and 2, the pyramids, are close
to object 4, the block.
4.2.2 Model description
The neural network that learns the grounding task utilizes the long
short-term memory architecture (LSTM; Hochreiter and Schmidhuber, 1997;
Gers and Cummins, 2000; Gers and Schmidhuber, 2001). LSTM uses state-
ful self-connected neural units called memory cells, which are allowed to
have multiplicative input, output, and forget gates. The biologically mo-
tivated generalized long short-term memory (LSTM-g) algorithm, derived
in Chapter 2, serves to train the network. LSTM-g is a reformulation of
LSTM’s original gradient descent training algorithm that gains the ability
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to accommodate arbitrary multi-level network architectures, while retaining
the spatial and temporal locality observed in biological neural networks.
The grounded-meaning model utilizes an LSTM network instead of a
more traditional recurrent network such as the SRN, in part because exper-
iments show LSTM to provide both faster convergence and better general-
ization in complex multi-input, multi-output tasks that require the network
to hold extensive information in working memory. Despite many attempts,
pilot experiments were unsuccessful in finding an SRN configuration that
could learn this language grounding task.
4.2.2.1 Network architecture
The specific network architecture of the grounded-meaning model is
depicted in Figure 4.6. The network has a visual processing pathway that
begins on the bottom right of the figure, comprised of a visual-stream input
layer followed by a visual accumulation layer. The latter is a collection
of memory cells that self-organize during training, gaining the capability to
integrate the temporal visual stream into a flexible representation of an entire
scene.
The network’s auditory pathway is set up much the same way and be-
gins on the bottom left of the figure with an auditory-stream input layer
followed by two auditory accumulation layers in series. Previous experi-
ments on learning ungrounded language representations, such as those in
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Section 2.7.3, showed that a two-layer pathway outperforms a single-layer
pathway on the task of integrating a temporal phoneme sequence into a sen-
tence representation. This appears to be due to the multi-level segmentation
inherent in the auditory part of the task. When using two layers, the first
auditory layer is allowed to specialize in the aggregation of morphemes and
words from phoneme sequences, while the second layer chiefly processes re-
lationships between words. It should be noted, however, that performance
on the grounding task does not depend crucially upon this two-layer network
architecture choice.
To recover the intention stream, the model integrates the sentence rep-
resentation and the scene representation using another layer of memory cells
called the integration layer. This layer’s representation is then used to gener-
ate an appropriate temporal sequence of predicates on the intention-stream
output layer.
The three layers of memory cells in the auditory and visual pathways
have input gates and forget gates, but not output gates, as these cells feed
exclusively into other, input-gated memory cells. The memory cells in the
integration layer, in contrast, have all three types of gates. To assist in
the production of output sequences, the integration layer has a recurrent
connection from the previous time-step’s intention-stream output.
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Phoneme Features (34) ID (4)Object Attributes (9)
ID (4)Object Attributes (12) ID (4)Predicate (4)
Integration Layer (80)
Auditory Accumulation II (80) Visual Accumulation (80)
Auditory Accumulation I (80)
Auditory Stream Input Layer Visual Stream Input Layer
Intention Stream Output Layer
Figure 4.6: The architecture of the network. Boxes represent layers of units
(with number of units in parentheses), and straight arrows represent banks of
trainable connection weights between units of the sending layer and units of
the receiving layer, though generally not all possible connections are present.
Layers with a curved self-connecting arrow are composed of memory blocks
(collections of memory cells and associated gates as described in Chapter 2;
following the convention of Chapter 3, the memory cell layers and gate layers
are collapsed into a single box for visual simplicity).
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4.2.3 Levels of systematicity
As was the case with Frank et al. (2009), it is difficult to map Hadley’s
(1994) levels of systematicity onto observable performance attributes of the
language grounding task. For example, Hadley’s notion of strong seman-
tic systematicity requires the learner to understand the meanings of known
words encountered in novel syntactic positions, even in embedded sentences—
a demonstration which is not possible with the modest training grammar em-
ployed here. To provide a benchmark against which to measure the model,
this section defines four levels of systematicity as it relates to the task used
here. These levels of systematic grounding correspond roughly in difficulty
to those defined by Frank et al.—though not necessarily to those defined by
Hadley—while lending themselves more directly to use with this task:
1. Weak systematic grounding: The learner can label familiar objects in
novel scenes using familiar object descriptions. That is, having seen
a [medium blue block] before, and referred to it as a medium blue
block in a particular scene, the learner can generalize this ability to
new scenes and new sentences.
2. Categorical systematic grounding: The learner can label novel ob-
jects in a scene using familiar descriptions. For example, if the learner
has never previously seen a [small red block], but has encountered
objects referred to as red blocks, it can apply the label red block to this
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novel object. This is “categorical” in the sense that applying familiar
labels to novel objects is tantamount to lumping them into existing
categories.
3. Descriptive systematic grounding: The learner can use novel descrip-
tions to label familiar objects in a scene. In this situation, the learner
has previously encountered, for example, a [small blue pyramid],
but has only ever heard it referred to as a small pyramid or a blue
pyramid or just a pyramid. If the learner can successfully apply the la-
bel small blue pyramid, which it has never heard before, to this object,
then it exhibits descriptive systematic grounding.
4. Strong systematic grounding: The learner can use novel descriptions
to label objects it has never previously encountered. That is, having
never encountered, for example, a [small green cylinder], and hav-
ing never heard the label small green cylinder, the learner can nonethe-
less recognize the novel object and refer to it using this novel label.
Section 4.3.1 uses these four criteria to demonstrate that the model pre-
sented in this chapter exhibits strong systematic grounding of the language
it learns.
4.2.4 Experimental evaluation
This experiment trains copies of the grounded-meaning model in four
different ways, evaluating it on sets of test sentences that probe the different
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levels of grounding systematicity from Section 4.2.3. It is important to note
that in each of these four conditions, the test inputs serving as the basis
for the performance scores are always novel—the model has never seen them
during training. In what follows, an object or description is considered novel
if it consists of a combination of features (e.g., [large red pyramid]) or
words (e.g., large red pyramid) that does not occur in the training set. The
four training conditions are:
1. Weak condition: The set of all possible scene-sentence pairs is parti-
tioned at random with 10% reserved exclusively for testing. While test
pairs are completely novel to the model, the individual objects and
descriptions are likely to be familiar.
2. Categorical condition: One specific type of object—for example, a
[small green block]—is never present in scenes during training. The
model is tested in situations where this novel object is given a familiar
description—as a small block, a green block, or simply a block, all labels
that the network has previously applied to other types of objects.
3. Descriptive condition: One specific type of object—for example, a
[medium blue pyramid]—while allowed to be present in the scenes,
is never described fully; that is, the object can be referred to as, for
example, a blue pyramid or a medium pyramid, but never as a medium
blue pyramid. The model is scored on scenes containing this famil-
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iar object paired with sentences containing the full, novel description,
medium blue pyramid.
4. Strong condition: One type of object—a [large red pyramid], for
example—is never described and never appears in scenes. The model
is scored in situations where this novel object appears and is referenced
using the novel description, which in this case is large red pyramid.
Ten distinct, randomized copies of the grounded-meaning model learn
the task set forth in each of the four conditions. For pairs of layers shown
as connected in Figure 4.6, individual pairs of units are connected with a
probability of 0.7, leading to networks with 320 memory blocks and approx-
imately 60 thousand trainable weights. The learning rate parameter is set
to 0.01. Each network is allowed to train on 3 million randomly selected
scene-sentence pairs from its training set.
Each training trial consists of a random scene comprising two, three,
or four distinct objects, with uniform probability. The grammar (Figure 4.3)
then generates a random sentence that describes some aspect of the scene.
Over half a million distinct scenes are possible, each giving rise to, on average,
36 possible grammatical sentences, for a total of approximately 18 million
distinct scene-sentence pairs. Since inputs, especially simple ones, are often
repeated, the network sees a very small fraction of the input space during
training, though the network, like most neural models, still appears to require
far more linguistic input than human learners, at least in terms of number of
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repetitions. For each pair of test inputs, the network must produce the correct
intention stream, consisting of a temporal sequence of 2 to 7 predicates.
Before training, each network was evaluated on the set of test sentences
for its condition. In each case, the pre-training networks activated the cor-
rect output units at levels appropriate for chance performance. No network,
during any pre-training run, produced even a single correct output predicate,
let alone a correct sequence of predicates corresponding to a sentence. This




Figure 4.7 compares the accuracy of fully trained networks across the
four conditions. The ten networks in the weak condition produced all inten-
tion stream predicates correctly for, on average, 95% of novel scene-sentence
pairs, while those in the categorical, descriptive, and strong conditions were
93%, 93%, and 97% accurate, respectively. The networks clearly pass all of
these systematicity tests on the grounding task.
Comparing the conditions reveals a significant difference in performance
only between the descriptive condition and the strong condition on a Welch
























































Weak Categorical Descriptive Strong
Figure 4.7: The percentage of completely correct intention streams recovered
from random samples of 100 test-set sentences, averaged over 10 trials in each
of the conditions. The small dots represent the performance of individual
networks in a condition, and the large dots represent overall condition means.
The error bars denote the 95% confidence intervals on the condition means.
an (intentional) asymmetry in the descriptive condition’s training set. The
network, observing 27 different visual objects but only 26 complete auditory
object descriptions, is slightly impaired by this structural asymmetry. By
contrast, in the strong condition, the scenes and sentences maintain their
structural symmetry, with 26 visual objects corresponding to 26 complete
auditory descriptions.
The network had far more trouble with the grounding part of the task—
that is, selecting the referents for the various object descriptions—than it had
with parsing the linguistic descriptions themselves. These two subtasks can
be scored separately by observing how often the network produces the cor-
rect predicate sequence and attribute values—indicating that it processed the
linguistic description correctly—and how often it identifies the unique iden-
tifier of the correct referent for that description. When scoring on accurate
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recognition of linguistic descriptions and ignoring referents, trained networks
produced, on average, less than one error per 1,000 novel sentences.
While trained networks produced the correct referent for 98% of noun
phrases—with their accuracy varying inversely with the number of objects in
the scene and the number of referents in the sentence, as one might expect—it
also took them much longer to reach this accuracy level, as can be seen in Fig-
ure 4.8. A typical network required only the first quarter of its training time
to achieve near-perfect accuracy when recognizing linguistic descriptions, at
which point it was identifying referents correctly only 80% of the time, a
figure that slowly improved for the duration of training. That referents are
so much more difficult to identify than object attributes and relations only
underscores the difficulty of the language grounding task.
4.3.2 Analysis
The results in the previous section demonstrate that a trained network
is capable of using grounded language systematically. To provide insight into
how this occurs, this section presents an analysis of the learned internal rep-
resentations of the network that enable this behavior. The analysis reveals
that the network’s linguistic representations capture important syntactic and
semantic features of the sentences; that the learned representations capture
latent micro-world regularities; and that the network’s grounded representa-
tions over the integration layer appear to be compositional with respect to the
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Figure 4.8: Depiction of performance versus training time for a randomly
selected network on both linguistic descriptions and referent identifications.
The network learns linguistic descriptions quickly, reaching maximal accu-
racy after a small fraction of the allowed training time. Achieving maximal
accuracy on referent identification requires much more training.
components of the desired output predicates, suggesting that the network’s
learned representations instantiate a combinatorial symbol system.
The data analyzed in this section come from a single, randomly selected
trained network from the weak systematicity condition. The choice of a
network from the weak condition ensures the absence of systematic biases in
the training set that the network experienced. That said, the representations
learned by networks in the other conditions were not fundamentally different
than the results presented.
The first avenue of investigation involves the information present in
learned representations distributed over the network’s second auditory ac-
cumulation layer. During processing of the auditory streams of each of 100
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test sentences, the testing program takes snapshots of this layer’s activation
values at the end of each heard word. Averaging over all occurrences of a
given word provides a canonical representation for that word. These repre-
sentations are then hierarchically clustered to capture their similarities and
differences, resulting in Figure 4.9. The top cluster corresponds to the ad-
jectives present in the training grammar, and the nouns cluster individually
below, with the singular and plural versions of the same noun clustering to-
gether. The meta-cluster of adjectives breaks down neatly into two clusters
based on the function of the adjectives as color or size descriptors, though
this may be due to a syntactic difference present in the grammar: Size de-
scriptors always precede color descriptors when the two are present together,
as is common in English. Given the amount of structure in these clusters, it
is fair to say that the representations in the second auditory accumulation
layer capture a basic form of syntactic category information regarding heard
words.
Using the same methodology, one can examine the representations of
heard words in the next layer downstream, the integration layer. Looking
specifically at the words involved in number agreement—the singular and
plural nouns and the corresponding verbs is and are—Figure 4.10 reveals that
this layer’s representations differ significantly from those of the previous layer.
The representations here differ based in part on their number agreement class,
with the singular nouns and is forming a single cluster, whereas the plural
verb are is much more closely related to the plural nouns. One might initially
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Figure 4.9: A hierarchical clustering of heard word representations from the
network’s second auditory accumulation layer. The hierarchy shows a tight
cluster of adjectives (top), subdivided by type, while the nouns (bottom)
cluster by word-form, with singular and plural representations forming indi-
vidual clusters.
guess that this clustering is simply based on the similar phonemes that end
the plural nouns, with all words ending in [s] or [z] forming one cluster to the
exclusion of the other words. By this logic, one would expect is to cluster
with the former group. However, the opposite is observed, suggesting instead
that the representational divide reflects number agreement information.
Drilling down further into the data involves moving away from averages
over all occurrences of a predicate type to averages over all occurrences of a
specific combination of a predicate and its arguments. So instead of averaging
over all Shape predicates, say, one needs to compute a separate average
over all the occurrences of (Shape block 1), (Shape cylinder 2), and so
on. A hierarchical clustering of these averages reveals the pattern shown in
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Figure 4.10: A hierarchical clustering of representations of heard words from
the network’s integration layer. The clustering shows a tight cluster (top) of
singular nouns which also includes the singular verb is, which are is much
more closely related to the plural nouns (bottom).
Figure 4.11. One can immediately identify four major clusters corresponding
to the four unique object identifiers, suggesting that the representations in
this layer systematically separate predicates based on which objects they
involve. This hierarchical clustering pattern is also observed for the Color
and Size predicates. This provides a glimpse of how the network performs
grounding: It systematically varies its internal representations of predicates
based on which micro-world objects those predicates involve.
Interestingly, each of the four main clusters in Figure 4.11 has a sim-
ilar internal structure, with the cylinder and block attributes being con-
sistently more similar to each other than to the pyramid attribute. This
internal structure is due to subtle constraints that the micro-world places
on the various shapes: Blocks and cylinders are allowed to support other
objects, whereas pyramids are not, due, of course, to their pointed tops. No
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Figure 4.11: A hierarchical clustering of representations from the network’s
integration layer that co-occur with output predicates. Canonical predi-
cate representations were obtained by averaging over all occurrences of a
specific predicate/argument combination. For readability, this hierarchy in-
volves only Shape predicates. The representations break down systematically
based on the object involved and then by the specific shape involved.
information about the differing functions of the various shapes is ever pre-
sented explicitly to the network. The only indication of a difference between
shapes is the absence of pyramid objects in certain argument positions of on
and under predicates specifying a Location. Nevertheless, the cluster sub-
structure in Figure 4.11 serves as evidence that the network encoded this
latent difference in the operational regularities of the micro-world.
To further interpret the integration layer’s internal representations, it
would be nice to be able to graph them directly. Unfortunately, these rep-
resentations exist in an 80-dimensional space–one dimension per unit in the
layer—rendering them difficult to visualize. An illuminating way to reduce
this complexity is via principal component analysis (PCA; Jolliffe, 2002),
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which creates a new 80-dimensional space by taking linear combinations of
the original 80 dimensions in such a way as to account for as much of the
variance as possible with each new dimension. Thus, most of the interesting
variations in the data will appear in the first few dimensions, or principal
components (PCs), of the transformed space. This has the side effect of cen-
tralizing redundant parts of the representation into single PCs, allowing a
glimpse beyond the distributedness of the representations and making them
more amenable to analysis and visualization. This allows the depiction of
representations from the integration layer in several 2-dimensional spaces
defined by pairs of the first few PCs. That said, the meaning underlying
some of the PCs is still likely to be difficult to interpret, so this section only
contains graphs for those PCs where the underlying pattern is clear. These
graphs offer insights into the symbolic nature of the model’s learned internal
representations.
Snapshots of integration-layer representations that precede predicate
outputs in the intention stream provide the data for Figure 4.12, which graphs
the average integration-layer representations for predicates involving each
separate object identifier. These average representations, denoted by large
numbers representing each identifier, are very clearly separated when viewed
in the space defined by PC1 and PC4, indicating that the network has no
trouble determining which identifier belongs in a given predicate. This figure
also breaks averages down further, showing sub-averages over each predicate




























Figure 4.12: A PCA-space view of the integration layer’s representational
clusters (highlighted in gray polygons) for each of the four possible object
identifiers (the large numbers). The sub-structure labels of each cluster show
representational averages over predicate type for each identifier. There is
systematic variation of each predicate type from the cluster center: Shape
predicates above, Color predicates below and to the left, and Size predicates
to the right and slightly above. This systematic variation is evidence of
combinatorial symbolic representations.
predicate name with the appropriate identifier. One notes immediately the
similarity in the sub-structural organization of these clusters: The Shape
predicates always appear above the cluster center, while the Color and Size
predicates appear, respectively, below and to the right.
A complementary pattern emerges in Figure 4.13, which visualizes av-
erages over all instances of Color, Size, and Shape predicates, which are
well-separated when viewing PCs 2 and 6. The sub-structure of these clus-


























Figure 4.13: A PCA-space depiction of the integration layer’s representa-
tional clusters (highlighted in gray polygons) of the predicate types Color,
Size, and Shape. The sub-structure of these clusters shows averages over
predicates containing specific object identifiers. Again, the systematic varia-
tion is evident, where predicates involving identifier 1 are below the cluster
average; 2 are to the left; 3 are above; and 4 are to the right. This is further
evidence of combinatorial representations of predicates and object identifiers.
a specific object identifier. Again, one can locate a given identifier in each
cluster in a systematic way: The average of identifier 1 is below the cluster
average; 2 is to the left; 3 is above; and 4 is to the right.
These are important observations. They demonstrate that the net-
work’s learned representations for object identifier and predicate type are
essentially independent. For example, if the network is attempting to cre-
ate a representation of a Color predicate, it does not need to know which
object identifier is involved in the predicate; instead, it can simply decrease
the value of the representation along PC4 (as can be seen in Figure 4.12),
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as this transformation is guaranteed to produce a Color predicate no matter
what the identifier is. Similarly, to produce a representation involving object
identifier 2, one need only translate the representation in the negative direc-
tion along PC2 (as in Figure 4.13), regardless of which predicate is involved.
Of course, translating the network’s representation along a PC entails small
changes to the activations of many or all of the involved neural units, such
that it would not be obvious to an observer that such a distributed change
was all part of a single symbolic operation.
This representational independence means that the distributed repre-
sentations are compositional—though one would be hard-pressed to spot it
without aids such as PCA. In this context, compositionality means that,
given representations for a block and a pyramid, one can create represen-
tations for blue block and blue pyramid by applying the same blue-ifying
transformation to each; additionally, one can apply the reverse transforma-
tion to a blue cylinder to yield a regular cylinder. Compositionality fol-
lows from the existence of independent structure in the representations and
allows representations to be manipulated based on their structure. Com-
positionality is, of course, the key property of classical symbols that allows
them to be manipulated combinatorially, giving rise to systematicity. The
fact that the network demonstrates representational independence, and thus
compositional distributed representations, explains its ability to perform sys-
tematically: It appears to have implemented, through learning, a latent com-
binatorial symbol system on top of its purely connectionist substrate.
160
4.4 Discussion
The evidence from the previous section suggests that the representa-
tions learned by the grounded-meaning model comprise an implementation
of a latent combinatorial symbol system in a neural architecture that is not
hard-wired or otherwise predisposed to the task. This type of representation
naturally combines the advantages of cognitive and connectionist representa-
tions in several ways. It is compositional, thus easily giving rise to systematic
behavior. It is fully distributed, lending the benefits of graceful degradation
due to damage that neural networks exhibit. Perhaps most importantly, it
emerges through learning as a consequence of systematicity in the environ-
ment.
This last point in particular requires elaboration. The assertion that
the symbolic structure emerges, and is not included in the system, may at
first seem to be subject to the same arguments advanced against Hadley and
Hayward’s claims about their model (1997). Their model’s representation
was such that the different roles and fillers were a priori delimited, and the
output criterion was that the best match from each class was chosen. This
resulted in a system that could only produce valid propositions as output.
In this sense, the output representation already included the relevant symbol
system. The grounded-meaning model’s output representation is fundamen-
tally different. While well-formed intention stream outputs, like Hadley and
Hayward’s, are propositional in nature, the grounded-meaning model’s train-
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ing regimen does not constrain the combinatorial possibilities, allowing the
system to generate output sequences that do not form valid propositional
representations at all. The system must learn which symbols interact combi-
natorially, which are mutually exclusive, and so on. Thus no symbol system
can be said to be built in before training.
Additionally, both the Hadley and Hayward (1997) and Frank et al.
(2009) models, and indeed a large number of past connectionist models in-
volving language, built all the necessary words into the network as funda-
mental units. The approach used here differs by using unsegmented phoneme
sequences to represent entire utterances, leaving the model to learn a proper
segmentation that provides the best mapping to the regularities of the micro-
world. The model’s phoneme-based input representation also leaves open the
possibility of the model learning novel words without an experimenter mod-
ifying the network architecture.
Like the Frank et al. (2009) model, the LSTM network powering the
grounded-meaning model is trained by the method of gradient descent, which
utilizes back-propagated error signals throughout the neural network. Since
there exists little neurobiological evidence for back-propagated error signals,
one might argue that both models are unrealistic in this respect. However,
there is evidence that the overall architecture of these models is not as far
removed from biological plausibility as one might expect. Specifically, Xie
and Seung (2003) have recently discovered that gradient descent by back-
propagation is essentially a computationally expeditious implementation of
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contrastive Hebbian learning. Hebbian learning methods are widely consid-
ered to be neurobiologically plausible and have been widely used in connec-
tionist modeling, including the models of Hadley and Hayward (1997) and
Hadley and Cardei (1999). Contrastive Hebbian learning, specifically, is the
main ingredient in the training regimen of more biologically oriented models
such as Leabra (O’Reilly, 2001). The model’s use of an LSTM network in
particular confers a few more benefits in terms of biological feasibility. Since
real neurons are stateful—that is, their current state is always dependent
upon their previous states in addition to their current inputs—they bear a
closer resemblance to LSTM’s stateful memory cells than to the stateless
neural units traditionally used in many connectionist models. Additionally,
the multiplicative functions of gate units in LSTM have close neurobiological
correlates, and similar mechanisms have been used in models of the prefrontal
cortex and basal ganglia (O’Reilly and Frank, 2006).
The grounded-meaning model differs significantly from the Frank et al.
(2009) model, particularly in that its output representations are directly
interpretable predicates, whereas their model’s situation vectors required ad-
ditional processing to ascertain the belief state of their model. Despite this
difference, the output representations in the Frank et al. model were, like
those in the grounded-meaning model, designed to convey the systematic-
ity present in the micro-world. Because of this, it seems likely that the
Frank et al. model, and indeed any other connectionist model that manages
anything resembling strong systematicity without hard-wired support for a
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combinatorial symbol system, may in fact be learning a latent symbol sys-
tem representation similar to the one demonstrated by the grounded-meaning
model. While Frank et al. may at first appear to directly deny that their
network possesses combinatorial representations, they in fact only argue this
for the situation vector representations of their model’s output layer. In
light of the evidence presented here, on the other hand, one might guess that
their model’s learned representations over the hidden layer may come to be
compositional, and thus symbolic in the sense of Fodor and Pylyshyn (1988).
This prediction may be construed as a reinforcement of one of Fodor and
Pylyshyn’s most important points—namely, that connectionist networks, to
be truly systematic, must implement a symbol system (1988). While it is un-
clear whether Fodor and Pylyshyn meant to include emergent latent symbol
systems as a potential means of satisfying this requirement, their comment,
viewed in this inclusive way, seems to be essentially accurate. That said,
one can still disagree with Fodor and Pylyshyn on their corollary assertion
that connectionist networks, as implementors of classical cognitive theories,
have nothing new to provide to cognitive science. Smolensky (1988) argued
convincingly that any approach must account for both the soft, statistical na-
ture of some aspects of cognition as well as the seemingly hard, rule-driven
nature of other parts. He suggested that the best way to do this was to
start with the soft connectionist formalism and use that to build the hard
symbolic framework. The model presented here works towards this goal,
but in doing so, does not need to give up the inherent softness of its con-
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nectionist roots. Symbolic cognitive theories often entirely ignore the issues
of how their symbolic representations are formed through learning, or how
they break down under load or because of deterioration from age or injury.
Connectionist approaches, many of which emphasize both learnability and
deterioration, are poised to address these questions, and in doing so, provide
valuable developmental insights to cognitive researchers.
While some (e.g., Smolensky, 1990; Plate, 1995) have already argued
convincingly that a marriage between symbols and distributed representa-
tions is both mathematically possible and neurocognitively necessary, this
work suggests a learnable route through which such a system may be realized.
This frees cognitive researchers to pursue both symbolic and connectionist
approaches to cognition, with each theory constraining the other. Thus,
symbolic approaches will continue to provide an extremely useful level of de-
scription of cognitive phenomena, and connectionist approaches will provide
a means of realizing the former through simple, general learning processes
over distributed neural networks. Barring a fundamental shift in science’s
understanding of how the brain processes information, this unified view is a
necessary step in relating the mind’s structure to the brain’s function.
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Chapter 5
Question Answering and Language Production
5.1 Introduction
The grounded-meaning model from the previous chapter shows how a
neural network can learn to ground linguistic knowledge in other senses—an
essential ability underlying true understanding of any language. However, a
complete language model has more goals to fulfill, such as formulating re-
sponses to heard language and then producing those responses. This chapter
introduces two incremental descendants of the grounded-meaning model that
possess each of these abilities, gained by training in the domain of question
answering.
Most linguistic utterances can be roughly classified as requests for infor-
mation or sources of information, although some are both or neither of these.
In human discourse, it is often the case that speech acts of these two classes
alternate, with one party requesting information and the other responding,
followed by one of the parties expressing another request, and so on. There
is a considerable literature on how one could construct a program capable of
participating in the request/response paradigm. One of the most recent and
well-known examples of such a question-answering system is IBM’s Watson
166
(Ferrucci et al., 2010), which can often best experienced players in the quiz
show Jeopardy!. While Watson and systems like it are undoubtedly impres-
sive, their errors are often baffling and inscrutable to onlookers, suggesting
that the strategies they employ differ greatly from those humans use.
While question-answering systems have been well-studied in natural
language processing domains, little research has been done on how the ques-
tion/answer style of interaction might influence the ways in which humans
acquire language. In human language modeling, much interest has been paid
to the study of language comprehension (the transformation of an auditory
signal into a meaning) and of language production (the inverse problem of
transforming a meaning into an auditory signal), but there is little human
language modeling research that focuses specifically on learning to produce
appropriate responses to questions. This is an interesting subject in light of
the fact that, when listening to language, learners are constantly confronted
with these request/response, question/answer pairs. Particularly interesting
is the question of how the language faculties of a learner in this situation
could be implemented solely by a complex neural network like the human
brain.
This chapter investigates the extent to which a pure neural network
model of a human learner can develop a grasp of a micro-language by listen-
ing to simple question/answer pairs (Monner and Reggia, in press b). The
model is situated in a simulated micro-world along with two other speakers,
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referred to as Watson and Sherlock. Watson asks simple questions about the
shared environment in a subset of English, and Sherlock responds to these
questions with the information Watson seeks. The model’s task is to learn to
emulate Sherlock. To do this effectively, the model must listen to the speech
sounds of Watson’s questions and learn to segment them into morphemes,
words, and phrases, and then interpret these components with respect to the
common surroundings, thereby grounding them in visual experience. The
model must then recognize what information Watson is asking for and pro-
vide that information in a form that aligns with an answer that Sherlock
would give.
This chapter examines two related models that differ in how the an-
swers are provided. The first model learns to provide the answer to a question
from Watson as a raw meaning—a series of predicates describing properties
of, and relations between, objects in the micro-world. This style of response
naturally resembles that of the grounded-meaning model in Chapter 4, since
grounded understanding of the question is a clear requirement of finding the
answer. As such, it is called the meaning-answer model. The answers
this model provides are meant to be analogous to the learner’s internal rep-
resentations of meaning, though the representational form the model uses is
determined a priori instead of learned. Teaching a model to answer this way
is useful because it demonstrates explicitly that such a model can ground
its answers by referring to concrete objects in the micro-world, rather than
simply rearranging the question and guessing a plausible answer. However,
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for this to be a reasonable model of human language learning, it would need
to learn entirely based on data that are readily available to any language
learner. Thus, the model would need to have direct access to Sherlock’s in-
ternal meaning representations, which is, of course, not generally possible in
human language learning situations (though there is some evidence that the
listener may often be able to infer meanings from context; see Tomasello,
2003). However, examining this limited model can still be useful, as its
predicate-based outputs provide direct evidence that neural models can learn
to produce a fully grounded representation of an answer to a question.
A second model addresses this limitation of the meaning-answer model
by providing its answers much like the input questions—as sequences of
speech sounds. This second model is termed the spoken-answer model.
The representation of an answer in this case is unambiguously observable
whenever Sherlock responds to Watson, placing the spoken-answer model a
step closer to the reality of human language learning. The problem of learn-
ing to answer questions is more difficult in this case, since the network is
trained using only the observable linguistic stimuli produced by Sherlock,
which are not only more verbose than Sherlock’s intended meanings but also
potentially lossy translations thereof. Nonetheless, analysis of this model
provides evidence that this approach to training offers a tractable path to
both language comprehension and production.
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5.2 Background
Previous efforts at neurocognitive modeling involving question answer-
ing have focused primarily on story understanding. Diederich and Long
(1991) presented a hybrid connectionist model that provides plausible an-
swers to open-class questions (“how,” “why,” “when,” and so on) about a
particular story. The model was a connectionist adaptation of a symbolic
question-answering system called QUEST (Graesser and Franklin, 1990) and
came equipped with pre-made spreading-activation modules containing both
general world knowledge and knowledge about the story in question. Whereas
this model used a vast database of general knowledge to answer open-class
questions, the models in this chapter are concerned with learning to answer
simpler, closed-class questions from first principles—that is, without building
any knowledge into the system.
Miikkulainen (1993, 1998) presented DISCERN, a cognitively inspired
connectionist model of story understanding that, unlike the Diederich and
Long (1991) model, learned by conventional incremental training methods,
such as Hebbian learning and gradient descent. Comprised of several dis-
tinct neural modules, DISCERN learned to process textual stories as famil-
iar scripts, assigning the roles in these scripts to the relevant elements in
the current story. In addition to story-paraphrasing capabilities, DISCERN
included a question-answering subsystem that would receive a simple tex-
tual question word by word and process it into a case-role representation,
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generally with one unbound role representing the information the questioner
sought. The model matched this representation against known stories in
episodic memory to fill the vacant role and generate a textual answer to
the question. This system differs from the models presented here in several
ways. While DISCERN operated on text resolved down to the word level,
the models in this chapter are concerned with speech resolved down to the
phoneme level, and as such, with learning to distinguish words as well as
interpret sentences. Where the makers of DISCERN built much functional
modularity into the network, the models presented here develop such mod-
ularity via training, as their design provides no a priori functions to the
layers. Finally, where DISCERN answers questions based on memory of a
particular story, the models in this chapter are concerned with answering
questions grounded in the immediate context provided by a visual micro-
world. The related GLIDES model (Williams and Miikkulainen, 2006) dealt
with language grounding in a similar way but was concerned with free-form
descriptions of the world, rather than answering specific questions about it.
Besides direct questions and answers, one can consider other types of
request/response paradigms for training a neural network in language com-
prehension and production. Markert et al. (2009) trained a hybrid model,
composed of nonconnectionist sensory analysis systems in addition to neu-
ral networks, to recognize simple spoken commands and use them to direct
a robot in a motor task. The robot was able to recognize visual objects,
associate them with words gleaned from the speech signal, and interpret
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commands to perform actions such as moving an object. This model is a
convincing demonstration of the applicability of neural modeling methods to
the task of integrating disparate input sources and learning to respond to a
verbal request. It was not, however, designed as a model of a human learner,
as evidenced by its non-neural preprocessing modules and built-in knowledge
of motor plans and sentence structures.
While not fitting neatly into the question-answering paradigm, the
model of sentence comprehension by St. John and McClelland (1990) serves
as inspiration for this work. This model used simple recurrent networks
(Jordan, 1986; Elman, 1990) to process a temporal sequence of words into
a spatial “sentence gestalt” representation that was refined by training the
network to complete role/filler pairs describing the sentence. Other mod-
els (e.g., Rohde, 2002) have since used this technique to great effect. The
models presented in this chapter develop similar gestalt representations of
both the visual scene and the auditory sentence before combining them into
a grounded whole that can be used to produce answers.
The spoken-answer model in particular takes inspiration from a number
of other language production models. Dell (1993) advanced a simple recur-
rent network model for sequentially producing the speech sounds of words
as collections of phonological features. The models presented here reuse this
notion of representing phonemes as bundles of features and extend Dell’s
model by producing speech sequences from learned internal semantic repre-
sentations of sentences instead of hand-designed lexical representations.
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Plaut and Kello (1999) presented a connectionist model of word com-
prehension and production that learned to associate 400 words with random
unique “semantic” representations. An interesting contribution of this model
was the inclusion of a forward model from articulatory features—representing
the vocal tract movements necessary to produce speech sounds—to acoustic
features. This kind of forward model enables a learner to receive feedback on
appropriate productions by listening to speech—its own or that of others—
and propagating mismatched acoustic expectations backward to modify ar-
ticulatory representations. Rather than re-implement their forward model,
the models in this chapter presume, for computational expediency, that such
a model exists and that it can translate the available acoustic feedback into
articulatory feedback.
Another connectionist model of comprehension and production ad-
vanced by Chang et al. (2006) learned to produce word sequences from a
prespecified message. The main mechanism behind this learning was listen-
ing and imitation—listening to the utterances of others and actively predict-
ing upcoming words, using previous words and inferred partial meanings as
clues. The models presented here take this same approach of learning by lis-
tening and imitation, while improving the potential scalability of the model
by not relying on singleton word representations (which effectively place hard
limits on the learnable vocabulary) and, in the spoken-answer model, com-
pletely foregoing hand-coded representations of structured meaning (which
173
place similar limits on the set of learnable concepts) in favor of implicit,
learned meaning representations.
5.3 Methods
Both the meaning-answer model and the spoken-answer model have
the same general structure, shown in Figure 5.1. Both models receive visual
input from the environment via a sequence of temporally presented predicates
describing objects and relations between them. The models also hear each
question from Watson as auditory input consisting of a temporal sequence of
phonemes. The outputs of both models mimic Sherlock’s answers, but they
do so at different levels: The meaning-answer model produces an answer
to Watson’s question as a sequence of grounded predicates, much like the
grounded-meaning model in Chapter 4, whereas the spoken-answer model
gives each answer as a sequence of speech sounds. Both models are pure
neural networks, though the structure of these networks differs slightly to
accommodate the differences between their tasks.
The remainder of this section explores in detail the tasks performed by
the models and the representations for their input and output signals before
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Figure 5.1: A high-level overview of the flow of information in the models.
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5.3.1 Tasks
As mentioned in Section 5.1, the models are faced with the task of
learning to comprehend and produce language in the context of answering
questions. The overview of the task is simple: One of the models is placed
in a shared micro-world environment with two other speakers, Watson and
Sherlock. A training trial begins with Watson asking a question, the answer
to which is directly observable in the environment. Sherlock surveys his
surroundings and gives the answer, which the model observes and attempts
to mimic. A testing trial, in contrast, is one in which Watson asks a similar
question, but Sherlock is silent, relying on the model to produce the desired
answer.
During a trial, the model first takes stock of the micro-world environ-
ment, receiving a stream of visual input and compressing it into a sort of
visual gestalt representation for later reference. It then listens for Watson’s
question as a temporal sequence of speech sounds, processing these into an
auditory gestalt of sorts. After hearing the totality of the question, the model
attempts to combine the visual and auditory gestalts, internally mapping the
references in the sentence to objects in the environment and subsequently fig-
uring out what it is that Watson wants to know.
If the model in question is the meaning-answer model, it then provides
the answer in the form of a sequence of grounded predicates that could serve
as the meaning for a complete-sentence answer to Watson’s question. The
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meaning-answer model must learn this behavior by imitating Sherlock, who
always knows the answers to Watson’s questions. In real human language
learning, Sherlock’s raw meaning would not necessarily be available for the
model to imitate. The motivation for the meaning-answer model is to trans-
parently demonstrate that a neural network model is capable of learning to
produce this type of precise answer by grounding its auditory input in the
visual scene.
In contrast to the meaning-answer model, the spoken-answer model
answers questions by generating sequences of speech sounds that together
form a complete sentence. The model again learns to produce these sounds
by imitating Sherlock, and since these sounds are observable, this addresses
the concern with the meaning-answer model and positions the spoken-answer
model much closer to the reality of a human language learner. Because the
model’s internal meaning representations are learned, they are also much
harder to interpret than the meaning-answer model’s hand-designed predi-
cates, and as such, it is more difficult to demonstrate robust grounding in
the spoken-answer model than in the meaning-answer model. However, the
spoken-answer model makes a different point: Mimicking ungrounded speech,
which is generally a lossy translation of the internal meaning of the speaker,
is sufficient to learn question-answering behavior.
The following subsections examine in detail the ways in which the au-
ditory inputs, visual inputs, and both predicate- and speech-based model
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outputs are constructed, and also describe the vocabularies and grammars
to which Watson and Sherlock restrict themselves.
5.3.2 Environment input
The micro-world environment shared by the three participants consists
of a number of objects placed in relation to each other; an example envi-
ronment configuration is depicted in Figure 5.2. Each object has values for
the three attributes (Size, Shape, and Color), and each attribute has three
possible values: small, medium, and large for Size; block, cylinder, and
pyramid for Shape; and red, green, and blue for Color. Thus, 27 distinct
objects are possible. In addition, each object has a number that identifies it
uniquely in the environment, which is a useful handle for a specific object and
is necessary in the event that the participants need to distinguish between
two otherwise identical objects.
Each object is represented as three predicates, each of which binds an
attribute value to an object identifier. For example, a small red block with
unique identifier 2 is completely described by the predicates (Size small
2), (Color red 2), and (Shape block 2), which are presented to the mod-
els in a temporal sequence. An environment consists of two to four randomly
generated objects, and the predicates describing all of these objects are pre-
sented at the visual input layer of the model as a temporal sequence at the
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Figure 5.2: An example of a micro-world environment with four objects,
along with the complete set of predicates that describe the environment.
The predicates are the environment input to the model; the visual depiction
of the objects here is simply for reference.
Input units are generally inactive, except for single active units correspond-
ing to the type of attribute (e.g., Color), the value of that attribute (e.g.,
blue), and the unique identifier (e.g., 3). See Figure 5.3 for a depiction of
example predicates and their representations in terms of neural activity.
Additional predicates are used to describe spatial relations between the
objects. One object may be near, on, or underneath another. For example,
if the small red block (with identifier 2) is on top of a medium-sized green
cylinder (identifier 3), that fact would be presented to the model as the pred-
icate (Location on 2 3). In the micro-world, the on and under relations
are complementary (meaning that (Location on 2 3) implies (Location
under 3 2)), and the near relation is symmetric (such that (Location near
1 3) implies (Location near 3 1)). The location predicates are presented



































































Figure 5.3: Neural representations of two example predicates used as visual
input and meaning output. The left-most group of 4 cells in each case de-
notes the predicate type, of which only one cell will be active in a well-formed
predicate. Cells in the middle group of 12 each stand for an attribute value;
again, in well-formed predicates, only one of these is active at a time, and
the attribute value will correspond to the correct predicate type. The right-
most cells correspond to unique identifiers for environmental objects; in most
cases, only an identifier from the first column is active, binding the active
predicate-attribute pair to that identifier, as in the first example above rep-
resenting (Color blue 3). Location predicates, such as the second example
(Location on 2 4), activate two identifier nodes to establish a relationship
between them.
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Though this space of possible environments may seem small at first,
the number of unique environmental configurations is quite large. Using
only two, three, or four objects at a time provides approximately 2.48× 1010
distinct possible micro-world configurations.1
The visual representation just described is a drastic simplification of
real visual input that the models adopt for reasons of computational tractabil-
ity. At the cost of moving away from sensory-level visual input, the models
gain enough computational efficiency to study the language acquisition phe-
nomenon of primary interest. This type of high-level visual representation
can be viewed as the equivalent of a representation that might be produced
by the later stages of the human visual system, though probably not in this
precise form.
This environment representation differs from that used in Chapter 4,
breaking each object up into single-attribute predicates. This ends up requir-
ing more work from the model, which must now learn to bind together many
attributes—based on the object identifier—to create a unified representation
of each object, taking care not to confuse objects with similar attributes.
Since each object is no longer presented to the network as a single coherent
pattern, this representation is in some sense lower level than that utilized







2) where n is the number of objects in an
environment and there are 27 featurally distinct objects. The first term denotes the number
of distinct combinations of objects possible. The second term denotes the independent
presence or absence of near predicates for all combinations of two objects, counted as
unordered because near is symmetric. The third term captures the three possibilities for
on and under predicates for each combination of two objects—neither of these predicates
exists, or both exist with two possible object orderings.
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in Chapter 4, bringing the model one step—albeit a small one—closer to
sensory-level (i.e., retinotopic) visual input. The other major deviation from
the Chapter 4 visual representation is the inclusion of additional predicates
describing the spatial relations between the objects in the environment. This
addition allows answers to be conditioned on the locations of objects, so the
models can now distinguish, for example, two otherwise identical small red
blocks by the fact that one of them rests on top of a cylinder and the other
does not.
5.3.3 Question input
Watson produces complete English sentences that ask questions about
the current shared environment. There are many possible questions for each
environment; for the example environment in Figure 5.2, Watson might ask:
what color block is the green pyramid on?, what thing is under the small
block?, what color are the medium things?, or where is the pyramid?.
At the start of each trial, Watson examines the environment and then
begins deriving a question beginning at the Question nonterminal in the
mildly context-sensitive grammar of Figure 5.4. The derivation is constrained
not only by the grammar itself, but also by the environment. Specifically,
any objects that Watson refers to must be present in the environment and,
to a sophisticated observer, unambiguously identified by the full context of
the question. For example, Watson could not ask what color is the block?
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because it is not clear which block is being referred to, and thus any answer
would be poorly defined. Watson can, however, ask questions about groups
of objects that share a property, such as what color are the medium things? ;
in this case, the medium things are the cylinder and pyramid, which are
both green, so the answer is well defined. Questions posed to the models are
required to have well-defined answers to maintain the simplicity of evaluation
and training; after all, if the answer is ambiguous, how can one tell whether
the model produced the correct answer or not? An important future research
task will be to relax this requirement and see if one can train a model such
that, when it is given an ambiguous question, it produces either an answer
that is plausible, or an answer indicating its uncertainty.
The words in Watson’s question are phonetically transcribed, and the
resulting phoneme sequences are appended to produce one uninterrupted
temporal sequence corresponding to the spoken sentence. Word and mor-
pheme boundaries are not marked, leaving the model to discover those on
its own, just as with real-world speech signals. When the speech sequence
for a question is presented as input to the model, individual phonemes are
given one at a time. Phonemes are represented using the same bundles of
binary acoustic features used in Chapter 4. These features include such cues
as voicing, affrication, and formant frequency categories. A full listing of
phonemes and their features can be found in Table 4.1.
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Question → where Is Object |What Is Property
Answer → Object Is Property
Object → the [Size] [Color] Shape
What → what color [Size] Shape |
what size [Color] Shape |
what [Size] [Color] thing
Property1 → Location |Color | Size
Location2 → on Object | under Object | near Object
Is3 → is | are
Size → small |medium | large
Color → red | blue | green
Shape → things | pyramid[s] | block[s] | cylinder[s]
Figure 5.4: The mildly context-sensitive grammar used to train the meaning-
answer model on the question-answering task. Terminals begin with a lower-
case letter, while nonterminals are in boldface and begin with an uppercase
letter. The symbol | separates alternative derivations, and terms in brack-
ets are optional. Watson begins derivations from the Question nonterminal
to generate a question that can be given as input to the model, and Sher-
lock begins from the Answer nonterminal to generate an answer to such a
question.
1When the parent nonterminal is Question, the evaluation chosen for Property is
constrained so as not to reveal the missing property from the preceding What expansion.
For example, questions such as what color pyramid is red? are disallowed.
2Pyramid objects are disallowed as subjects of under and objects of on because, in
the micro-world, pyramids cannot support other objects due to their pointed tops.
3The evaluation chosen for Is must agree in number with the Object expansion that
serves as its subject.
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5.3.4 Answer output
After Watson has finished asking a question, the model attempts a
response. On training trials, Sherlock then gives the correct response, and
the model adjusts its connection weights to better imitate this response in
the future. Training is supervised in the sense that complete training targets
are always provided, but it is a type of self-supervision where the model need
only observe the naturally occurring dialog between Watson and Sherlock
and attempt—perhaps covertly—to imitate the latter.
To answer Watson’s question, the model must examine the environment
and determine the set of object attributes and relations Watson is referring
to. If the question was what color block is the green pyramid on?, in the
context of the environment of Figure 5.2, the model must first determine that
(Color green 4) and (Shape pyramid 4) are of interest, and then find that
the on-relation only makes sense with object number 1, as (Location on 4
1). (Shape block 1) shows that object number 1 fits with the clue that
Watson has a block in mind. Finally, the model must deduce that Watson
asked about the color, and so must retrieve the predicate (Color blue 1)
from its working memory representation of the environment.
When training the meaning-answer model, Sherlock gives precisely
these five predicates as its answer, and the meaning-answer model must learn
to do the same. On the other hand, when training the spoken-answer model,
Sherlock gives the answer as a speech sequence. Specifically, Sherlock derives
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a complete English sentence, starting from the Answer nonterminal in the
grammar of Figure 5.4. Sherlock constrains the derivation to conform to the
contents of the predicate-based answer. For the question what color block is
the green pyramid on? and the environment shown in Figure 5.2, Sherlock
will invariably answer the green pyramid is on the blue block. The answer
sentence is phonetically transcribed, just as Watson’s questions are, to form
an unsegmented temporal sequence of phonemes. The spoken-answer model
uses Sherlock’s speech stream as a temporal sequence of training targets to
be produced in response to the question input.
Previous models (e.g., Plaut and Kello, 1999) have proposed that a
learner run its internal representation of the answer’s meaning forward to
create a series of articulations for the sounds of the sentence. By feeding
these representations through a forward model mapping articulatory features
to auditory features, the learner could generate predictions about the speech
stream. This would enable the learner to compare Sherlock’s speech stream
with its own predictions, working backward to turn auditory prediction er-
rors into a training signal for articulatory features, and thus learning how
to produce the desired speech. The spoken-answer model, for computational
expediency, assumes that this process has already taken place, training di-
rectly on phonemes as bundles of binary articulatory features. The complete
list of binary articulatory features and associated phonemes can be found in
Table 5.1.
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Table 5.1: Binary Articulatory Features of Spoken Phonemes
Phoneme





















In both the predicate-output and speech-output scenarios, the answers
to the questions differ, based on the micro-world environment, such that
the mapping from questions to answers is never one-to-one. Indeed, both
predicate-based and speech-based answers to Watson’s question what color
block is the green pyramid on? would change if the block under the green
pyramid were red instead of blue; the predicate-based answer would also
change (albeit slightly) if the scene were visually identical but the object
numbering was altered. Though this example suggests that the number
of possible answer variations is small, some questions admit much greater
environment-based variation than others. Questions that are more open-
ended, such as where is the block? could have literally hundreds of possible
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answers stemming from the diversity of environments where the question
makes sense. Thus, neither the model nor Sherlock could answer questions
reliably without integrating information from the visual environment.
5.3.5 Neural architectures
To learn the tasks described in the previous section, the neural net-
works that comprise both the meaning-answer model and the spoken-answer
model need to accurately recognize and produce sequences that are as long
as 20 predicates or 40 phonemes. They are built using the long short-term
memory (LSTM; Hochreiter and Schmidhuber, 1997; Gers and Cummins,
2000; Gers and Schmidhuber, 2001) architecture, which has been previously
shown to perform very well on long temporal sequences, and trained using the
generalized long short-term memory (LSTM-g) training algorithm described
in Chapter 2.
Although the basic components of the two models are the same, the
network architectures differ slightly, based on the demands of each task. The
network architecture of the meaning-answer model is shown in Figure 5.5.
The network has an input layer for visual predicates (bottom right), which
are presented temporally and accumulated into the visual gestalt in a visual
accumulation layer. Internal layers such as this one are composed of the self-
recurrent LSTM memory blocks described in Chapter 2 and are identified




Auditory Accumulation II (60) Visual Accumulation (60)
Auditory Accumulation I (60)
Visual Predicates (24)
Meaning Predicates (24)
Figure 5.5: The neural network architecture of the meaning-answer model,
which is closely related to that of the grounded-meaning model (see Figure 4.6
for comparison and explanation).
input layer for auditory features, which feed through two successive layers of
memory cells, forming an auditory gestalt on the second such layer. The two
pathways differ in serial length because pilot experiments showed that the
visual and auditory gestalt representations are best formed with one and two
layers of intermediary processing, respectively. After both input gestalts have
formed, they are integrated by another layer of memory cells, which is then
used to sequentially generate predicates that specify the grounded output
that answers the input question. The network’s previous output is fed back
to the integration layer in the style of a simple recurrent network (SRN;
Jordan, 1986) to provide a more specific context for sequential processing.
The network that implements the spoken-answer model, detailed in
Figure 5.6, differs from that of the meaning-answer model in only a few key
respects. The main change is that the meaning-answer model’s output layer,
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which used to specify predicates, now consists of articulatory features used
to create output speech sequences. The other change is the addition of an-
other layer of memory cells between the integration layer and the output.
Pilot experiments showed that network architectures lacking this additional
layer had more trouble converting the intended speech stream into articu-
latory features. A key feature of the spoken-answer model architecture is
that, unlike the meaning-answer model, it does not prespecify any semantic
representations. This forces the network to learn its own internal meaning
representations, which have the benefit of being distributed while supporting
the strongly systematic generalization that language use requires (Fodor and
Pylyshyn, 1988; Hadley, 1994).
5.4 Results
5.4.1 The meaning-answer model
Ten independent instances of the meaning-answer model, each with
randomly chosen initial connection weights, train on the question-answering
task for 5 million randomly generated trials. This duration of training may
seem long, but it represents a mere fraction of a percent of the input space,
leaving the model to generalize across the rest. An arrow between a pair
of layers in Figure 5.5 indicates that a given pair of units from these layers
possesses a trainable weighted connection with a probability of 0.7. The
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Figure 5.6: The neural network architecture of the spoken-answer model,
depicted in the style described in Figure 4.6. This architecture has an addi-
tional production layer that helps the network learn to generate the output
phonemes from the internal meaning representations of the integration layer.
The number of units in the visual predicate input layer decreased from 24 to
19 to accommodate the slightly simplified grammar that the spoken-answer
model learns (see Figure 5.11).
191
thousand trainable connection weights in total. The networks use a learning
rate of 0.01.
Reported accuracy results are based only on trials that the model had
never encountered before evaluation time, and as such, always reflect gen-
eralization and never memorization. For each such trial, the model must
produce a sequence of predicates, where a predicate is counted as correct
only if it occurs in the correct sequential position and has all unit activa-
tions on the correct side of 0.5. On average, the trained meaning-answer
models were able to produce a perfect sequence of grounded predicates to
answer a novel input question 92.5% of the time, strongly suggesting that
this style of observe-and-imitate training is sufficient even for the difficult
task of grounded question comprehension and answering.
To evaluate the relative difficulty of the components of the task, one
can decompose the output predicates into three categories: attribute val-
ues corresponding to linguistic descriptions that are present in the question,
referent identifications made by grounding the question in the environment,
and attributes that are inferred from the environment to answer the ques-
tion. Comparing the time-course of accuracy over these three categories,
Figure 5.7 shows that the model learns to understand spoken descriptions
fairly quickly, with accuracy leveling off above 95% after the first million tri-
als. At this point, accuracy on referent identifications and question-answers
is relatively weak, at 80% and 70%, respectively; however, accuracy on these
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Figure 5.7: Accuracy versus training time for three separate components of
the question-answering task, averaged over all ten training runs.
areas continues to slowly improve as training progresses, providing evidence
that grounding the language in the environment is much more difficult than
recognizing a sequence of words and the basic outline of the meaning it
entails. It also shows that using the environment to infer the answers to
questions is harder still.
To begin to gain an understanding of how the model acquires this sys-
tematic ability to answer novel questions in novel environments, one must
examine the internal representations that the model learns during training.
These are obtained from snapshots of one trained model’s integration layer
taken immediately after it finishes hearing Watson’s question. For certain
very simple questions, such as what color is the block?, there are enough in-
stances in the test data such that each possible answer—in this case, red,
green, or blue—is represented multiple times. Looking for systematic dif-
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ferences between related sets of questions—and between multiple instances
of the same question where the different micro-world environments would
suggest differing answers—reveals what the model knows at the instant im-
mediately after it hears the complete question.
The representations of three related questions are examined first. Each
question asks about the color of a different type of object—a block, a pyramid,
or a cylinder—and can have any of the three possible colors as its answer, de-
pending on the environment. Applying principal component analysis (PCA)
to the representations aids in analysis by removing some of the redundancy
and distributedness that is characteristic of learned representations in neural
networks. While variation along the principal components (PCs) need not,
by design, correspond to interpretable changes in the internal representa-
tion, this is in fact the case for many PCs. This indicates that the models
are learning representations that can vary systematically in many dimen-
sions. The following figures only involve those PCs for which the variation
is easily interpretable. Though lower PC numbers represent larger amounts
of variation in general, the PC number is essentially immaterial here, since
the goal is merely to point out systematic variation in some PC.
Figure 5.8 graphs the representations in PCA-space, grouping them by
question type, and subdividing those groups based on the expected answer.
Here, each shaded polygon corresponds to a group of questions that are
identical, though they may have different answers. For example, a polygon
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might represent the question what color is the pyramid?. Valid answers to this
question involve a color attribute: red, green, or blue. Each vertex of such
a polygon is labeled with the answer Watson is looking for and represents
an average over all such questions that have this answer. So, to complete
the example, the vertex labeled blue (the top-left-most vertex in Figure 5.8)
represents the average representation over all instances where Watson asked
what color is the pyramid? and had a blue pyramid in mind.
In this figure and those that follow, the representations for some of the
shaded groups may seem to overlap, which one might expect to cause the
model to mistake one group for another. These representations, however,
are always well-separated by other principal components that are not shown,
leaving the model with no such ambiguity.
The results show a remarkably systematic pattern. First, the model’s
internal representations differ consistently, based on the expected answer to
the question, which was not present in the auditory input and has not yet
been produced by the network as output predicates. This systematic differ-
ence implies that the model is aware of the expected answer to the question as
soon as it is asked. While the model possessing the answer is not surprising,
since all the information needed to deduce it is present in the visual input,
the clarity of the answer’s presence in the internal representation just after
the question input suggests that the model processed the question online,













what color is the block?
what color is the cylinder?
what color is the pyramid?










Figure 5.8: Learned internal representations generated by the model for a set
of what color? questions, visualized in PCA-space and separated according
to the expected answer to the question. Shaded polygons correspond to sets
of questions that are identical but might nonetheless have different answers.
Each possible answering attribute corresponds to a labeled vertex of the
polygon.
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the micro-world environment. Additional systematicity is apparent in the
respective orientations of the answer-groups for each question. Regardless
of which question was asked, a blue answer is always a positive shift along
PC7 and a red answer is always a negative shift, with green answers falling
in the middle and along a positive shift in PC6. This type of organization
recalls the representations discovered in the model from Chapter 4, where
they served as evidence of compositional, symbol-like representations for the
various color concepts.
This analysis was repeated for a collection of similar what size? ques-
tions, with very similar results as shown in Figure 5.9. Again, the model
displays clear representational differences that reveal its knowledge of the
question’s answer and further show it represening this information using sys-
tematic variations that are largely independent of the question being asked.
One might next inquire about the extent to which the model’s internal
representations reflect the environmental referents present in the question
and answer. This can be gauged by analyzing the same set of what color?
and what size? questions, again partitioning the trials into groups by ques-
tion, but this time subdividing these groups based on the unique identifier
that the micro-world assigned to the referent. These identifiers are never
represented in auditory input. Thus, the network’s reliable knowledge about
identifying number is direct evidence that the model’s internal sentence rep-










what size is the block?
what size is the cylinder?
what size is the pyramid?










Figure 5.9: Learned internal representations generated by the model for a set
of what size? questions, visualized in PCA-space and separated according to
the expected answer to the question, in the style of Figure 5.8.
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a remarkably systematic representation that makes clear several distinctions
at once. First, the two question types what color? and what size? are sep-
arated along PC1. Second, the shape of the object in each question has an
observable effect on its representation regardless of question type, with pyra-
mid questions producing markedly smaller shaded regions in this projection
than the other questions, while the cylinder and block questions produce
regions of similar size, with the former shifted down along PC4 across both
question types. Finally and most importantly, each question’s representation
reveals clear knowledge of the numerical identifier of the question’s referent,
with questions about objects 1 and 4 being distinguished along PC4, while
questions about objects 2 and 3 differ along PC1. This figure definitively
shows the systematic independence of the model’s knowledge about the type
of answer being sought (size or color), the shape of the object in question
(block, pyramid, or cylinder), and the identifying number of the referent.
5.4.2 The spoken-answer model
Because of the additional size and complexity of the spoken-answer
model, it trains on a slightly smaller grammar for computational expedi-
ency. This grammar is a subset of the one in Figure 5.4, arrived at by
disallowing cylindrical objects and removing the size attribute altogether.
For reference, the resulting grammar is shown in Figure 5.11. Pilot experi-












what color is the block?
what color is the cylinder?
what color is the pyramid?
what size is the block?
what size is the cylinder?
what size is the pyramid?





















Figure 5.10: Learned internal representations generated by the model for a
set of what color? and what size? questions, visualized in PCA-space and
separated according to the object number of the sentence’s referent, in the
style of Figure 5.8.
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Question → where Is Object |What Is Property
Answer → Object Is Property
Object → the [Color] Shape
What → what color Shape |
what [Color] thing
Property1 → Location |Color
Location2 → on Object | under Object | near Object
Is3 → is | are
Color → red | blue | green
Shape → things | pyramid[s] | block[s]
Figure 5.11: The slightly simpler grammar on which the spoken-answer model
is trained. For comparison, and for the text of the footnotes, see the original
grammar in Figure 5.4.
grammar, and scales from smaller grammars at approximately the same rate
as the meaning-answer model. However, computational resource constraints
impeded replicated experiments with the model at that size.
Ten individual instances of the spoken-answer model train for up to
5 million randomly generated trials to learn the question-answering task,
using the grammar from Figure 5.11. The networks are connected as shown
in Figure 5.6, with each pair of units in connecting layers having a probability
of 0.7 of sharing a weighted connection. This probability, combined with the
420 total memory cells across all internal layers, results in networks with
approximately 120 thousand connection weights. The learning rate is 0.002.
Trained models are assessed on their ability to produce a perfect se-
quence of phonemes comprising a full-sentence answer to an input question
on a novel trial. Each phoneme in a sequence is considered correct if each
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feature unit has an activation on the correct side of 0.5. On average, the
spoken-answer models are able to accomplish this for 96.9% of never-before-
seen trials. For example, in a micro-world containing a blue block on top
of a red block, as well as a red pyramid nearby, Watson asked the model
what red thing is the blue block on?, to which the model responded with
[D@blUblAkIzAnD@ôEdblAk], which translates as the blue block is on the red block.
This response was correct in the sense that the phoneme sequence the model
chose represents the desired answer to the question; additionally, the model
produced these phonemes in the correct sequence, and each had exactly the
right articulatory features.
The occasional errors made by the networks fall into roughly three cat-
egories. The first and most common is a slight mispronunciation of an other-
wise correct answer. For example, the model was asked what color pyramid
is on the red block?, and it produced the answer [D@bl?pIô@m@dIzAnD@ôEdblAk],
where the “?” indicates that the network produced a pattern of articula-
tory features that does not precisely correspond to one of the language’s
phonemes. However, it is clear from context that the model meant to say the
blue pyramid is on the red block, which is the correct answer to the question
in the environment provided during that trial. Despite the fact that the net-
work clearly knew the correct answer and came extremely close to producing
it, the reported statistics count every trial like this as an error.
The other type of error occurs in cases where the model seems unsure
of the expected answer to the question. Sometimes, this takes the form
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of a direct and confident substitution of an incorrect answer, as was the
case when the model was asked what color is the block? and confidently
answered the block is green when the block was in fact blue. Other times,
the model muddles two possible answers when speaking. For example, when
asked what color block is the blue pyramid under?, the model responded with
[D@blUpIô@m@dIz@ndÄD@gl?blAk], which glosses roughly as the blue pyramid is
under the glih block. The correct answer for the malformed word here would
have been blue, but the model was apparently confused by a preponderance of
green objects present in the micro-world on that trial, producing this hybrid
of the two words in its answer. In other instances, the model trails off or
“mumbles” when it does not know which word to say in its answer. A trial
where the model was asked where is the blue pyramid? provides an example
of this behavior. The pyramid in question was on top of a green block,
which required the model to produce three salient pieces of information that
were not present in the question (i.e., on, green, and block) as part of its
answer. The model came back with [D@blUpIô@m@dIzAnD@gôinb??], roughly the
blue pyramid is on the green buhhh.... Though the model produced the first
two components of the expected answer, it was apparently unsure enough
about block that it trailed off into unrecognizable phonemes and, in fact,
stopped producing phonemes short of where the utterance would normally
end.
Looking at the spoken-answer model’s learned distributed represen-
tations reveals the same sorts of patterns that were present in those of
203
the meaning-answer model. Figures 5.12–5.14 examine the spoken-answer
model’s internal representations by analyzing snapshots of the integration
layer activations immediately after a question is presented. PCA strips some
of the redundancy out of the representations, identifying the main compo-
nents for productive visualization, two at a time. This time, the investigation
focuses on a more involved set of where? questions, which each require the
network to produce three pieces of information that were not present in the
question. In response to the example question where is the red block?, the
model would need to respond by placing the red block in relation to a refer-
ence object, as in the red block is under the blue pyramid. Figures 5.12–5.14
test the internal representations for the presence of information about the
location (under), color (blue), and shape (pyramid) of the reference object
immediately after the model hears the question and before it begins its re-
sponse.
Figure 5.12 shows a view of internal representations from PCs 2 and
3, depicting not only a clear separation of three variations of the where?
question, but also systematic manipulations of PC3 to distinguish the on
and near relationals, while PC2 separates these from under.
Figure 5.13 shows the color of the reference objects in PCs 4 and 8.
While other PCs not depicted here demarcate representations of the different
question types, this figure shows PC4 separating red from green and PC8










where is the blue block?
where is the green block?
where is the red block?









Figure 5.12: Learned internal representations generated by the spoken-
answer model for a set of where? questions, visualized in PCA-space and
separated according to the relational word that positions the reference ob-
ject in relation to the question’s subject. Shaded polygons correspond to sets
of questions that are identical but might nonetheless have different answers.
Each possible word representing a valid answer corresponds to a labeled ver-





















where is the blue block?
where is the green block?
where is the red block?
−0.2 −0.1 0.0 0.1
Figure 5.13: Learned internal representations generated by the model for a
set of where? questions, visualized in PCA-space and separated according to
the color of the reference object used to locate the question’s subject, in the
















where is the blue block?
where is the green block?
where is the red block?
−0.8 −0.6 −0.4 −0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4
Figure 5.14: Learned internal representations generated by the model for a
set of where? questions, visualized in PCA-space and separated according to
the shape of the reference object used to locate the question’s subject, in the
style of Figure 5.12.
Finally, Figure 5.14 breaks out the question representations in PCs
1 and 3, showing that the identity of the reference object as a block or a
pyramid is primarily represented along the first principal component.
In total, Figures 5.12–5.14 present convincing evidence that the spoken-
answer model learns internal representations much like those of the meaning-
answer model. These representations quantize the input space and vary
systematically along a number of principal dimensions to represent complex
knowledge.
This section on the spoken-answer model, unlike the previous section
on the meaning-answer model, does not contain a figure depicting informa-
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tion about the remaining property of the reference objects—the identifying
number assigned to each. This is because an analysis of the representations
showed no underlying systematicity to the representations when broken down
by object number. However, this is not surprising. Being more speech-like,
the responses that the spoken-answer model produces differ from those of the
meaning-answer model in that they do not involve explicit specification of
object numbers. Object numbers only exist in the visual input to the spoken-
answer model, and to perform the question-answering task, the model must
use them to bind attributes together to form coherent objects—that is, bind-
ing (Color blue 2) with (Shape pyramid 2) and (Location near 2 3)
to produce the conception of a blue pyramid that is near some other object.
Once this binding is complete for the entire environment, the model has no
reason to retain the object number that was used to perform the binding; the
number has served its function and is henceforth superfluous since it is not
needed as part of the response. Therefore, one should not expect the high-
level representations at the integration layer to involve object number at all,
and indeed, the variation due to object number is small and unsystematic
compared to the meaning-answer model.
5.5 Discussion
The results from the previous section suggest that for both the meaning-
answer model and the spoken-answer model, observation and imitation are
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realistic methods by which a question-answering behavior can be learned.
The meaning-answer model learned to answer questions by directly mimick-
ing the intended meaning of another speaker, Sherlock. While such imitation
may occasionally be possible in situations where the learner can readily infer
the speaker’s meaning, such situations might not be frequent enough to fa-
cilitate full language learning. In any event, such a model could only hope to
explain how the answers are derived, but not how they are communicated.
Besides serving as a simplified proof-of-concept and a stepping stone from the
grounded-meaning model to the spoken-answer model, the meaning-answer
model provides clear evidence that a purely neural network model is capa-
ble of integrating two separate sensory streams to produce a coherent whole.
The meaning-answer model is the only known neural network model able to
successfully learn to map sentence-level questions, represented at sub-lexical
resolution, onto complex, composable symbolic meanings representing their
answers.
The spoken-answer model improves on the meaning-answer model in
two ways. First, it learns to perform the question-answering task not by
mimicking Sherlock’s meaning, but by mimicking Sherlock’s speech. Even
though speech is often a lossy translation of the meaning, it has the virtue
of always being observable—a property that places this model closer to real-
world plausibility. Second, the spoken-answer model’s performance encom-
passes not only answer derivation but also response generation, giving it an
extra level of explanatory power over the meaning-answer model. This final
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model is the only known neural network able to map sub-lexical representa-
tions of natural language questions to natural language answers, devising its
own semantic representations along the way.
As was the case with the grounded-meaning model in Chapter 4, both
of the models presented here appear to devise internal representations that
are approximately compositional, imbuing them with the generative power
of symbolic approaches to cognition. At the same time, these learned rep-
resentations are distributed, conferring beneficial properties like redundancy
and graceful degradation.
These models suggest that simple observation and imitation might be
sufficient tools for learning to solve question-answering tasks. As discussed
at the outset of this chapter, question answering—or more generally, the re-
quest/response mode of communication—is fundamental to language. Since
the principles in question are so elementary, computational models that ob-





The work presented in this thesis makes a variety of original contribu-
tions to multiple fields, including computer science, second-language acquisi-
tion, and cognitive neuroscience. It also has a number of limitations as well
as possibilities for future work.
6.1 Contributions
The first major contribution is the generalized long short-term mem-
ory (LSTM-g), a variant of the original training algorithm for networks of
the long short-term memory architecture. The original LSTM training algo-
rithm has the desirable and biologically realistic trait that it depends only
on information that is spatially and temporally local to the memory cell be-
ing trained; it also has a serious limitation in that it is applicable only to
shallow networks with no more than a single hidden layer in series. Deeper
recurrent networks are trainable by other means, but all previously known
algorithms make use of information that is nonlocal in either time or space,
seriously impairing their biological plausibility while simultaneously harming
their efficiency. The new LSTM-g algorithm from Chapter 2 begins with the
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basic template of gradient descent on the error function and, by reorganiz-
ing the formalism and truncating error signals in a novel fashion, produces
a general training algorithm for second-order networks with arbitrarily deep
architectures while utilizing only local information. Combined with other
recent results demonstrating the biological plausibility of gradient descent
(if not specifically error back-propagating implementations thereof; Xie and
Seung, 2003), LSTM-g provides an approach to neural network training that
is simultaneously powerful, efficient, and biologically inspired.
The neural models of the acquisition of grammatical gender presented
in Chapter 3 address the suitability of LSTM-g to model human learning
artifacts, which has bearing on its potential to create more human-like nat-
ural language processing models. These models, in addition to their role
of validating the use of LSTM-g in human language models in general, are
major contributions of this research in their own right because they bear on
the long-standing debate over critical period effects observed in the second-
language acquisition literature. The models use diverse real-world input to
examine how a language learner with no preconceived notions about gram-
matical gender—or even knowledge of its existence—can develop a functional
knowledge of gender assignment and agreement by merely predicting the in-
puts it will see next. The models show that grammatical gender is highly
learnable under these conditions by approaching human-level performance
on gender-related tasks in two languages. Examinations of bilingual mod-
els show that final attainment is absolutely affected by entrenchment—that
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is, the longer the learner is exposed to the native language before a second
language is introduced, the lower the learner’s peak performance on tasks
in the second language. This major effect is mediated in part by memory
development, which lends support to the “less is more” hypothesis because
model comparisons show that starting with a small working memory capac-
ity and augmenting it during language learning contributes to better overall
performance. Since these two contributors to critical period effects are usu-
ally irreparably confounded in human learners, the ability of the models to
vary them independently is key to their importance as contributions to the
second-language acquisition literature.
The greatest contributions of this dissertation, however, come from
the neurocomputational models of grounded language comprehension, ques-
tion answering, and language production introduced in Chapters 4 and 5.
Of these, the spoken-answer model from Chapter 5 is the most advanced
and serves as the culmination of the language modeling work in this dis-
sertation. This model learns using fine-grained auditory input at the level
of individual phonemes, segmenting the auditory stream into morphemes,
words, and phrases grounded in its visual knowledge of its surroundings.
The grounded-meaning model and the meaning-answer model learn to com-
prehend language and answer questions, respectively, by mapping them to
an output representation consisting of sets of predicates that describe the in-
tended meaning. In contrast, the spoken-answer model learns to understand
speech by devising its own distributed representations of meaning. From
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these learned meaning representations, the spoken-answer model learns to
speak, generating sequences of articulatory movements that specify speech
streams forming complete-sentence answers to questions. The model does
all this using the language-agnostic media of acoustics and articulation for
its inputs and outputs, allowing it to, in theory, repeat the experiments pre-
sented here using virtually any spoken language, without modification. This
feature of the model is fundamental because the human language-learning
substrate is clearly just as general, allowing children to learn any language
to which they are exposed.
All told, the spoken-answer model captures many important facets of
the language learning process, including segmentation of unbroken phoneme
streams, grounding of words and phrases in meanings derived from other
senses, word selection and ordering for production, and the inferences re-
quired to answer questions. Though previous models have addressed some of
these themes, no other known neural network models to date have combined
them all, especially with so much care paid to input and output realism and
biological plausibility of the underlying neural network methods. This puts
the spoken-answer model in a unique position to serve as the basis for more
human-relatable natural language processing models.
One important point that these models make clear is the compatibility
of compositional, classically symbolic representations with distributed neural
representations. Compositionality is key in achieving both efficient encod-
ing of, and computation over, large multi-dimensional data. The assertions
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of cognitive scientists that mental representations must be compositional to
explain human behavior (Fodor and Pylyshyn, 1988) need not be in conflict
with assertions by connectionists that the brain’s representations must be
distributed. While it is difficult to intuit, such compatibility has been shown
possible in theory (Smolensky, 1990; Plate, 1995), though little attention has
been paid to how a learner might gradually modify its distributed represen-
tations to achieve compositionality. Chapters 4 and 5 present evidence that
the models learn such compositional representations using gradient descent,
constituting perhaps the strongest evidence to date that such learning is
possible. However, this work does not shed light on how or why the models
developed compositionality, leaving that question as a promising topic for
future research.
6.2 Limitations and future work
Though the gender models of Chapter 3 serve both as an excellent jus-
tification for the human-like learning properties of LSTM-g and as a useful
contribution to discussions about critical period effects, they have a number
of limitations. The largest of these is that the models learn solely about the
acoustic properties of words. This may be sufficient to study phonological,
morphological, and possibly even syntactic properties of grammatical gen-
der learning, but it completely ignores semantic aspects that are known to
play a role in the assignment of gender to words. A more complete model
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would take semantic knowledge into account, although doing so with any-
thing approaching realistic input would be a daunting challenge due to a lack
of large semantically labeled corpora. A second limitation of the gender mod-
els is their restriction to two languages in the work presented—specifically
two siblings in the lingustic family tree, French and Spanish, that have very
similar gender systems. Since the models can, because of the phonological
nature of their input and output representations, learn about gender systems
of varying complexity in any spoken language, it would be enlightening to
test them with further languages—in particular those having very different
gender systems. It would also be useful to examine a variety of language
pairs to discover whether similarity between the first- and second-language
gender systems is a benefit or a detriment to bilingual learning. Finally, the
models neglect a number of other documented causes of critical period ef-
fects, including social and motivational factors, which would be interesting
to study in tandem with entrenchment and development.
The final spoken-answer model of Chapter 5 has limitations as well.
For example, it could be improved to have stronger fidelity to human-like
sensory inputs and motor outputs. The current auditory input, at the level
of sequences of acoustic features, is essentially a single step removed from the
frequency-sensitive neurons of the human cochlea. The model’s visual inputs
are predicates, on the other hand, which provide a built-in understanding of
the environment that is much more abstract than a biologically motivated
retinotopic map. The abstractness of these representations certainly aids the
216
model, since the objects, attributes, and even relational predicates already
correspond to words in heard sentences, rather than having to be built up
in conjunction with the representations for the words themselves. Lowering
the abstraction level of these inputs will be an important avenue for future
extension of the spoken-answer model, once considerations of computational
resources permit. Additionally, the spoken-answer model in its current form
relies on direct error feedback at the articulatory level, which is not plausible
for human learners. Current theories posit a forward model from articulation
to audition, allowing a listener to predict the auditory signals that will arise
from articulatory outputs. The learner can then compare these predictions
with the heard signal to generate auditory prediction errors which can be
transformed into articulatory error information (e.g., Kello and Plaut, 2004).
A future version of the model could learn this forward model via a babbling
stage and propagate errors backward across it to train speech production in
a more natural manner.
A further limitation of the spoken-answer model involves the tasks that
the model learned to perform. All of the open-class words used in the lan-
guage learning tasks were concrete in the sense that they were tied directly
to environmental stimuli. An important avenue for future work will be to
include abstract notions, such as ownership, in the task.
Finally, the spoken-answer model is limited in its immediate applicabil-
ity to the human brain because no attempt has been made to map its layers
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to specific brain regions. As mentioned in Chapter 1, one of the main goals
of this modeling effort was to develop a sentence-level successor to the word-
level Wernicke-Lichtheim-Geschwind (WLG) model developed by Weems and
Reggia (2006). As such, a productive future avenue for investigation could
include an attempt to extend the spoken-answer model by relating it to the
brain regions present in the WLG model. Such work would also include a de-
tailed lesioning study of the model, which could now focus on several aphasia
metrics, such as fluency and grammaticality, that had no analogues in the
original WLG model because it was limited to single words. Such a study
could be invaluable in predicting deficits due to lesions in specific areas and
might even be able to shed light on patient-specific therapies best suited to
stimulate recovery.
In addition to its future extension as a brain model, the spoken-answer
model, or even the simpler grounded-meaning model, has potential applica-
bility in studies of psycholinguistic phenomena. Since a major focus of the
model is grounding, one could easily teach the model to perform anaphor
resolution by training it on an appropriate grammar. This would provide a
fine-grained sense of the sorts of input necessary to produce a model that
matches human behavior on the task. Listener interpretation of quantifier
scope would provide another fertile test bed, as the model’s interpretations of
quantifiers can be observed via the grounded predicates it produces. Such a
model could be studied during development to see if it makes the same inter-
pretive missteps that children make when learning any particular language.
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Many psycholinguistic tasks that explore listener interpretations would be
ripe for investigation with this type of model.
This dissertation showcases important insights gained by starting from
a low level in the hierarchy of the study of the brain and mind. From collec-
tions of simple interacting neurons, a wealth of data has emerged concerning
the genesis and composition of cognitive representations, as well as the ori-
gin of behaviors as complex as the inference necessary to answer a question.
This data can lead not only to more accurate models of cognition but also
to more sophisticated natural language processing systems that more closely
emulate a mind. The human brain is the most complex natural machine
known. To fully understand the wonders that spring from it, we must study
its organization at every level, from molecule to mind.
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effects of late acquisition of L2 and the consequences of immigration on L1
for semantic and morphosyntactic language aspects. Cognition 93, B97–
B108.
Schmid, H. (1994). Probabilistic part-of-speech tagging using decision trees.
In Proceedings of the International Conference on New Methods in Lan-
guage Processing, pp. 44–49.
Schmidhuber, J., D. Wierstra, M. Gagliolo, and F. Gomez (2007). Training
recurrent networks by Evolino. Neural Computation 19 (3), 757–779.
Schulz, R. and J. A. Reggia (2004). Temporally asymmetric learning sup-
ports sequence processing in multi-winner self-organizing maps. Neural
Computation 16 (3), 535–661.
Schulz, R. and J. A. Reggia (2005). Mirror symmetric topographic maps
can arise from activity-dependent synaptic changes. Neural Computa-
tion 17 (5), 1059–1083.
Searle, J. R. (1980). Minds, brains, and programs. Behavioral and Brain
Sciences 3 (03), 417–457.
Shin, Y. and J. Ghosh (1991). The pi-sigma network: An efficient higher-
order neural network for pattern classification and function approximation.
In Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Neural Networks,
pp. 13–18.
Singh, K. (1976). Distinctive features: Theory and validation. New York:
University Park Press.
227
Smolensky, P. (1988). The constituent structure of connectionist mental
states: A reply to Fodor and Pylyshyn. Southern Journal of Philoso-
phy 26 (S1), 137–161.
Smolensky, P. (1990). Tensor product variable binding and the representation
of symbolic structures in connectionist systems. Artificial Intelligence 46,
159–216.
Sokolik, M. E. and M. E. Smith (1992). Assignment of gender to French
nouns in primary and secondary language: A connectionist model. Second
Language Research 8, 39–58.
St. John, M. F. and J. L. McClelland (1990). Learning and applying contex-
tual constraints in sentence comprehension. Artificial Intelligence 46 (1-2),
217–257.
Surridge, M. E. (1989). Le facteur sémantique dans l’attribution du genre
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